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Abstract
This thesis applies micro–econometric techniques to examine the effect of social struc-
ture on knowledge. Chapter 2 investigates the role of mass migration in the passage of
compulsory schooling laws. It provides qualitative and quantitative evidence that com-
pulsory schooling laws were used as a nation–building tool to homogenise the civic
values held by the culturally diverse migrants who moved to America during the “Age
of Mass Migration”. Our central finding is that the adoption of compulsory schooling
by American-born median voters occurs significantly earlier in time in states that host
many migrants who had lower exposure to civic values in their home countries and had
lower demand for common schooling when in the US. Chapter 3 explores whether, and
to what extent, the position in the coauthorship network of medical scientists matters
for the productivity of a researcher. I use sudden and unexpected deaths of star scien-
tists as exogenous shocks to the network thus providing a causal identification of the
loss of a star on the productivity of a scientist. I characterise the heterogeneity in the
impact of the death by exploiting the position of the deceased scientists. Following
the death of a star, coauthors suffer on average a 8% decrease in annual publications
and this effect can differ by up to 31% depending on the network position. Chapter 4
examines knowledge spillovers by measuring the relative intensity of patent citations
in two technological fields for which clean and dirty inventions can be clearly distin-
guished: energy production (renewables vs. fossil fuel energy generation) and automo-
biles (electric cars vs. internal combustion engines). We develop a new methodology
based on Google’s PageRank algorithm to measure the social benefit of knowledge
spillover. We find that clean technologies generate 40% higher spillovers than their
dirty counterparts.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
The aim of this thesis is to shed new light on the social structures generating knowl-
edge. Examining the factors at the foundation of knowledge is difficult in part due
to the difficulty of defining what is meant by knowledge and in part due to the fact
that it seems impossible to obtain some forms of knowledge without interacting with
others. In this thesis, knowledge takes a broad meaning and is examined in different
forms: as an institution (i.e. compulsory schooling law) in chapter 2 and in the form
of publications and patents in chapters 3 and 4 respectively. Each chapter focuses on
different features of the social structure at the foundation of knowledge, ranging from
the demography of the population to the structure and position of individuals within
a community, and examines how these social arrangements can enhance or impede
knowledge generation or transmission.
Educational systems provides an institutional infrastructure to provide knowledge
and can be shaped by the composition of the population. Chapter 2 aims to explain
the role of mass migration in the creation of compulsory schooling laws in the United
States. By the mid-19th century, America was the best educated nation on Earth: sig-
nificant financial investments in education were being undertaken and the majority of
children voluntarily attended public schools. So why did American states start intro-
ducing compulsory schooling laws at this point in time? We provide qualitative and
quantitative evidence that compulsory schooling laws were used as a nation-building
tool to homogenize the civic values held by the tens of millions of culturally diverse
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migrants who moved to America during the “Age of Mass Migration” between 1850
and 1914. Using state level data, we show the adoption of compulsory schooling
laws occurred significantly earlier in states that hosted a subgroup of European mi-
grants with lower exposure to civic values in their home countries. We present IV
estimates based on a Bartik-Card instrument to address concerns over endogenous
location choices of migrants. We then use cross-county data to show that these same
subgroup European migrant had significantly lower demand for American common
schooling pre-compulsion, and so would have been less exposed to the kinds of civic
value instilled by the American education system had compulsory schooling not been
passed. By providing micro-foundations for schooling laws, our study highlights the
link between mass migration and institutional change, where changes are driven by
the policy choices of native median-voters in the receiving country rather than migrant
settlers themselves.
In the process of creating new ideas, scientists build on knowledge previously found.
In fact, scientists are embedded in a network of scientists within which knowledge is
shared. It is widely understood that many important bits of information flow through
social relations and that certain positions provide better access to such information-
flows. Each cluster within the network tends to contain different pools of information,
which in turn implies that a scientist’s access to information will be increasing in the
number of cluster he or she can reach. The fact that certain network positions are more
advantageous than others has important implications for the creation of knowledge
and consequently, the productivity of a researcher. Chapter 3 empirically explores
whether, and to what extent, the position in the coauthorship network matters for the
productivity of a researcher. For this purpose, we exploit a comprehensive dataset
covering all major medical publications since 1965. As coauthorships are the result
of a purposeful matching likely to reflect the quality of a researcher, we consider the
sudden and unexpected death of a coauthor as an exogenous shock to the coauthorship
network. This framework identifies a causal impact of the loss of a coauthor on the pro-
ductivity of surviving coauthors. The identification of sudden death in obituary records
21
creates a bias towards “star” scientists who have been to be mentioned in an obituary.
We therefore create a pool of stars through propensity score matching. Through a
difference–in–difference, we quantify the change annual publications of a researcher
following the sudden and unexpected death of a star–coauthor relative to a matched
researcher whose associated star–coauthor is still alive. We then characterise the het-
erogeneity in these effects by network position. Based on the idea that scientists each
embody unique knowledge and that knowledge flows within the network, we propose a
measure, called brokerage degree, based on the number of scientists further away one
can only reached via a specific coauthor. In other words, brokerage degree measures
how much a scientist depends on a coauthor to gain access to scientists further away.
The particularly rich dataset allows to condition upon a wealth of factors that influence
the productivity of a scientist such as the access to resources or characteristics of the
local network. My results reveal heterogeneous peer effects: the death of scientists
occupying positions that enable access to non–redundant knowledge leads to a larger
decline in the productivity of their coauthors.
Knowledge spillover from innovative activities provide a case for government in-
tervention in the market because private R&D investments are likely too low. An
important example are climate change policies that typically try to support so called
clean technologies that avoid greenhouse gas pollution and hamper dirty technologies
that are associated with polluting emissions. Chapter 4 systematically compares knowl-
edge spillovers in two technological fields for which clean and dirty inventions can be
clearly distinguished: energy production (renewables vs. fossil fuel energy generation)
and automobiles (electric cars vs. internal combustion engines). We provide consistent
evidence that clean inventions generate up to 40% higher level of knowledge spillovers
than their dirty counterparts. To establish this finding, we use patent citation and de-
velop a new methodology based on Google’s Page Rank. Two explanations stand out
as drivers behind this clean advantage: clean technologies have more general appli-
cations, and they are radically new compared to more incremental dirty innovation.
Our results imply that stronger public support targeted to clean R&D is warranted.
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They also suggest that green policies might be able to boost economic growth if the
factors leading to an under-provision of knowledge goods are more severe for clean
knowledge.
Chapter 2
Nation-Building Through Compulsory
Schooling During the Age of Mass
Migration
2.1 Introduction
By the mid-19th century Americans were the best-educated in the world; financial in-
vestments into education were substantial and voluntary attendance was high [Landes
and Solomon 1972, Black and Sokoloff 2006, Goldin and Katz 2008]. Figure 2.1 illus-
trates this point with newly assembled panel data on enrolment rates for 5-14 year olds
from 1830 through to 1890 for the US and similarly developed nations. The Figure
clearly shows that US rates were always above 50%, trending upwards, and diverging
from other countries’ from 1850 onwards.
This raises the puzzle that motivates our research question: why did US states start
introducing compulsory schooling laws at a time when enrolment rates were high and
trending upwards? These laws would not have been binding for the average American
child, nor would they be binding for the marginal child and thus the driving force
behind ‘the educated American’ [Goldin and Katz 2003, 2008]. Nor were they meant
for blacks, as legislative caveats often effectively excluded them from schools even
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Figure 2.1: The Educated American
RED = Northeast, GREEN= Midwest, YELLOW =West, BLUE = South
Enrolment Rates (5-14 year olds)
Figure 1: The Educated American
Figure 2: Timeline for Passage of Compulsory Schooling, by US State and European Country
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post-compulsion [Black and Sokoloff 2006, Collins and M rgo 2006].1
The hypothesis w test is that compulsory schooling laws were used to expose the
children of migrants who moved to America during the ‘Age of Mass Migration’ from
1850 to 1914 to American common schools and so instill them with the same civic
values held by American-born children, who were voluntarily attending such schools
in large numbers.
The idea that underpins this hypothesis is that a state provided formal education
system can shape civic values. This idea is central in history studies of why European
schooling systems develop d at the time they did [Weber 1976, Ramirez and Boli 1987]
and of why compulsory schooling was introduced in America [Cubberley 1947, Meyer
et al. 1979, Engerman and Sokoloff 2005, Brockliss and Sheldon 2012]. The eco-
nomics literature identifies ‘civic values’ as the values that: (i) make individuals more
likely to take actions to improve the common welfare of their community [Alesina and
1A body of work has emphasized Americans became educated because of fiscal decentralization,
public funding, public provision, separation of church and state, and gender neutrality [Goldin and Katz
2008]. Goldin and Katz [2003] document that compulsion accounts for at most 5% of the increase in
high school enrolment over the period 1910-40, when such laws were being fully enforced.
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Reich 2015]; (ii) underpin democratic institutions [Glaeser et al. 2007]; (iii) shape the
acceptability of welfare transfers [Lott 1999]. Existing empirical evidence supports the
idea that schools affects values via the content of curricula [Clots-Figueras and Masella
2013, Cantoni et al. 2015], and that those exposed to compulsory schooling are signifi-
cantly more likely to be registered to vote, to vote, to engage in political discussion with
others, to follow political campaigns and attend political meetings, as well as having
higher rates of participation in community affairs and trust in government [Milligan et
al. 2004].
Our research design exploits variation in civic values among European migrants
from different countries, generated by differences in compulsory schooling laws in dif-
ferent countries. Since European countries introduced compulsory schooling to teach
civic values, migrants exposed to compulsory state schooling in their country of origin
were more likely to have been taught to civic values. Of course, the exact way in which
compulsory state schooling operated would likely differ between each European coun-
try. What we emphasize here is the notion that most state education systems generally
instill more values that underpin democratic institutions and trust in the state relative
to the counterfactual of a non-state provided compulsory education system: in nine-
teenth century Europe this would have amounted to either attending a private school, a
religious school, or not attending school altogether.
These ideas fix our identification strategy, namely we exploit the fact that the need
for American-borns to teach civic values to European migrants was greater in US states
where European migrants without historic exposure to compulsory state schooling in
their home country, and hence with weaker civic values, were more numerous. We thus
exploit differences in the composition of the migrant population, holding constant state
characteristics that attract all migrants regardless of the compulsory schooling laws in
their country of origin.2
2Of course, this logical chain requires two further conditions to hold. This first is that migrants trans-
port their values with them, a hypothesis that has empirical support [Guinnane et al. 2006, Fernandez
2013, Fernandez and Fogli 2009]. This implies migrants’ civic values depend on whether they have been
exposed to some form of compulsory state education in their home country. The second condition is that
parents transmit civic values, and other preferences, to their children. Again, this hypothesis also finds
empirical support [Bisin and Verdier 2000, Dohmen et al. 2012].
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Our analysis proceeds in three stages. We first present qualitative evidence to
underpin the hypothesis that American society used compulsory schooling as the key
policy tool to nation-build in response to mass migration. We show this was driven by
the view that exposure to American public schools would instill the desired civic values
among migrants, and a recognition that such values could be transmitted from children
to their parents.
Second, we assemble a new data-set on the timing of compulsory schooling laws
across European countries and we combine it with US Census data on state popula-
tion’s by country of origin to explain the timing of compulsory schooling laws across
US states. We use survival analysis to estimate whether the cross-state timing of com-
pulsory schooling laws is associated with the composition of migrants in the state. Our
central finding is that American-born median voters pass compulsory schooling laws
significantly earlier in time in US states with a larger share of migrants from European
countries without historic exposure to compulsory state schooling in their country of
origin: a one standard deviation in the share of these migrants doubles the hazard of
compulsory schooling laws being passed in a decade between census years.
We show our core result to be robust to controlling for potentially confounding
factors: literacy rates among adult migrants do not predict the cross-state passage of
compulsion, and attendance rates of migrant children in some form of school, be they
common or parochial school, only weakly impact the timing of compulsory schooling
law. We also document that our main result is not driven by other forms of within-
migrant diversity – not just differences in human capital but also in the religion, region
of origin and English language proficiency of migrants. Finally, we show the main
result holds across US regions, including in Southern and Western states.
The nation-building interpretation hinges on the comparison of the differential
impact Europeans with and without historic exposure to compulsory state schooling in
their home country have on the timing of such legislation in US states. Unobserved
state factors that make a location equally attractive to both migrant groups do not bias
this comparison. The chief econometric concern is that the process driving the location
choices of migrants differ between these groups of European migrants. To address the
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endogenous location choices of migrants, we present IV estimates using a control func-
tion approach in the non-linear survival model, based on a Bartik-Card instrumentation
strategy: these show our main result to be robust to accounting for the endogenous
location choices of migrants.
Finally, we set up a horse-race between the nation-building hypothesis and other
mechanisms driving compulsory schooling, such as redistributive motives, or due to a
complementarity between capital and skilled labor. We find some evidence for these
alternatives, but none of them mutes the nation-building channel.
The third part of our analysis provides direct evidence on migrants’ demand for
American common schooling that underpins the nation-building efforts of American-
borns. During the study period, many migrant groups faced a choice between sending
their children to parochial schools (so based on religion), or to attend an American
common school. Only if migrants’ demand for American common schools was suf-
ficiently low would compulsory schooling bind and be required to change migrants’
civic values. We develop a probabilistic voting model of schooling provision to pin
down the demand for American common schools in various migrant groups and test its
predictions using cross-county data from 1890 that contains information on the most
important investment into American common schools: teachers.
The revealed demands for American common schooling across migrant groups
match up closely with the cross-state analysis. We find that European migrants from
countries without long exposure to compulsory state schooling in their country of origin
have significantly lower demand for American common schools relative to European
migrants from countries with compulsory schooling. Furthermore, we document a sig-
nificant convergence in demand for, and pupil attendance at, common schools between
natives and both groups of European migrants when compulsory schooling laws are in-
troduced. Hence compulsory schooling did indeed lead European migrants to be more
exposed to the civic values being taught in American common schools, and this was
especially so for Europeans from countries without historic exposure to compulsory
state schooling in their country of origin. This cross-county analysis links tightly with
the state-level analysis by establishing the counterfactual of what would have been
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migrants’ exposure to the kinds of civic values instilled through American common
schools absent compulsory schooling laws.
Our finding that compulsory schooling laws were driven by the need to foster the
assimilation of migrants complements the literature that studies the individual deter-
minants of migrants’ economic and cultural assimilation during the Age of Mass Mi-
gration [Abramitzky et al. 2014, 2016]. It is well recognized that during this period a
wider set of educational policies collectively known as the Americanization Movement,
encompassing language requirements in schools and ultimately citizenship classes tar-
geted towards adult migrants and conducted by the US Bureau of Naturalization [Cub-
berley 1947, Carter 2009], were introduced primarily to assimilate migrants. While
other disciplines have recognized that there have been periods of American history
where the schooling system has been used to inculcate values among the foreign-born
[Tyack 1976], our analysis contributes to the literature by showing nation-building mo-
tives drove the passage of compulsory schooling laws from the 1850s onwards, the first
pillar of the Americanization Movement, and the legislative bedrock on which all later
developments of the American education system have been built.3
Most broadly, we contribute to the literature linking the national origins of mi-
grants and institutional change. The seminal work of Acemoglu et al. [2001] illustrates
how colonial settlers from Europe established institutions that had long lasting impacts
on economic development. Our analysis can be seen as ‘Acemoglu et al. in reverse’
as we analyze how the American-born population, from whom the median voter de-
termines state-level policies such as compulsory schooling, best responded in public
policy to large migrant flows from a set of culturally diverse countries.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents qualitative evidence on the
use of compulsory schooling as a nation-building tool during the Age of Mass Migra-
tion. Section 3 develops a conceptual framework describing how compulsory schooling
can be used to nation-build by homogenizing civic values between its native and immi-
3For example: (i) Native American children being sent to boarding schools in the early nineteenth
century; (ii) the dispatch of American teachers to Puerto Rico and the Philippines after the Spanish-
American war; (iii) attempts to democratize Germany and Japan after World War II. In more recent
times, Arlington [1991] describes how English became the required language of instruction in Southern
US states in 1980s, in response to mass migration from Latin American.
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grant members. Section 4 describes the state level data and newly assembled database
of compulsory state education laws by European country. Section 5 presents evidence
linking the composition of migrant groups and the cross-state passage of compulsory
schooling. Section 6 develops and tests a model of investment into education to esti-
mate the relative demand for American common schools across migrant groups using
county data. Section 7 concludes. The Appendix provides proofs, data sources and
robustness checks.
2.2 Qualitative Evidence
That American society used compulsory schooling as a tool to nation-build during the
Age of Mass Migration has been recognized in leading accounts of the development
of the American schooling system written by educationalists [Cubberley 1947], soci-
ologists [Meyer et al. 1979] and economic historians [Engerman and Sokoloff 2005,
Brockliss and Sheldon 2012]. We highlight those pieces of qualitative evidence that
inform our research design and presentation of quantitative evidence. We review how
long-standing concerns over immigrants’ assimilation informed political debate, and
how the education system was viewed as the key policy tool to deal with these con-
cerns. This was driven by the view that exposure to American common schools would
instill the desired civic values among migrants, and a recognition that such values could
then be transmitted from children to parents. We then provide evidence that nation-
building motives informed the architects of the common school movement, both as a
general principle and to foster the assimilation of migrants in particular. We conclude
by providing some evidence of curricula in common schools, as this relates directly to
the inculcation of civic values.
2.2.1 Migrants and Compulsory Schooling in the Political Debate
American society’s anxieties over immigrant assimilation have been well documented
for each wave of large-scale migration. These concerns became politically salient from
the 1850s onwards, most famously in 1855 when the Native American Party (also re-
ferred to as the ‘Know Nothing Party’) elected six governors and a number of Con-
gressional representatives. The party’s core philosophy was one of ‘Americanism’,
30Chapter 2. Nation-Building Through Compulsory Schooling During the Age ofMassMigration
consistently communicating the fear of the ”unAmericanness” of immigrants [Higham
1988].
Much of the political debate and concerns of American-borns over migrants’ as-
similation are crystallized in the Dillingham Report, widely regarded as the most com-
prehensive legislative study on immigration ever conducted. The Report was drafted
over 1907-11 by a Commission of senators, members of the House of Representatives
and Presidential appointees. The Commission was established in response to concerns
over the assimilation of migrants from Southern and Eastern Europe, and produced a
41-volume report, including a number of volumes solely dedicated to the role of the
education system in the assimilation process. Throughout its work, the Commission
highlighted the importance of Americanizing immigrants where the English language
and learning were central to becoming an American citizen.
Moreover, the Commission explicitly recognized the role that children played in
the wider long run process of inculcating values in the entire migrant population:4“The
most potent influence in promoting the assimilation of the family is the children, who,
through contact with American life in the schools, almost invariably act as the uncon-
scious agents in the uplift of their parents. Moreover, as the children grow older and
become wage earners, they usually enter some higher occupation than that of their
fathers, and in such cases the Americanizing influence upon their parents continues
until frequently the whole family is gradually led away from the old surroundings and
old standards into those more nearly American. This influence of the children is po-
tent among immigrants in the great cities, as well as in the smaller industrial centers.”
[p.42, Volume 29].
2.2.2 Nation Building and the American Common School Move-
ment
The key individuals driving the American common school movement were Horace
Mann (1796-1859), Henry Barnard (1811-1900) and Calvin Stowe (1806-1882). They
were united in a belief that schooling was the instrument, “by which the particularities
4This view also matches with historic evidence on the inter-generational transmission of human cap-
ital, especially language skills, from children to parents [Ferrie and Kuziemko 2015].
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of localism and religious tradition and of national origin would be integrated into a sin-
gle sustaining identity” and could foster “goals of equity, social harmony, and national
unity” [p9, p39, Glenn 2002].
Horace Mann is widely regarded as the most prominent figure of the common
school movement, becoming the first secretary of the Massachusetts Board of Edu-
cation in 1837 (the earliest adopter of compulsory schooling). He believed common
schools would, “promote moral education” and “unite the country by teaching com-
mon values” [p147, p150, Jeynes 2007]. Like many advocates for the common school
movement, he recurrently emphasized the link between education and the civic virtues
necessary for effective participation in a democracy.
Henry Barnard was the secretary of the Connecticut Board of Education, and was
very much influenced by what he had seen of the European education system. His
motives for building the public school system have been described as follows: “De-
spite the challenges that Barnard faced, he, like Mann, was tenacious in maintaining
the view that the common school cause was for the good of the country. He believed
that democracy and education went together “in the cause of truth, justice, liberty,
patriotism, religion.”” [p154, Jeynes 2007].
Finally, Calvin Stowe was a key driver of the common school movement in the
Midwest. Stowe, like Mann, believed moral education was the most important aspect
of schooling and was also heavily influenced by what he saw of European education
practices.5
It has been argued that all these central figures ultimately saw schools as the key
5When Calvin Stowe reported back to American education leaders about European practices, he em-
phasized that “public education in Europe was having a civilizing effect on that continent because it was
bringing Christianity and the teachings of democracy to the most remote parts, where despotism often
ruled” [Jeynes 2007]. Glenn [p100, 2002] writes, “The influence of foreign models, especially that of
Protestant states of the Continent, Prussia and the Netherlands, was of critical importance in shaping
the goals and the arguments of he education reformers. It was through the nation-building role of pop-
ular schooling in those countries that key ideas of the Enlightenment and the French Revolution of 1789
because central elements of what was virtually a consensus program along elites in the United States
throughout the century and a quarter beginning around 1830”, and, “that the alternative model offered
by England, where education remained essentially in the hands of private, ecclesiastical, and charita-
ble enterprise until the 20th century, did not have more appeal suggests how strongly Enlightenment
concerns for national unity and uniformity dominated the thinking of the leaders in the common school
movement.”
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tool for social control and assimilation. Certainly, advocates of common schools came
to emphasize their role as an alternative to families to foster the assimilation of im-
migrant children. As Tyack [p363, 1976] argues, “Advocates of compulsory schooling
often argued that families–or at least some families–like those of the poor or foreign-
born–were failing to carry out their traditional functions of moral and vocational train-
ing...reformers used the powers of the state to intervene in families to create alternative
institutions of socialization.” One of the most noted advocates for common schools in
Philadelphia was E.C.Wines best articulated the link between compulsory schooling,
immigration and nation-building: “We refer to that overflowing tide of immigration,
which disgorges our shores its annual tens of thousands of Europe’s most degraded
population–men without knowledge, without virtue, without patriotism, and with noth-
ing to lose in any election..Are these persons fit depositaries of political power? The
only practicable antidote to this, the only effectual safe-guard against the other, the
only sure palladium of our liberties, is so thorough an education of all our citizens,
native and foreign, as shall nullify the dangerous element in immigration.” [p742-3,
Wines 1851].
2.2.3 Compulsory Schooling and Civic Values
American educators wanted their schooling system to place relatively more emphasis
on the role of schooling in shaping the character, values and loyalties of students as fu-
ture participants in political and social life. This philosophy is what would have driven
the civic values instilled into American-born children voluntarily attending schools in
such high numbers (Figure 2.1) and would drive some of the legislative acts that in-
troduced compulsory schooling, to also make explicit references to civic values.6 In
detailing how compulsory schooling laws were implemented to provide insights on the
values to be taught, it is important to note that American school districts have always
had a high degree of autonomy. This has led to considerable heterogeneity in practices,
making it almost impossible to track curriculum changes over time by district [Goldin
1999a]. Subject to this caveat, we highlight the following.
6For example, in Connecticut the law states the curriculum must cover “US history and citizenship”,
and in Colorado it states that instruction “must cover the constitution”.
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First, the alternative source of education to common schools were parochial and
private schools. According to Lindert [2004], 12% of all pupils were enrolled in such
schools in 1880. Migrant specific shares are not available but were presumably higher
given that the language of instruction in these schools was not necessarily English (and
the figure aligns closely with the overall share of migrants in the population). In some
cases, compulsory schooling laws required children to be taught in some public school.7
In other cases, states regulated parochial and private schools by specifying standards
they had to comply with to meet compulsory state schooling requirements. For in-
stance, the standards set in Illinois and Wisconsin aroused fierce opposition because
of their provisions that private schools teach in the English language and that they be
approved by boards of public education [Tyack 1976].
Second, states differed as to whether English should be the main language of in-
struction. Some states imposed clear English language requirements early on, while in
others bilingualism was first accepted and then banned from public schools.8 Eventu-
ally the Americanization Movement led to further legislative iterations making language
and instruction requirements more explicit [Lleras-Muney and Shertzer 2015]. This
was ultimately followed by the introduction of citizenship classes targeted to foreign-
born adults from 1915-16 onwards, that were in part conducted by the US Bureau
7For example, the Massachusetts law of 1952 states that, “Every person who shall have any child
under his control between the ages of eight and fourteen years, shall send such child to some public
school within the town or city in which he resides...”
8For example, a 1919 law in Minnesota reads: “A school, to satisfy the requirements of compulsory
attendance, must be one in which all the common branches are taught in the English language, from
textbooks written in the English language and taught by teachers qualified to teach in the English lan-
guage. A foreign language may be taught when such language is an elective or a prescribed subject of
the curriculum, not to exceed one hour each day.” [Minnesota, Laws 1919, Ch. 320, amending Gen.
Stat. 1914, sec. 2979 as described in Ruppenthal 1920]. Daniels [pp.159-60, 1990] discusses the varia-
tion across states: “Beginning in 1839 a number of states, starting with Pennsylvania and Ohio, passed
laws enabling (or in some cases requiring) instruction in German in the public schools when a number
of parents, often but not always 50 percent, requested it, and these laws were copied, with inevitable
variations, in most states with large blocs of German settlers. The Ohio law authorized the setting up of
exclusively German-language schools. In Cincinnati this option was exercised so fully that there were,
in effect, two systems, one English, one German, and, in the 1850s, the school board recognized the
right of pupils to receive instruction in either German or English. In Saint Louis, on the other hand, the
use of bilingualism was a device to attract German American children to the public schools. In 1860 it
is estimated that four of five German American children there went to non-public schools; two decades
later the proportions had been reversed. In Saint Louis all advanced subjects were taught in English.
So successful was the integration that even before the anti-German hysteria of World War I, German
instruction as opposed to instruction in the German language was discontinued.”
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of Naturalization [Cubberley 1947]. These classes were designed to, “imbue the im-
migrant with American ideals of living...and preparing them for citizenship” [Carter
2009, p23-4]. In short, it is not that nation-building efforts ignored adult immigrants.
Rather, as recognized by the Dillingham Report, policies to target immigrant children
were prioritized and attempted earlier.
2.3 Conceptual Framework
To bridge between the qualitative and quantitative evidence, we present a framework
to make precise the idea of how a society made up of native and migrant groups, with
heterogeneity in values across groups, can use compulsory schooling to nation-build.
The framework is closely based on Alesina and Reich [2015].
Consider a state comprised of: (i) American-borns, normalized to mass 1; (ii)
newly arrived immigrants of mass g  1. Individuals have heterogeneous civic values
represented by a point on the real line. Let f ( j) be the density of American-borns with
values j 2 R, and g( j) be the corresponding density among immigrants. Denote by di j
the ‘distance’ between values i and j, di j = |i  j|, and let c denote private consumption.
An American-born individual with values i 2 R is assumed to have utility:
ui = c 
Z
j2R
f ( j)di jd j 
Z
j2R
g( j)di jd j. (2.1)
The second term on the RHS of (2.1) measures the difference between her values and
those of other American-borns; the third term measures the difference between her
values and those of immigrants. American-borns thus prefer to live in a more homo-
geneous society in which individuals share values. This is an intrinsic preference held
by natives: homogenizing the population might have other indirect benefits, but the
underlying nation-building motive of natives is that they prefer to live with others that
share their values.
To see how schooling might affect the homogeneity of values held in society, as-
sume first that some voluntary schooling system is in place, attended by American-
borns (as described in Figure 2.1). We assume the school curriculum matches the val-
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ues of the median American, im. Attending school shifts individual values towards im
by degree l . Schooling can impact a variety of specific values [Lott 1999, Glaeser et al.
2007], and contemporary evidence suggests that the content of school curricula do in-
deed influence beliefs and values held later in life [Milligan et al. 2004, Clots-Figueras
and Masella 2013, Cantoni et al. 2015]. The population then decides by majority rule
whether to make this schooling system compulsory.
In line with our empirical setting, g is sufficiently small so the median voter is
an American-born.9 As American-borns already attend school, the direct effect of im-
plementing compulsory schooling is on the migrant population who are homogenized
towards the values of the median American, im. Assuming a fixed cost of implementing
(and enforcing) compulsory schooling, the policy increases the tax burden for all by an
amount T . Hence the utility of an American with median values, im, if compulsory
schooling were to be introduced is,
uim = c 
Z
j2R
f ( j)dim jd j 
Z
j2R
g( j)(1 l )dim jd j T. (2.2)
Proposition 1 Suppose all immigrants have values j > im to the left of the median
American, then a majority of Americans vote for compulsory schooling if and only if,
Z
j2R
g( j)dim jd j   T/l . (2.3)
The Proof is in the Appendix.10
The framework makes precise that whether a state votes for compulsory schooling
depends on: (i) how different the migrant population is from the median American,
dim j; (ii) the size of the migrant group, g( j); (iii) the effectiveness of schooling in
9Figure A1 uses IPUMS 1880 census data (a 100% sample) to show that while migrants account for
a sizeable share of each state’s population, they remain a minority in each state. This fact also holds on
subsamples that better reflect those eligible to vote, such as the share of men, those in the labor force,
and those residing in urban areas. Hence, even if migrants themselves demanded compulsory schooling,
they were not pivotal at the state level in determining the passage of such legislation.
10The assumption j > im simplifies the algebra and best describes our setting. Allowing for over-
lapping preferences of Americans and migrants implies that if compulsion is introduced, this moves
the values of some immigrant further from the preferences of some Americans. The condition under
which the majority of Americans then vote for compulsory schooling depends on the entire distribution
of preferences among them.
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shifting preferences, l ; (iv) the fiscal cost of making schooling compulsory (and its
enforcement), T .11
Section 4 details how we proxy the key measure, dim j: pre-held civic values among
migrants using their historic exposure to compulsory state schooling in Europe. Section
5 takes this to the data to explain the cross-state timing of compulsory schooling in US
states. A necessary condition for natives to prefer to make schooling compulsory is
because it binds on immigrants and so exposes them to American civic values. This is
at the heart of the analysis in Section 6 that estimates the relative demand for American
common schooling among immigrants and natives.
2.4 Data and Methods
The top half of Figure 2.2 illustrates the variation we seek to explain: the timing of
compulsory schooling laws by US state, as coded in Landes and Solomon [1972]. This
coding is our preferred source because it covers all states from the 1850s. A prominent
alternative coding is that provided by Goldin and Katz [2003] (who extend the coding of
Lleras-Muney [2002]). The Goldin and Katz [2003] data only covers the period from
1900 onwards, and so does not provide information on the 33 states that introduced
compulsory schooling before 1900. For those 15 states that overlap between the Landes
and Solomon [1972] and Goldin and Katz [2003] codings, we find the year of passage
for compulsory schooling is identical for 13 states, and the differences are minor in the
other two cases (Louisiana: 1912 vs. 1910; Tennessee: 1906 vs. 1905).12
11The costs of compulsory schooling laws can also be interpreted more broadly. For example, with
compulsion, immigrant children would have had to reallocate time away from potentially more produc-
tive labor market work, to be exposed to the civic values only the state schooling system could provide
en masse. Second, and related to the evidence in Section 6, there would be greater class sizes as a result
for all children including American-borns.
12Table A1 shows further details on the passage of key child related legislation by state. There is
variation across states in the ages for which compulsory school laws were binding: we do not exploit
such variation for our analysis.
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We focus on understanding what drove the adoption of compulsory schooling
across states. The existing literature has focused on measuring the impacts of this
legislation on various outcomes: a question for which the enforcement of compulsory
schooling is more first order.13
To operationalize the conceptual framework, we need to identify a source of
within-migrant diversity in values to match dim j, that is the difference in civic val-
ues between Americans and migrants. Our strategy uses the fact that the European
state schooling model was itself driven by the promotion of certain civic values and
American educators were familiar with this. During the study period, civic values in
many European countries and the US were aligned towards instilling values to under-
pin democratic institutions, to foster trust in the state and to promote the common good.
This suggests a natural distinction between two types of European migrant: those from
countries that had compulsory state schooling laws in place before the first US state
(Massachusetts in 1852) and were thus more likely to be exposed to such civic values
in their country of origin, and European migrants from countries that introduced com-
pulsory state schooling after 1850 and were thus less likely to have been inculcated in
civic values related to democracy and trust in the state, that were held and valued in
American society.
For this purpose we have assembled a novel data-set on the timing of compulsory
state schooling laws by European country, shown in the bottom half of Figure 2.2. The
Appendix details the data sources underlying this coding. Figure 2.2 shows the Eu-
ropean countries defined to have compulsory schooling in place by 1850 are Austria-
Hungary, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Norway, Portugal and Sweden. The adoption
of compulsory schooling in Europe is not perfectly explained by geography, language
or religion. In particular, within each group of European countries that adopted com-
13Economic historians have argued that compulsory schooling laws were initially weakly enforced
[Clay et al. 2012], and that they become more effective over time. In particular, there were gradual
extensions in operation to cover: (i) the period of compulsory schooling each year; (ii) precise age and
poverty requirements for children to attend; (iii) the application of schooling laws to private/parochial
schools; (iv) increased requirements of cooperation from schools in enforcement; (v) the appointment
of attendance officers, and then the institution of state supervision of local enforcement; (vi) and the
connection of school-attendance enforcement with the child-labor legislation of States through a system
of working permits and state inspection of mills, stores, and factories.
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pulsory schooling pre and post 1850, there are countries in Northern, Southern and
Eastern Europe, and countries where the main religion is Catholicism or Protestantism.
This variation enables us to separately identify the impact on the cross-state passage
of compulsory schooling of within-migrant diversity in values from differences along
other dimensions.14
Of course, the exact way in which compulsory state schooling operated would
likely differ between each European country. What we emphasize here is the notion that
typical to most state education systems is that they generally instill values: (i) to make
individuals likely to take actions to improve the common welfare of their community
[Alesina and Reich 2015]; (ii) that underpin democracy and trust in the state [Glaeser
et al. 2007]; (iii) shape the acceptability welfare transfers [Lott 1999]. We leave for
future research a more detailed coding of the specific civil values promoted under each
compulsory schooling system, that might then be further exploited in empirical work.
Table A2 also provides the earliest and latest dates by which compulsory school-
ing might reasonably be argued to have been passed in any country, given the sources
cited and ambiguities/regional variations within a country (Table A3 discusses the cod-
ing for countries in which there is within-country variation in compulsory schooling).
For our main analysis we focus on the dates shown in Figure 2.2. We later provide ro-
bustness checks on our results using these lower and upper bound dates of compulsory
schooling.15
Finally, Table A4 probes the link between compulsory schooling laws and school
enrolment rates in Europe, exploiting five secondary data sources. In each data set,
we compare enrolment rates between countries with and without compulsion. Despite
these sources differing in their coverage of countries, years, and the enrolment measure,
14This variation also ensures that individuals from both sets of countries arrive in each wave of mass
migration to the US (starting with the first waves of migration from Northern Europe, followed by later
waves of migration from Southern and Eastern Europe [Bandiera et al. 2013]. We also note that Eu-
ropean countries without compulsory schooling have higher GDP per capita than those with compul-
sion, consistent with nation-building rather than economic development driving compulsion in Europe
[Ramirez and Boli 1987]. The relative GDP per capita between the two types of European country
remains almost fixed over the entire period.
15We define countries using pre-1914 borders, that can be matched into US census place of birth codes.
Except for Canada and Japan, we were unable to find detailed sources for all non-European countries to
accurately divide them into those with and without historic experience of compulsion.
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three of them report significantly higher enrolment rates in countries with compulsory
schooling than without. This supports the hypothesis that migrants from countries with
compulsory state-provided education are likely to have been instilled with the kinds of
civic values related to democracy and trust in the state, to a greater extent that chil-
dren from countries where education would have been various non-state actors: private
schools, religious schools or households themselves.16
2.4.1 Descriptives
We combine US Census data on state population by country of birth with our coding
on the timing of compulsory schooling law by European country to compute for each
state-year, the population share of migrants from European countries with and without
compulsory schooling before 1850. Data limitations prevent us from dividing non-
European migrants between those with and without compulsory schooling at home:
thus they are grouped in one category throughout.
Figure A2 shows the share of the state population in each group (Europeans with
and without compulsory state schooling in their country of origin, and non-Europeans),
averaged across census years before the passage of compulsory schooling laws in each
state. There is considerable variation in the size of the groups across US states: the
share of Europeans with compulsory schooling ranges from .05% to 18%, the share
of Europeans without compulsory schooling from .3% to 29%, the share of non-
Europeans from .03% to 32%. Most importantly, the correlation between the migrant
shares are positive but not high, allowing us to separately identify the response of
American-born median voters to the presence of each group.
Table 2.1 compares the characteristics of the different migrant groups and Amer-
16These data make clear that even in European countries with compulsion, enrolment rates remained
well below 100% on average, as with US states. Whether these differences in values then translate
to differences in values held by Europeans that migrated to the US depends on the nature of migrant
selection. The few studies that have examined the question for this period provide somewhat mixed
evidence, and highlight that selection varies across entry cohorts and countries. For example, Abramitzky
et al. [2012] link US and Norwegian census records to provide evidence on the negative selection of
Norwegian migrants. At the same time, Abramitzky et al. [2014] document that on arrival to the US, the
average migrant did not face a substantial occupation based earnings penalty, experienced occupational
advancement in the US at the same rate as natives, and those migrants that left the US were negatively
selected.
2.4. Data and Methods 41
icans in state-census years before compulsory schooling is introduced. The first row
describes the relative population share of each group and again highlights the consid-
erable variation in these shares across US states in a given year, and the variation in
shares within a state over time. The next two rows in Panel A highlight differences
in human capital across groups. Among adults, the share of illiterates is significantly
higher among Europeans from countries without compulsory schooling than among
European-born adults from countries with compulsory schooling.17 These differences
are significant even conditioning on state fixed effects (Column 6). This is in line with
the ‘first stage’ evidence provided in Table A4 comparing enrolment rates in Europe
among countries with and without compulsory schooling. The next row in Table 2.1
shows these patterns persist across generations. Comparing enrolment rates in any type
of school in the US (public or parochial) for children aged 8-14 in each group (the co-
hort for whom compulsory schooling was typically related to), these are significantly
lower among migrants groups from European countries without compulsory schooling
than for children from European countries with compulsory schooling in place by 1850.
As expected both migrant groups trail behind the enrolment rates of American-borns,
and enrolment rates of non-Europeans lie somewhere between the levels of the two
European groups.
This evidence suggests that compulsory schooling laws might have been passed
by US states to raise the skills of migrant children (that could be acquired through
compulsion to attend any school), rather than to instill civic values among them (that
could only be acquired through compulsion to attend a common school or requiring
other schools to teach elements of the same curriculum). We disentangle these expla-
nations by exploiting variation in enrolment rates within each European group, to see
if enrolment rates per se drives the passage of compulsion, that would follow from the
skills-based rather than values-based nation-building explanation.
The remaining rows of Panel A highlight that the two groups of European migrants
17Illiteracy rates among American-born adults are higher than for any of the migrant groups because
migrants are much younger on average. This fact combined with the strong upward time trend over the
19th century in the educational attainment of Americans shown in Figure 2.1, means that their adult
illiteracy rates of natives are higher than for migrants because older cohorts of American-borns are
included.
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do not significantly differ from each other on other characteristics including the share of
young people in the group (aged 15 or less), labor force participation rates, the share of
the group residing on a farm, and an overall measure of the groups economic standing
in the US as proxied by an occupational index score available across US census years.18
18The score is based on the OCCSCORE constructed variable in IPUMS census samples. This assigns
each occupation in all years a value representing the median total income (in hundreds of $1950) of all
persons with that particular occupation in 1950.
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2.4.2 Empirical Method
We use survival analysis to estimate the cross-state timing of the passage of compulsory
schooling. We estimate the hazard rate, h(t), namely, the probability of compulsory
schooling law being passed in a time interval from census year t until census year
t + 10, conditional on compulsory schooling not having been passed in that state up
until census year t. This approach allows for duration dependence in the passage of
legislation by states (so that history matters), and corrects for censoring bias without
introducing selection bias. The unit of observation is the state-census year where we use
census years from 1850 to 1930. In the survival analysis set-up, ‘failure’ corresponds to
the year of passage of compulsory schooling. As that is an absorbing state, state-years
after compulsory schooling is passed are not utilized as they provide no information
relevant to determine when compulsory schooling is actually passed. We first estimate
the following Cox proportional hazard model:
hs(t|xst) = h0(t)exp(Â j b jN jst +Â j g jX jst +lXst), (2.4)
where the baseline hazard h0(t) is unparameterized, and t corresponds to census year.
This model scales the baseline hazard by a function of state covariates. In particular,
we consider how the composition of various migrant groups j in the state correlate to
the passage of compulsory schooling. The division of population groups j we consider
is between European migrants in the state from countries with and without historic
exposure to compulsory state-provided education systems, as well as non-European
migrants. N jst is the share of the state population that is in group j in year t: this is our
key variable of interest; X jst includes the same group characteristics shown in Table 2.1.
Xst includes the total population of the state, and the state’s occupational index score, a
proxy for the state’s economic development.
The coefficient of interest is how changes in the composition of the state popula-
tion group j affect the hazard of passing compulsory schooling laws, bb j. As population
sizes across groups j differ, we convert all population shares N jst into effect sizes (cal-
culated from pre-adoption state-census years). bb j then corresponds to the impact of
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a one standard increase in the share of group j in the state on the hazard of passing
compulsory schooling law. We test the null that b j is equal to one, so that a hazard
significantly greater (less) that one corresponds to the law being passed significantly
earlier (later) in time, all else equal.
The nation-building interpretation hinges on a comparison of bb j between Euro-
peans with and without historic exposure to compulsory state-provided education sys-
tems. The main econometric concern is that the process driving the endogenous loca-
tion choices of migrants differs between groups, thus biasing the difference in bb j’s. We
address such concerns using multiple strategies in Section 5.4.
2.5 Results
2.5.1 Baseline Findings
Table 2.2 presents our baseline results. The first specification pools foreign-borns into
one group: we find that a one standard deviation increase in the share of the population
that is foreign-born significantly increases the hazard rate of compulsory schooling
being passed between two Census dates by 24%. Column 2 splits the foreign-born
into European and non-Europeans, and the result suggests the presence of European
migrants is significantly associated with the passage of compulsory schooling.
While similar results have been noted in the earlier literature studying the passage
of compulsory schooling laws, Column 3 splits European migrants along the key mar-
gin relevant for the nation-building hypothesis. We find the presence of European mi-
grants from countries that do not have historic experience of compulsory state schooling
at home significantly brings forward in time the passage of compulsory schooling in
US states: a one standard deviation increase in the population share of such Europeans
is associated with a 64% higher hazard rate. In contrast, the presence of Europeans
with a long history of compulsory schooling at home does not influence when com-
pulsory schooling is passed by states. The effect sizes across these types of European
migrant are significantly different to each other, as shown at the foot of the Table [p-
value=.005].
Column 4 estimates (2.4) in full, so X jst further includes the enrolment rates of
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8-14 year olds for American and the three migrant groups j (the age group for whom
compulsory schooling in US states was most relevant for), and we present the im-
pacts of these human capital related controls (in effect sizes) in addition to the co-
efficients of interest, bb j. Two key results emerge. First, the distinction between the
types of European migrant is robust to controlling for other dimensions along which
they differ [p-value=.004]. The magnitude of the effect remains large: a one stan-
dard deviation increase in the population share of Europeans without compulsory state
schooling at home doubles the hazard of a US state passing compulsory schooling. Sec-
ond, enrollment rates of migrants’ children in the US have weak impacts on whether
American-born voters introduce compulsory schooling. We note that higher enrollment
rates among the children of natives speed up the adoption of the laws, as shown in the
literature [Landes and Solomon 1972]. This might reflect the natural complementar-
ity between American enrolment rates, namely, the extent to which American children
are instilled in certain civic values in school will inevitably increase the returns to also
instill the same values in migrant children using the same common schools.
To further document the link between compulsory schooling and the human cap-
ital of adult migrants, Table A5 repeats the specification in Column 4 of Table 2.2
but reports the full set of human capital related coefficients, where all covariates are
measured in effect sizes. This highlights that higher illiteracy rates among adults in
each group are not associated with the earlier passage of compulsory schooling. In-
deed, states with less literate adult populations of American-borns and Europeans with
exposure to state compulsory state education systems in their country of origin, adopt
compulsory schooling significantly later in time, all else equal. This is evidence against
the cross-state passage of compulsory schooling being driven predominantly by a desire
by American-borns to skill the migrant population.
The nation-building explanation thus remains first order: the conceptual frame-
work highlighted that American-borns have a desire to homogenize those migrants that
are more distant from them in values, and the empirical evidence suggests it is the civic
values held by migrants, as proxied by their historic exposure to compulsory state-
provided education systems at home, rather than migrants’ investment in the human
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capital of their children in the US, or the skills among adults, that largely drives the
cross-state passage of compulsory schooling.
Of course, the American median voter could have targeted those with compulsory
schooling in their country of origin because state education systems inculcate country-
specific identities that are not transportable across locations, and so those individuals
are most in need of being re-indoctrinated with American values.19 Yet, this is strongly
rejected by the data. Rather, we find American-borns target those Europeans without
historic experience of compulsory schooling in their country of origin (as well as to-
wards non-Europeans who are also unlikely to have compulsory schooling back home).
This is consistent with compulsory schooling being a nation-building tool because of its
impact on civic values that were common and transportable across Europe and America
in the nineteenth century.
Such portability of civic values is consistent with ideas that governments have
incentives to compel citizens to go through the same state schooling system because,
relative to a counterfactual world in which schooling is provided privately, through
religious organizations or by households themselves, compulsory state schooling can
instill civic values that help underpin democracy [Glaeser et al. 2007], trust in gov-
ernment and civic participation [Milligan et al. 2004], to shape common interests and
goals [Lott 1999, Alesina and Reich 2015], or because state capacity is easier to raise
in more homogeneous societies in which the common good is more easily identifiable
and political institutions are inclusive [Besley and Persson 2010].
2.5.2 Robustness Checks
The Appendix documents the robustness of our core finding. Specification (2.4) ex-
ploits cross-country differences in whether migrants’ country of origin had compulsory
state schooling laws in place in 1850 or not. The first robustness check explores an
alternative specification that exploits within-country variation over time, in exposure
19This would, for example, be in line with other explanations put forward for why societies compel
citizens to go through the same schooling system, such as to build strong national identities in the face
of external military conflict [Aghion et al. 2012]. The fact that this is rejected is reassuring given that
the US context is not one in which the threat of external military conflict is likely to be the driving force
behind compulsion.
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Table 2.2: Immigrant Groups and the Passage of Compulsory Schooling Laws
Table 2: Immigrant Groups and the Passage of Compulsory Schooling Laws
Non parametric Cox proportional hazard model estimates, hazard rates reported
Robust standard errors; Populations shares and enrolment rates measured in effect sizes
(1) Foreign (2) European (3) Historic Exposure toCompulsory Schooling
(4) Enrolment
Rates
Share of the State Population that is:
Foreign Born 1.24*
(.142)
European Born 1.43**
(.226)
1.64*** 2.15***
(.225) (.509)
.988 .780
(.122) (.161)
Non-European Born .998 .995 1.80***
(.041) (.035) (.409)
Enrolment Rate of American-Borns 2.82**
(1.39)
.815*
(.094)
1.03
(.153)
Enrolment Rate of Non-European Foreign-Borns 1.18
(.235)
Group Controls No No No Yes
State Controls No No No Yes
European Groups Equal [p-value] [.005] [.004]
Euro Without CSL = Non-Euro [p-value] [.001] [.505]
Observations (state-census year) 230 230 230 230
Notes: *** denotes significance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10%. A non-parametric Cox proportional hazard model is estimated, where hazard rates are reported.
Hence tests for significance relate to the null that the coefficient is equal to one. The unit of observation is the state-census year, for all census years from 1850. A
state drops from the sample once compulsory schooling is passed. The year of passage of compulsory school attendance laws is extracted from Landes and
Solomon [1972]. In all Columns population share groupings are defined in effect sizes, where this is calculated using population shares from census-years prior to
the introduction of compulsory schooling law. Robust standard errors are reported. The European countries defined to have had compulsory schooling laws in
place in 1850 are Austria-Hungary, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Norway, Portugal and Sweden. In Column 4 we control for the following characteristics of each
group (American born, non-European, European with and without compulsory schooling laws in 1850): the share aged 0-15, the share of adults (aged 15 and
over) that are illiterate, the labor force participation rate, and the share residing on a farm. We also control for the following state characteristics: the total
population and the average occupational score of the population. We also control for the enrolment rate of 8-14 year olds among American borns (in effect sizes),
and group specific enrolment rates for all European and non-European groups in the state (in effect sizes). At the foot of Column 3 onwards we report the p-value
on the null hypothesis that the hazard coefficients are the same for the two European groups, and the p-value that the hazard coefficients are the same for the
non-European immigrant groups and European borns from countries that did not have compulsory schooling in place in 1850.
From European Countries that had CSL in 1850
From European Countries that did NOT have CSL in 1850
Enrolment Rate of Europeans From Countries that
did NOT have CSL in 1850
Enrolment Rate of Europeans From Countries that
had CSL in 1850
to compulsory state schooling. To do so, we consider the impact of a rolling window
of Europeans’ exposure to compulsory schooling by examining whether the American
median-voter is differentially sensitive to the presence of European migrants that have
passed compulsory schooling at least 30 years ago, versus the presence of Europeans
from countries that have either never passed compulsory schooling or passed it less
than a generation ago. This highlights how American voters react differently over time
to migrants from the same country, as that country becomes exposed to compulsory
schooling at home. This helps further pin down that when passing compulsory school-
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ing laws, American-born median voters across states are responding to the civic values
held by European migrants, rather than some time invariant characteristic of European
countries that had compulsion in place in 1850.
The result, in Column 1 of Table A6, demonstrates that with this definition, the
sharp contrast between how American-borns react to different types of European mi-
grant becomes even more pronounced: a one standard deviation increase in the popula-
tion share of European migrants from countries that do not have more than a generation
of exposure to compulsory schooling at home significantly increases the hazard by 2.31.
In contrast, the presence of Europeans with compulsory schooling at home for at least
one generation significantly reduces the hazard rate below one. These results highlight
how American-born voters appear to react differentially over time to the same country
of origin as that country’s population accumulates experience of compulsory schooling.
Table A6 then shows the robustness of our main finding to additionally controlling
for three classes of variable. First, we control for the passage of other legislation in US
states, that might be complementary to, or pre-requisites for, compulsory schooling law.
For example, child labor laws and the establishment of a birth registration system have
been argued to be interlinked with compulsory schooling [Lleras-Muney 2002, Goldin
and Katz 2003]. Second, we show the main result survives controlling for proxies for
the states’ progressivity. Third, we control for additional types of legislation passed in
European countries: in particular we show our main result is robust to controlling for
the presence of European migrants from countries with and without child labor laws
in 1850, to rule out that such policy preferences drive migrants to sort into locations
with like-minded Americans, rather than compulsory schooling being introduced as a
nation-building tool by American-borns.
Table A5 shows our main result continues to hold using: (i) alternative economet-
ric specifications, including imposing parametric structure on the underlying hazard,
h0(t); (ii) alternative classifications of European countries with and without compul-
sory schooling, using the lower and upper bound limits of when compulsory schooling
could have been introduced, shown in Table A2.
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2.5.3 Spatial Variation
Figure 2.2 highlighted a clear spatial pattern in the adoption of compulsory schooling,
with Southern and Western states trailing other regions. We thus address whether there
could be a very different process driving compulsory schooling law in those regions.
Many Western states were admitted to the Union towards the end of the 19th Cen-
tury, and passed compulsory schooling laws just before gaining entrance. Such states
might have introduced compulsory schooling laws in order to enter the Union, rather
than because of nation-building motives. On the other hand, the requirements for enter-
ing the Union in the US Constitution (Article IV, Section 3) make no explicit reference
to any degree of modernization or institutional complexity that candidate states must
have reached, and some educationalists have been explicit that the nation-building hy-
pothesis is as relevant in Western states as others [Meyer et al. 1979].
In Southern states there was huge resistance to educating black children (before
the Civil War it was illegal in many Southern states to teach slaves to read or write).
It is however unclear whether this slowed down the adoption of compulsory schooling
laws: typically caveats were included in compulsory schooling laws to ensure blacks
did not benefit from compulsion, such as exemptions due to poverty or distance from
the nearest public school [Lleras-Muney 2002, Black and Sokoloff 2006, Collins and
Margo 2006]. A related concern however arises because during our study period, the
Great Migration of Blacks occurred from Southern to urban Northern states (hence
more closely matching the spatial patterns in Figure 2.2). However, this is unlikely
to be related to the passage of compulsion because the migration of blacks occurred
mostly between 1916 and 1930, well after compulsory schooling laws began to be
introduced: pre-1910 the net migration of blacks was only .5mn [Collins 1997].20
To take these concerns to data, we first limit attention to states that are observed
in all census years from 1850 to 1930. These comprise long established states in which
the desire to nation-build might be stronger than in states that joined the Union more
recently. The result, in Column 1 of Table 2.3, suggests that in long established states,
20Chay and Munshi [2013] document that an important pull factor for black migration to start in 1916
was the shutting down of European migration, that left labor supply shortages in Northern states. Prior
to 1916 there is little evidence that European and black migration to states was interlinked.
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American-born voters remain sensitive to the presence of European migrants from
countries without a history of compulsory state schooling. The baseline result is also
robust to restricting the sample to the 30 largest states by population (where over 90%
of the US population resides): this limits attention to states with weaker incentives to
introduce compulsory schooling to attract individuals. The estimated effect size rises
because in the most populous states, a one standard deviation increase in European
migrant groups corresponds to a far larger change in the absolute group number than
in the baseline specification. Column 3 estimates the baseline specification excluding
Western states: we continue to find the presence of European migrants from countries
without a history of compulsory schooling to be significantly related to the cross-state
timing of compulsion across states, and there to be a differential impact from Euro-
peans with historic exposure to compulsory schooling at home [p-value=.000]. Column
4 then estimates (2.4) using only Western and Southern states: even in this subsample
the nation-building explanation holds.
Table 2.3: Regional Variation in the Passage of Compulsory Schooling Laws
Table 3: Regional Variation in the Passage of Compulsory Schooling Laws
Non parametric Cox proportional hazard model estimates, hazard rates reported
Robust standard errors; Populations shares and enrolment rates measured in effect sizes
(1) Established
States
(2) Most Populous
States
(3) Exclude
Western States
(4) Only Western and
Southern States
Share of the State Population that is:
From European Countries that did NOT have CSL in 1850 3.16** 14.6*** 5.55*** 4.62**
(1.64) (14.2) (2.50) (2.94)
From European Countries that had CSL in 1850 1.52 .662 .857 .270**
(.506) (.205) (.197) (.167)
Non-European Born 1.73*** 1.66** 1.37 1.60
(.302) (.413) (.337) (.512)
Group Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
State Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
European Groups Equal [p-value] [.094] [.004] [.000] [.016]
Euro Without CSL = Non-Euro [p-value] [.201] [.020] [.004] [.091]
Observations (state-census year) 187 153 186 141
Table 4: Second Stage Estimates for 2SRI Instrumental Variables Method
Non parametric Cox proportional and log logistic hazard model estimates
Robust standard errors; Populations shares and enrolment rates measured in effect sizes
Model: (1) NP Cox PH (1) Log logistic(Time Ratio)
(2) Log logistic
(Time Ratio)
(3) Log logistic (Time
Ratio)
Share of the State Population that is:
From European Countries that did NOT have CSL in 1850 1.65** .920*** .906*** .923***
(.382) (.022) (.020) (.018)
From European Countries that had CSL in 1850 1.15 .098 .098* .986
(.152) (.012) (.011) (.015)
Non-European Born .85 .994 .990 .946***
(.125) (.014) (.012) (.009)
Includes First Stage Residuals [OLS] Yes Yes No No
Includes First Stage Residuals [Non-parametric] No No Yes Yes
Group Controls No No No Yes
State Controls No No No Yes
European Groups Equal [p-value] [.262] [.056] [.013] [.011]
Euro Without CSL = Non-Euro [p-value] [.019] [.030] [.006] [.217]
Gamma Parameter .048*** .044*** .017***
(.007) (.007) (.003)
Observations (state-census year) 180 180 180 180
Notes: *** denotes significance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10%. A non-parametric Cox proportional hazard model is estimated, where hazard rates are reported. Hence tests for significance relate
to the null that the coefficient is equal to one. The unit of observation is the state-census year, for all census years from 1850. A state drops from the sample once compulsory schooling is
passed. The year of passage of compulsory school attendance laws is extracted from Landes and Solomon [1972]. Robust standard errors are reported. In Column 1 the 36 states that are
observed in all 8 IPUMS census waves from 1850 to 1930 are included in the sample. These states are Alabama, Arkansas, California, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana,
Iowa, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Oregon,
Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, West Virginia and Wisconsin. In Column 2 the 30 most populous states are included in the sample. In all
Columns population share groupings are defined in effect sizes, where this is calculated using population shares from census-years prior to the introduction of compulsory schooling law. The
European countries defined to have had compulsory schooling laws in place in 1850 are Austria-Hungary, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Norway, Portugal and Sweden. In all Columns we control
for the following characteristics of each group (American born, non-European, European with and without compulsory schooling laws in 1850): the share aged 0-15, the enrolment rate of 8-14
year olds, the share of adults (aged 15 and over) that are illiterate, the labor force participation rate, and the share residing on a farm. We also control for the following state characteristics: the
total population and the average occupational score of the population. At the foot of each Column we report the p-value on the null hypothesis that the hazard coefficients are the same for the two
European groups, and the p-value that the hazard coefficients are the same for the non-European immigrant groups and European borns from countries that did not have compulsory schooling in
place in 1850.
Notes: *** denotes significance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10%. In Column 1 a non-parametric Cox proportional hazard model is estimated, where hazard rates are reported. In Columns 2 and 3 a
log logistic hazard model is estimated where time ratios are reported. In all cases tests for significance relate to the null that the coefficient is equal to one. The unit of observation is the state-
census year, for all census years from 1860. A state drops from the sample once compulsory schooling is passed. Robust standard errors are reported. The year of passage of compulsory
school attendance laws is extracted from Landes and Solomon [1972]. In all Columns population share groupings are defined in effect sizes, where this is calculated using population shares from
census-years prior to the introduction of compulsory schooling law. The European countries defined to have had compulsory schooling laws in place in 1850 are Austria-Hungary, Denmark,
Germany, Greece, Norway, Portugal and Sweden. We control for the following characteristics of each group (American born, non-European, European with and without compulsory schooling
laws in 1850): the share aged 0-15, the share of adults (aged 15 and over) that are illiterate, the enrolment rate of 8-14 year olds, the labor force participation rate, and the share residing on a
farm. We also control for the following state characteristics: the total population and the average occupational score of the population. All Columns control for the first stage residuals in the 2SRI
method. At the foot of each Column we report the p-value on the null hypothesis that the coefficients are the same for the two European groups, and the p-value that the coefficients are the same
for the non-European immigrant groups and European borns from countries that did not have compulsory schooling in place in 1850. At the foot of Columns 2 to 4 the relevant parameters from
the parametric hazard and frailty parameters are reported.
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2.5.4 Endogenous Location Choices of Migrants
The coefficients of interest bb j from (2.4) cannot be interpreted as causal given migrants
sort into locations, a process that might be driven by unobserved factors that also drive
the passage of compulsory schooling laws. However, endogenous location choices can
only drive the core result if the process differs across migrant groups. Specifically, it
would have to be that European migrants without long exposure to compulsory state
schooling at home are attracted by unobservable state characteristics that correlate with
the adoption of schooling laws, while European migrants with long exposure to com-
pulsory schooling at home are not attracted by these same characteristics.
We address the issue instrumenting for the share of the population of group j in
state s in census year t using a Bartik-Card strategy, where we use the two-stage resid-
ual inclusion (2SRI) method for instrumenting in a non-linear model. The instrument
has been much utilized in the immigration literature and is based on the intuition that
migrants tend to locate where there are already members of the same group. To con-
struct the instrument for N jst we first calculate the nationwide share of migrant group j
(so N jst summed across states s at time t) in states that have not adopted, weighted by
state s’s share of that migrant group j in the previous census period among states that
have not adopted compulsory schooling. We measure population shares in effect sizes
and so denote the effect size of migrant group j in state s in census year t by N j,Es,t . The
instrument is then defined as follows:
W jst =
N j,Es,t 1
Âl2R(t 1)N
j,E
l,t 1
Â
k2R(t)
N j,Ekt , (2.5)
where R(t) is the set of states that remain at risk of adopting compulsory schooling law
in census period t, K is the cardinality of R(t) and L is the cardinality of R(t 1). This
instrument can be calculated for all census years except the first.
Table A8 reports the first stage results: for each group j, the instruments corre-
late with migration shares N j,Est : all coefficients lie in the range .69  .90 and all are
statistically significant at the 1% level. Column 1 in Table 2.4 shows the second stage
results using the 2SRI method. The point estimates for the bb j’s remain stable, although
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each is slightly more imprecise. However, it remains the case that the presence of
European migrants from countries that do not have historic experience of compulsory
state schooling at home significantly brings forward in time the passage of compulsory
schooling: a one standard deviation increase in the population share of such Europeans
is associated with a 65% higher hazard rate. In contrast, the presence of Europeans
with a long history of compulsory schooling at home does not influence when compul-
sory schooling is passed by US states, although the 2SRI estimates are imprecise so we
cannot reject the null that these hazards are equal [p-value=.262].
To improve precision, Column 2 presents 2SRI estimates assuming the underly-
ing hazard follows a Log logistic distribution. In this specification the coefficients of
interest bb j are presented in a time ratio format (rather than a hazard). A time ratio
less than one has the same interpretation as a hazard greater than one, indicating the
covariate is associated with the passage of compulsory schooling earlier in time. The
second stage results closely align with the baseline findings: the presence of European
migrants from countries without historic experience of compulsory schooling at home
significantly brings forward in time the passage of compulsory schooling. In contrast,
the presence of Europeans with a long history of compulsory schooling at home does
not influence the timing of compulsory schooling law, and these effect sizes across
European migrants are significantly different to each other [p-value=.056].
There is no particular reason to think the first stage relationship between N jst
and W jst is linear. We therefore consider a non-parametric first stage for N
j
st , N
j
st =
m(W jst ,Z
j
st)+e
j
st ,with m(.) unknown.21 Column 3 shows the result from this more flex-
ible first stage: the passage of compulsory schooling in a state occurs significantly ear-
lier in time in the presence of more European migrants from countries without historic
experience of compulsory schooling, and the impacts of the two groups of European
migrant are significantly different to each other [p-value=.013].
Finally, Column 4 presents 2SRI estimates from the full model that includes the
exogenous variables Z jst = (X
j
st , Xst). In the first stage, Columns 4-6 in Table A8 show
21A consistent estimate of eˆ jst is then obtained as the difference between mˆ(W
j
st ,Z
j
st) and N
j
st , using
local linear regression with Epanechnikov Kernel weights to first obtain mˆ(.).
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the instrument continues to be highly significantly associated with all three migrant
share groups. In the second stage, Column 4 in Table 2.4 shows a pattern of impacts
very similar to the baseline estimates from the full model: the findings provide strong
support for the nation-building hypothesis. The presence of European migrants with-
out historic exposure to compulsory schooling at home significantly brings forward in
time the passage of compulsory schooling law; the presence of European migrants with
historic exposure to compulsory schooling has no impact on the timing of compulsory
schooling law, and these impacts significantly differ from each other [p-value=.011].
Moreover, we also find a significant impact of the presence of non-Europeans, mirror-
ing the baseline findings.
The Appendix presents additional evidence related to endogenous location choices
of individuals, including on: (i) the internal migration of American-borns, to further ad-
dress the concern the passage of compulsory schooling was an instrument used by states
to attract American migrants (or Americans took ideas over compulsory schooling with
them as they migrated across states); (ii) the internal migration of the foreign-born, to
check if migrants chose to endogenously locate into states after compulsory schooling
laws were in place (we find no evidence of trend breaks in migrant population shares
in states pre- and post-compulsion).
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Table 2.4: Second Stage Estimates for 2SRI Instrumental Variables Method
Table 3: Regional Variation in the Passage of Compulsory Schooling Laws
Non parametric Cox proportional hazard model estimates, hazard rates reported
Robust standard errors; Populations shares and enrolment rates measured in effect sizes
(1) Established
States
(2) Most Populous
States
(3) Exclude
Western States
(4) Only Western and
Southern States
Share of the State Population that is:
From European Countries that did NOT have CSL in 1850 3.16** 14.6*** 5.55*** 4.62**
(1.64) (14.2) (2.50) (2.94)
From European Countries that had CSL in 1850 1.52 .662 .857 .270**
(.506) (.205) (.197) (.167)
Non-European Born 1.73*** 1.66** 1.37 1.60
(.302) (.413) (.337) (.512)
Group Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
State Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
European Groups Equal [p-value] [.094] [.004] [.000] [.016]
Euro Without CSL = Non-Euro [p-value] [.201] [.020] [.004] [.091]
Observations (state-census year) 187 153 186 141
Table 4: Second Stage Estimates for 2SRI Instrumental Variables Method
Non parametric Cox proportional and log logistic hazard model estimates
Robust standard errors; Populations shares and enrolment rates measured in effect sizes
Model: (1) NP Cox PH (1) Log logistic(Time Ratio)
(2) Log logistic
(Time Ratio)
(3) Log logistic (Time
Ratio)
Share of the State Population that is:
From European Countries that did NOT have CSL in 1850 1.65** .920*** .906*** .923***
(.382) (.022) (.020) (.018)
From European Countries that had CSL in 1850 1.15 .098 .098* .986
(.152) (.012) (.011) (.015)
Non-European Born .85 .994 .990 .946***
(.125) (.014) (.012) (.009)
Includes First Stage Residuals [OLS] Yes Yes No No
Includes First Stage Residuals [Non-parametric] No No Yes Yes
Group Controls No No No Yes
State Controls No No No Yes
European Groups Equal [p-value] [.262] [.056] [.013] [.011]
Euro Without CSL = Non-Euro [p-value] [.019] [.030] [.006] [.217]
Gamma Parameter .048*** .044*** .017***
(.007) (.007) (.003)
Observations (state-census year) 180 180 180 180
Notes: *** denotes significance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10%. A non-parametric Cox proportional hazard model is estimated, where hazard rates are reported. Hence tests for significance relate
to the null that the coefficient is equal to one. The unit of observation is the state-census year, for all census years from 1850. A state drops from the sample once compulsory schooling is
passed. The year of passage of compulsory school attendance laws is extracted from Landes and Solomon [1972]. Robust standard errors are reported. In Column 1 the 36 states that are
observed in all 8 IPUMS census waves from 1850 to 1930 are included in the sample. These states are Alabama, Arkansas, California, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana,
Iowa, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Oregon,
Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, West Virginia and Wisconsin. In Column 2 the 30 most populous states are included in the sample. In all
Columns population share groupings are defined in effect sizes, where this is calculated using population shares from census-years prior to the introduction of compulsory schooling law. The
European countries defined to have had compulsory schooling laws in place in 1850 are Austria-Hungary, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Norway, Portugal and Sweden. In all Columns we control
for the following characteristics of each group (American born, non-European, European with and without compulsory schooling laws in 1850): the share aged 0-15, the enrolment rate of 8-14
year olds, the share of adults (aged 15 and over) that are illiterate, the labor force participation rate, and the share residing on a farm. We also control for the following state characteristics: the
total population and the average occupational score of the population. At the foot of each Column we report the p-value on the null hypothesis that the hazard coefficients are the same for the two
European groups, and the p-value that the hazard coefficients are the same for the non-European immigrant groups and European borns from countries that did not have compulsory schooling in
place in 1850.
Notes: *** denotes significance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10%. In Column 1 a non-parametric Cox proportional hazard model is estimated, where hazard rates are reported. In Columns 2 and 3 a
log logistic hazard model is estimated where time ratios are reported. In all cases tests for significance relate to the null that the coefficient is equal to one. The unit of observation is the state-
census year, for all census years from 1860. A state drops from the sample once compulsory schooling is passed. Robust standard errors are reported. The year of passage of compulsory
school attendance laws is extracted from Landes and Solomon [1972]. In all Columns population share groupings are defined in effect sizes, where this is calculated using population shares from
census-years prior to the introduction of compulsory schooling law. The European countries defined to have had compulsory schooling laws in place in 1850 are Austria-Hungary, Denmark,
Germany, Greece, Norway, Portugal and Sweden. We control for the following characteristics of each group (American born, non-European, European with and without compulsory schooling
laws in 1850): the share aged 0-15, the share of adults (aged 15 and over) that are illiterate, the enrolment rate of 8-14 year olds, the labor force participation rate, and the share residing on a
farm. We also control for the following state characteristics: the total population and the average occupational score of the population. All Columns control for the first stage residuals in the 2SRI
method. At the foot of each Column we report the p-value on the null hypothesis that the coefficients are the same for the two European groups, and the p-value that the coefficients are the same
for the non-European immigrant groups and European borns from countries that did not have compulsory schooling in place in 1850. At the foot of Columns 2 to 4 the relevant parameters from
the parametric hazard and frailty parameters are reported.
2.5.5 Other Forms of Migrant Diversity
The nation-building explanation implies the key source of within-migrant diversity is
in their civic values, as proxied by migrants’ historic exposure to compulsory state
schooling in their origin country. However, American-born voters might actually be
sensitive to other correlated sources of within-migrant diversity. Our next set of results
establish whether the form of diversity within European migrants we have focused on
so far actually proxies for another dimension of heterogeneity across migrants.
The first dimension we consider is religion: during the study period the Catholic
church remained the most significant rival to governments in the provision of education
[Glenn 2002]. We consider the US as a majority Protestant country, and use the Barro
and McCleary [1985] data to group European countries into whether their majority
religion is Protestant or Catholic–Other. Column 1 of Table 2.5 shows the result, where
the following key points are of note: (i) among European migrants from countries that
do not have compulsory state education by 1850, the estimated hazards are above one
for both religions, although the hazard for migrants from Catholic–Other countries is
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significantly higher than for migrants from Protestant countries [p-value=.013]; (ii) for
Europeans with a long history of compulsory state schooling the hazard rate remains
below one again for both groups of migrant by religion, and these hazards are not
significantly different from each other [p-value=.289]; (iv) within European migrants
from Protestant countries, there remain significant differences in the hazard between
those with and without long exposure to compulsory schooling in their country of
origin [p-value=.052]; (v) within European migrants from Catholic–Other countries,
exactly the same source of diversity remains significant [p-value=.000]. In short,
while there are important differences in how American voters respond to the presence
of European migrants of different religions, being especially sensitive to Europeans
from Catholic–Other countries, within religion, historic exposure to compulsory state-
provided schooling among European migrants in a state remains a key predictor of
when such legislation is passed in each US state.
The Dillingham Report highlighted the divide between “old” (from Northern Europe
and Scandinavia) and “new” (from Southern and Eastern Europe) immigrants with
respect to their skills, economic conditions at arrival and migratory horizon. Hence the
second source of within-migrant diversity we consider is European region of origin.
We subdivide European migrants with and without historic exposure to compulsory
schooling between these from old and new Europe, so defined. Column 2 shows the
result, where we note: (i) among European migrants from countries without compul-
sory schooling by 1850, the hazards are above one for both subsets of Europeans;
(ii) these hazards are not significantly different from each other [p-value=.269]; (iii)
for Europeans with a long established history of compulsory schooling the hazard
rates remain below one for both groups of European by region of origin, and again
these hazards are not significantly different from each other [p-value=.348]; (iv) within
European migrants from Northern Europe–Scandinavia, there remain significant differ-
ences in the hazard between those with and without long exposure to compulsory state
schooling in their country of origin [p-value=.066]; (v) within European migrants from
Southern–Eastern Europe, exactly the same source of diversity remains significant in
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explaining the cross-state passage of compulsory schooling [p-value=.003]. In short,
the evidence suggests while American-born voters are sensitive to the region of origin
of European migrants, the over–riding source of diversity the median voter is sensitive
to is differences in migrant values.22
We next consider English language as the key source of within-migrant diver-
sity. To do so, we subdivide European-born migrants from countries without historic
exposure to compulsory schooling in their country of origin, between those from non-
English speaking countries and those from English speaking countries. All European
migrants from countries with compulsory schooling already in place by 1850 originate
from non-English speaking countries. Hence only a three-way division of European
migrants is possible when considering English language as the additional source of
within-migrant diversity over and above differences in values.
Column 3 shows the result, where the following points are of note: (i) among Eu-
ropean migrants from countries that do not have compulsory state schooling in place
by 1850, the estimated hazards are above one for both subsets of Europeans; (ii) these
hazards are not significantly different from each other [p-value=.555]; (iii) for Euro-
peans with a long established history of compulsory state schooling the hazard rate
remains below one; (iv) within European migrants from non-English speaking coun-
tries, there remain significant differences in the hazard rate for compulsory schooling
between those with and without long exposure to compulsory schooling in their country
of origin [p-value=.057]. In short, American-born median voters appear more sensitive
to diversity in values among European migrants than diversity in their English speaking
22This result reinforces the earlier finding that the human capital or enrolment rates of migrants were
not an important factor driving the cross-state adoption of compulsion, as migrants from Southern–
Eastern Europe would have had the lowest levels of human capital accumulation. The differences in
migrant characteristics between these European regions of origin might capture a host of other factors
including: (i) differential propensities to out–migrate [Abramitzky et al. 2012, Bandiera et al. 2013];
(ii) ties to second generation immigrants in the US (who are then American-born but with foreign born
parents). On the first point, we have also taken implied out-migration rates of nationalities from Bandiera
et al. [2013] and then created a four way classification of European migrants by their historic exposure
to compulsory schooling, and whether they have above or below median out–migration rates. The results
confirm that within-migrant diversity in values as captured by historic exposure to compulsion remains
the key source of variation across migrants. On the second point, in the Appendix we discuss the robust-
ness of our core result to splitting the American-born population between second generation immigrants
and those whose parents are both American-born.
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abilities. Indeed, the evidence suggests a one standard deviation increase in the popu-
lation share of English speaking migrants (i.e. British and Irish migrants) significantly
increases the hazard of compulsory schooling by 66%, all else equal. As highlighted
earlier, this result is most likely picking up the fact that Irish migrants were Catholics,
and this was an important divide in values with the median American.
While the evidence points to diversity among migrants along multiple dimensions
mattering, all the findings point to the specific targeting of compulsory schooling laws
in the US towards European migrants that did not have such values inculcated through
a compulsory state education system in their country of origin.
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Table 2.5: Other Sources of Diversity Within European Migrants
Table 5: Other Sources of Diversity Within European Migrants
Non parametric Cox proportional model, hazard rates reported
Robust standard errors; Populations shares measured in effect sizes
(1) Religion (2) EuropeanRegion (3) Language
Share of the State Population that is From:
Euro Countries that did NOT have CSL in 1850, Protestant 1.22
(.234)
Euro Countries that did NOT have CSL in 1850, Catholic/Other 2.39***
(.596)
Euro Countries that had CSL in 1850, Protestant .598*
(.176)
Euro Countries that had CSL in 1850, Catholic/Other .840***
(.044)
Non-European Born 2.29*** 2.08** 1.83***
(.609) (.639) (.227)
Euro Countries that did NOT have CSL in 1850, Northern/Scandinavian 1.89
(.837)
Euro Countries that did NOT have CSL in 1850, Southern/Eastern 1.16*
(.099)
Euro Countries that had CSL in 1850, Northern/Scandinavian .698
(.162)
Euro Countries that had CSL in 1850, Southern/Eastern .883***
(.038)
Euro Countries that did NOT have CSL in 1850, English Speaking 1.66*
(.494)
Euro Countries that did NOT have CSL in 1850, Non English Speaking 1.25
(.311)
Euro Countries that had CSL in 1850 (all Non English Speaking) .776
(.127)
Group and State Controls Yes Yes Yes
With CSL = Without CSL, Protestant [.052]
With CSL = Without CSL, Catholic/Other [.000]
With CSL = Without CSL, Northern European [.066]
With CSL = Without CSL, Southern/Eastern European [.003]
With CSL (All Non English) = Without CSL, Non English [.057]
Observations (state-census year) 230 230 230
Notes: *** denotes significance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10%. A non-parametric Cox proportional hazard model is estimated, where hazard rates are reported.
Hence tests for significance relate to the null that the coefficient is one. The unit of observation is the state-census year, for all census years from 1850. A state
drops from the sample once compulsory schooling is passed. Robust standard errors are reported. The year of passage of compulsory school attendance laws
is extracted from Landes and Solomon [1972]. In all Columns population share groupings are defined in effect sizes, where this is calculated using population
shares in census-years prior to the introduction of compulsory schooling law. The European countries defined to have had compulsory schooling laws in place in
1850 are Austria-Hungary, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Norway, Portugal and Sweden. In all Columns we control for the following characteristics of each group
(American born, non-European, European with and without compulsory schooling laws in 1850, as well as the one additional group defined in each column): the
share aged 0-15, the share of adults (aged 15 and over) that are illiterate, the labor force participation rate, the enrolment rate of 8-14 year olds and the share
residing on a farm. In all Columns we control for the following state characteristics: the total population, and the average occupational score of the population. In
Column 1, we use the Barro and McCleary [1985] data to define country religion. The following European countries are then defined to be Protestant: Britain,
Denmark, Finland, Germany, Holland, Norway and Switzerland. In Column 2, Northern Europe/Scandinavian countries are defined to be Belgium, Britain,
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Holland, Iceland, Ireland, Lichtenstein, Luxembourg, Norway, Sweden and Switzerland. In Column 3, English speaking
European countries are Britain and Ireland (both without compulsory schooling in 1850). At the foot of each Column we report the p-value on the null hypothesis
that the hazard coefficients are the same between various European groups with and without compulsory schooling in 1850.
2.5.6 Alternative Mechanisms
Nation-building motives are not the only reason why the state intervenes in education
provision en masse. Normative and positive arguments can be used to justify state pro-
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vision of education based on efficiency or redistributive concerns, human capital exter-
nalities, or complementarity between capital and skilled labor during industrialization.
While none of these necessarily require compulsory schooling, we now assess whether
our core finding remains robust to additionally accounting for the basic predictions of
some of these alternative mechanisms.
To examine if redistributive motives drive the passage of compulsory schooling,
we estimate (2.4) and additionally control for the standard deviation in the state oc-
cupational income score (the mean occupational income score is already in Xst). This
proxies the redistributive pressures the state faces. Column 1 of Table 2.6 shows that
although there is a positive correlation between inequality so measured and the hazard
of passing legislation, the coefficient is not significantly different from one. The im-
pacts of the population shares of interest remain almost unchanged from the baseline
specification, suggesting the presence of migrant groups and inequality in a state are
not correlated.
Column 2 examines the industrialization hypothesis by controlling for the share of
workers in the state’s labor force working in different occupations: professions, craft
and operative. We find that as a greater share of workers are engaged in the middle-
skilled craft occupations, the hazard of introducing compulsory schooling significantly
increases (the point estimate on the hazard is below one for the least-skilled operative
occupations). Hence there is evidence on compulsory schooling being related to indus-
trialization, but this additional mechanism operates in parallel with the nation-building
motives embodied in our core finding.23
Galor et al. [2009] make precise how the industrialization process interacts with
land inequality in determining the level of state provision of education. They argue
there exists a conflict between the entrenched landed elite (who have little incentive
23This is in line with the evidence presented in Galor andMoav [2006] from England, on howmembers
of Parliament voted for the Balfour Act of 1902, the proposed education reform that created a public
secondary schooling system. They find Parliamentarians were more likely to vote for the legislation if
they represented more skill intensive constituencies (even accounting for their party affiliation). For the
US, Goldin and Katz [2001] argue that over 1890-1999 the contribution of human capital accumulation
to the US growth process nearly doubled, and Goldin [1999b] describes how the changing industrial
structure of the US economy drove changes in the content of what was needing to be taught in secondary
schools.
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to invest in mass schooling) and the emerging capitalist elite, who do have such incen-
tives given the complementarity between capital and skilled labor. To proxy the relative
balance of power in this conflict they propose a measure of land inequality, that is the
share of land held by the top 20% of all land holdings. We then additionally control
for this same measure in (2.4). The result in Column 3 shows that the effect goes in
the expected direction but the ratio is not significantly below one. Moreover, the coeffi-
cients relevant for the nation-building hypothesis remain stable, further suggesting the
composition of the migrant population is not related to land inequality.24
The remaining Columns focus on the explanation that political parties were key to
compulsory schooling. Indeed, much has been written about the Republican-Democrat
divide over compulsory schooling, with the policy often being seen to be driven by a
faction of the Republican party [Provasnik 2006]. In line with this we find that a one
standard deviation increase in the vote share for Republicans in Congressional elec-
tions significantly increases the hazard rate. Given that significant third parties existed
for much of the 19th century, Column 5 repeats the analysis controlling for Demo-
crat party vote shares: as implied by the qualitative evidence, a greater vote share for
Democrats does indeed significantly reduce the hazard of passing compulsory school-
ing law. However, controlling for Republican or Democrat vote shares do not alter the
migrant population share coefficients, that remain stable throughout.
24This land inequality measure is available for 1880, 1900 and 1920: we linearly interpolate it for
other state-census years. Galor et al. [2009] show that state schooling expenditures are significantly
correlated to land inequality.
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Table 2.6: Alternative Mechanisms Driving the Passage of Compulsory Schooling Laws
Table 6: Alternative Mechanisms
Non parametric Cox proportional model, hazard rates reported
Robust standard errors; Populations shares measured in effect sizes
(1) Redistribution (2) Industrialization (3) Land Inequality (4) Republicans (5) Democrats
Share of the State Population that is From:
European Countries that did NOT have CSL in 1850 2.14*** 2.38*** 1.84** 2.62*** 3.00***
(.470) (.520) (.461) (.858) (1.04)
European Countries that had CSL in 1850 .831 .819 .901 .915 1.02
(.160) (.148) (.196) (.180) (.170)
Non-European Countries 1.82*** 2.01** 2.14*** 1.77** 1.62*
(.389) (.554) (.518) (.455) (.459)
SD of Occupational Income Score 1.38
(.423)
Share of Labor Force Engaged in Professional Occupations 1.00
(.000)
Share of Labor Force Engaged in Craft Occupations 2.51*
(1.32)
Share of Labor Force Engaged in Operative Occupations .550
(.296)
Land Share of Top 20% of Holdings [Galor et al . 2009] .815
(.171)
Republican Party Vote Share in Congressional Elections 1.68*
(.455)
Democratic Party Vote Share in Congressional Elections .558***
(.105)
Group and State Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
European Groups Equal (with and without CSL) [p-value] [.003] [.000] [.025] [.002] [.003]
Euro Without CSL = Non-Euro [p-value] [.513] [.549] [.591] [.331] [.135]
Observations (state-census year) 230 230 216 148 148
Notes: *** denotes significance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10%. A non-parametric Cox proportional hazard model is estimated, where hazard rates are reported. Hence tests for significance relate to the
null that the coefficient is one. The unit of observation is the state-census year, for all census years from 1850. A state drops from the sample once compulsory schooling laws are passed. Robust
standard errors are reported. The year of passage of compulsory school attendance laws is extracted from Landes and Solomon [1972]. In all Columns population share groupings are defined in effect
sizes, where this is calculated using population shares in census-years prior to the introduction of compulsory schooling law. The European countries defined to have had compulsory schooling laws in
place in 1850 are Austria-Hungary, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Norway, Portugal and Sweden. In all Columns we control for the following characteristics of each group (American born, non-European,
European with and without compulsory schooling laws in 1850, as well as the one additional group defined in each column): the share aged 0-15, the share of adults (aged 15 and over) that are illiterate,
the labor force participation rate, the enrolment rate of 8-14 year olds and the share residing on a farm. In all Columns we control for the following state characteristics: the total population, and the
average occupational score of the population. Column 1 controls for the state-year standard deviation in the occupational index score. Column 2 controls for the share of the population defined to be
working in craft occupations, and operative occupations (where professional occupations are the omitted category). Column 3 controls for the land share of the largest 20% of farm land holdings, from
[Galor et al . 2009], to proxy inequality of land holdings. This is available for 1880, 1900 and 1920: we linearly interpolate it for other state-census years. Column 4 (5) controls for the vote share of the
Republican (Democratic) party in congressional elections: these are available only in census years from 1860 onwards for a subset of states. At the foot of each Column we report the p-value on the null
hypothesis that the hazard coefficients are the same for the two European groups.
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2.6 Migrants’ Demand for American Common School-
ing
The extent to which compulsory schooling is an effective tool by which to expose
migrant children to the same kinds of civic value that were being taught to American-
born children, depends fundamentally on migrant’s underlying demand for American
common schooling. Only if their demand for common schooling was sufficiently low
would compulsory schooling be required to change the kinds of instruction they were
exposed to, and thus shape their civic values. We now exploit detailed information
on locally-financed investments into American common schools in the cross-section of
counties in 1890 to pin down the relative demands for American common schools of
the different migrant groups.
2.6.1 Conceptual Framework
As migrants can form a significant share of the population in jurisdictions that deter-
mine investments into common schools, we use a textbook probabilistic voting model
[Persson and Tabellini 2000] to derive an empirical specification informative of the rel-
ative demands for such schools among migrant groups.25 A jurisdiction comprises a
continuum of citizens. An individual i belongs to group j, where groups are of size
N j, Â j N j = N. Within a group, individuals have the same income, y j. Individual
preferences are quasi-linear,
u j(g) = c j+a j(.)H(g), (2.6)
where c j is the private consumption of a member of group j, H(g) is concave in the
public good, g (common schools), and is assumed twice-differentiable with H(0) = 0.
The group valuation for American common schools is a j(q j,1(HCSLj)): q j captures
25This is in contrast to the earlier conceptual framework in Section 3, where we utilized a median voter
model to understand the passage of compulsory schooling law at the state level. The justification is that:
(i) at the state level, migrants never form close to the majority of the electorate (as Figure A1 shows)
and so the median voter is American-born; (ii) the outcome studies was a discrete choice of whether to
introduce compulsory schooling law or not. In contrast, at the county level, migrant shares are larger,
and we study a continuous outcome (investment into common schools) so the probabilistic voting model
is more appropriate.
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factors that influence the group’s demand for common schools (such as the share of
young people in the group), and 1(HCSLj) is an indicator for the historic entrenchment
of compulsory schooling law (HCSL) in the country of origin for those in migrant group
j. In line with our context, the local jurisdiction finances common schools by a local
income tax rate t so individuals face a budget constraint, c j = (1  t)y j, and no group
can be excluded. It is because of this local financing that we can map between observed
investments into common schools and the underlying demand for those schools.
The probabilistic voting model specifies the following political process that pro-
duces a equilibrium level of common schooling: there are two political parties (A, B),
whose only motivation is to hold office. The source of within group heterogeneity is a
political bias parameter s i j ⇠U [  12f j , 12f j ]: a positive value of s i j implies that voter i
has a bias in favor of party B while voters with s i j = 0 are politically neutral. Hence
f j measures the political homogeneity of a group j. Voter i in group j thus prefers
candidate A if u j(gA)> u j(gB)+s i j.
The timing of events is as follows. First, parties A and B simultaneously and non-
cooperatively announce electoral platforms: gA, gB. At this stage, they know the distri-
bution from which s i j is drawn, but not realized values across voters. Second, elections
are held where citizens vote sincerely for a single party. Voters and parties look no fur-
ther than the next election. Third, the elected party implements her announced policy
platform.
Proposition 2 The political equilibrium is g⇤ = gA = gB where g⇤ is implicitly defined
as,
Hg(g⇤) =
q Â jW jy j
y¯Â jW ja j(q j,1(HCSLj))
. (2.7)
W j = N jf j is group j’s ‘political weight’, and q = Â j q
jN j
N is the share of young in the
population.
The Proof is in the Appendix.
The group’s political weight captures how influential the group is by virtue of its
size and howmany swing voters are in group j. A key feature of the probabilistic voting
model is that all groups have some weight in the determination of commons schooling
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g⇤. The key comparative static we consider is how the optimal provision of common
schooling changes in group- j’s size:
∂Hg(g⇤)
∂N j
=
1
f j
∂Hg(g⇤)
∂W j
=
qy j
f jy¯
 
Â jW ja j(q j,1(HCSLj))
 2
"
Â
k 6= j
Wkyk[ak a j]
#
(2.8)
Hence the larger is a j relative to other group ak’s, the more likely is it that ∂g
⇤
∂N j >
0. The sign of ∂g
⇤
∂N j can then be informative of sign(a
j relative to ak). We use this
intuition to rank the relative demands for common schools across the j groups. This
dovetails with the earlier analysis of what drove the cross-state adoption of compulsory
schooling: our results there showed the American-born median voter was especially
sensitive to European migrants from countries without historic exposure to compulsory
state-provided schooling. Hence they behaved as if,
a j(q j,1(HCSLj) = 1)> a j(q j,1(HCSLj) = 0), (2.9)
so that absent compulsory schooling in the US, this specific group of European migrants
would have demanded less common schooling, and as a result, those migrant children
would have been less exposed to the kinds of instruction and shaping of civic values that
American-born children were experiencing. We now recover estimates of this relative
ranking to understand whether these beliefs were justified. Unlike the earlier cross-
state analysis, here it is important that groups have endogenously sorted into counties
and so we can recover their equilibrium demand for American common schools.
2.6.2 Empirical Method
We estimate the model using cross-county data from 1890 that were collected as part of
the population census, but were the result of a separate report in which the Census Bu-
reau contacted the superintendents of public education in each state. Superintendents
were asked to report the race and sex of teachers and enrolled pupils in each county.
The data, documented in Haines [2010], details investments into common schools in
over 2400 counties in 45 states. We proxy the equilibrium provision of common school-
ing, g⇤, using the number of common school teachers in the county. These are locally
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financed and likely comprise the most significant investment into public schooling. As
IPUMS 1890 census data is unavailable, we build control variables using 1880 values
based on the 100% census sample. The groups considered replicate those in the ear-
lier analysis: the American-born, European migrants from countries with compulsory
schooling, European migrants from countries without compulsory schooling and non-
European migrants. We then estimate the following OLS specification for county c in
state s,
ln(teachers)cs =Â ja jN jcs+Â j g jX jcs+lXc+ds+ucs, (2.10)
where N jcs is the total population size of group j (again measured as an effect size),
and X jcs includes other characteristics of group j (the share aged 0-15, the labor force
participation rate, the share residing on a farm, and the average occupational income
score).26
Xc includes the (log) total population of the county aged below 15, and the county’s
occupational index score. ds is a state fixed effect so the coefficients of interest, a j,
are identified from variation in the composition of migrant populations across coun-
ties within the same state. Figure A5 illustrates the cross-county variation in migrant
group sizes for four states (one from each census region). Panel B of Table 2.1 provides
descriptive evidence on the shares of county populations from each group j and docu-
ments the considerable within state variation in these shares. Robust standard errors are
reported, and we weight observations by 1880 county population so our coefficients of
interest map to the average demand of an individual from group j. Mapping the model
to the empirical specification makes clear the relative ranking of a j(.)’s across groups
(not their levels) can be identified from the ranking of ba j’s estimated from (2.10). As
we do not control for the total county population, this allows us to control for the pop-
ulation size and characteristics for all four groups j and so measure demands relative
to those of the American-born.
26The County Yearbook provides information on public education for black and white populations
separately. For our analysis, all schooling related variables (teachers and attending pupils) correspond to
whites. However, in some states there is expected to be some small bias here as teachers of all races were
pooled together. Moreover, there is an imperfect match between true school jurisdictions and counties,
and this attenuates our coefficients of interest, a j.
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2.6.3 Results
Table 2.7 presents the results. Column 1 estimates (2.10) only controlling for the pop-
ulations of each group j. At the foot of the table we report p-values on the equality of
these coefficients to establish the ranking of relative demands for common schooling.
The results highlight again that a key source of diversity within European migrants in
their demand for common schools is whether they have historic exposure to compulsory
state schooling in their country of origin. More precisely: (i) a one standard deviation
increase in the county population of European migrants with long exposure to compul-
sory state schooling in their country of origin significantly increases the provision of
common school teachers by 5.8%; (ii) a one standard deviation increase in the county
population of European migrants without exposure to compulsory schooling in their
country of origin significantly decreases the provision of common school teachers by
18%; (iii) these impacts across European migrant groups significantly differ from each
other [p-value =.000]; (iii) the presence of non-European migrants is associated with
significantly higher investments into common school teachers. This ranking of ba j’s is
robust to including state fixed effects (Column 2), and group and county controls (X jcs,
Xc) (Column 3).
Mapping the marginal impacts from the specification in Column 3 back to the
model then implies the following ranking of quasi-linear demand parameters from
(2.6):
aEuro1(HCSL j)=1 = a
Am born > aNonEuro > aEuro1(HCSL j)=0. (2.11)
This links directly to the earlier analysis on how the composition of migrants drove
the cross-state timing of compulsory schooling: there we found the American-born
median voter was especially sensitive to the presence of migrants from European coun-
tries without historic exposure to compulsory schooling. The implied ranking of ba j’s
across European migrant groups closely matches up across the two sets of analysis, de-
spite the two sets of quantitative evidence using entirely different data sources, econo-
metric methods and identification strategies. Fundamentally, it suggests European mi-
grants from countries without historic exposure to compulsory schooling would have
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invested less in American common schools (aEuro1(HCSL j)=1 > a
Euro
1(HCSL j)=0). As such, the
American-born median voter held correct beliefs in bringing forward in time compul-
sory schooling laws in those states where such migrants were more numerous.27
Table 2.7: Migrants and County Investments in Common Schools
Table 7: Migrants and County Investments in Common Schools
OLS estimates, robust standard errors
Dependent variable: Log common school teachers in county
County populations measured in effect sizes
(1) Immigrant
Groups (2) State FE (3) Controls
County Population that is:
American Born .298*** .239*** .029**
(.060) (.042) (.011)
European Born from Countries that did NOT have CSL in 1850 -.180*** -.176*** -.040***
(.032) (.024) (.011)
European Born from Countries that had CSL in 1850 .058* .076*** .036***
(.034) (.025) (.007)
Non-European Born .120*** .078*** .017***
(.018) (.012) (.005)
Mean of Dependent Variable (in levels)
State Fixed Effects No Yes Yes
Group and County Controls No No Yes
American = European Born without CSL [p-value] [.000] [.000] [.002]
European Groups Equal (with and without CSL) [p-value] [.000] [.000] [.000]
Observations (county) 2472 2472 2472
133
Notes: *** denotes significance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10%. The unit of observation is a county, and the sample covers counties from 45
states. The dependent variable is the log of the number of white teachers in the county. All outcomes are measured in 1890. All right hand side
controls are measured in 1880, and derived from the 100% IPUMS-USA census sample. OLS regression estimates are shown, where robust
standard errors are estimated, and observations are weighted by the county population. In all Columns population groupings are all defined in
effect sizes, where this is calculated from population numbers in the cross section of counties in 1890. The European countries defined to have
had compulsory schooling laws in place in 1850 are Austria-Hungary, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Norway, Portugal and Sweden. Column 2
onwards includes state fixed effects. In Column 3 we control for the following characteristics of each group (American born, non-European,
European with and without compulsory schooling laws in 1850): the share aged 0-15, the labor force participation rate, the share residing on a
farm, and the average occupational income score. At the foot of each Column we report the p-value on the null hypothesis that the coefficients
are the same for various pairs of groups.
Given investments into common school are measured in the cross-section of coun-
ties in 1890, and that by then half of all states had passed compulsory schooling, we
next estimate a modified version of (2.10) that allows for the demand for common
schools to vary within the same migrant group depending on whether or not they re-
side in a state with compulsory schooling. This allows us to establish whether the
27One disconnect between the cross-state and cross-county evidence relates to non-Europeans. This
disconnect can stem from two sources: (i) the selection of non-European migrants into the US differs
from that for European migrants; (ii) American-borns were less informed about the preferences of non-
European migrants, that is plausible given the long history of anti-Chinese discrimination in the US,
culminating in the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882, that banned all immigration of Chinese laborers.
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compulsory schooling laws had the intended effect of increasing migrants’ exposure to
American civic values in common schools. Defining a dummy Ds equal to one if state
s has passed compulsory schooling in 1890, we estimate the following specification:
ln(teachers)cs =Â ja j0N jcs+Â ja j1
⇥
Ds⇥N jcs
⇤
+Â j g jX jcs+ds+ucs, (2.12)
where ba j0 and (ba j0+ ba j1) measure the relative demand for common schools pre and
post-compulsory schooling respectively, for the same migrant group j. The correspond-
ing estimates are shown graphically in Figure 2.3. We focus first on Panel A: the left
hand side shows the ba j0’s for each group j (and their corresponding 95% confidence
interval): the y-axis shows the magnitude of each estimate, but as only relative de-
mands for common schools are identified from (2.12), we centre the point estimates
on the value for American-borns. This shows that pre-compulsory schooling, a key
source of diversity in values for common schools was between European migrants with
and without historic exposure to compulsory state schooling in their country of ori-
gin. Indeed, pre-compulsory schooling, European-born migrants from countries with
compulsory schooling already in place by 1850 have significantly higher demands for
common schooling than other European migrants and the American-born.28
The right hand side of Panel A in Figure 2.3 shows the change in demand for
common schooling for the same groups j: these ba j1 estimates show there is a sig-
nificant convergence in demands for common schooling with compulsory schooling.
The change in demand for common schools is significantly greater among Europeans
without historic exposure to compulsory schooling than among Europeans with such
exposure to compulsory state schooling. This evidence suggests the introduction of
compulsory schooling did indeed lead European migrants to be significantly more ex-
posed to the American common schooling system, as measured by this willingness to
invest in such schools. Moreover, this was especially so for Europeans from countries
without historic exposure to compulsory schooling in their country of origin and hence
most in need of homogenizing their civic values towards those being instilled among
28It is well recognized that compulsory schooling laws necessitated no supply side response, so that
the supply of teachers would not have been directly impacted [Margo and Finegan 1996].
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American-born children.
The data complied by Superintendants also allows us to re-estimate (2.12) but
considering pupil attendance as a county level outcome. We can thus assess how pupil
attendance various with migrant shares in the county, and how this relationship alters
under compulsory schooling. The evidence is summarized in Panel B of Figure 2.3.
The results highlight that pre-compulsory schooling, counties with more migrants from
European countries without historic exposure to compulsory schooling in their country
of origin, had lower attendance in American common schools. As shown above, com-
pulsory schooling led to a significant degree of convergence in demands for American
common schools between migrant groups and American-borns. These implied changes
in demand for common schooling are in line with evidence in Panel B on the impact of
compulsory schooling on actual pupil attendance in common schools.
In line with this evidence, Lleras-Muney and Shertzer [2015] show how compul-
sory schooling laws significant increased enrolment rates of migrant children by 5%,
with smaller impacts on American-born children. Ultimately, this will have impacted
the instruction migrant children were exposed to (relative to the counterfactual absent
compulsory schooling) and so shaped the civic values that were instilled into them.
Our evidence thus links closely to the findings of Milligan et al. [2004], who show
using NES and CPS data, that those exposed to compulsory schooling are later in life,
significantly more likely to be registered to vote, to vote, to engage in political discus-
sion with others, to follow political campaigns and attend political meetings, as well
as having higher rates of participation in community affairs and trust in government.
These are the kinds of changes in values emphasized in Glaeser et al. [2007] as being
inculcated through compulsory schooling. Indeed, our findings and these related pa-
pers all suggest that the original architects of the common school system, as discussed
in Section 2, all of whom linked education with inculcating the civic values necessary
for effective participation in American democracy, achieved their aim.29
29Recent evidence also highlights cases in which assimilation policies lead to a backlash among mi-
grants: Fouka [2014] presents evidence showing that Germans that faced restrictions on the use of the
German language in primary schools (introduced over the period 1917-23) are less likely to volunteer
during the Second World War, more likely to marry within their ethnic group, and be more likely to give
German sounding names to their children.
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2.7 Discussion
Many great figures in political and economic history including Napoleon and Adam
Smith, have emphasized the central role of a state’s education system in nation-building
[Milligan et al. 2004, Clots-Figueras and Masella 2013]. In this paper we have exam-
ined the hypothesis that nation-building efforts were part of the policy response of
American voters to the large and diverse waves of migrant inflows during the Age of
Mass Migration. In particular, we have provided qualitative and quantitative evidence
that compulsory schooling was used by Americans as a nation-building tool to homoge-
nize the civic values of migrants who moved to America during the nineteenth century,
with these laws being targeting first towards European migrants without exposure to
a compulsory state schooling system in their country of origin. Our work adds to the
broad literature emphasizing that the national origins of migrants matters [La Porta et
al. 1998, Acemoglu et al. 2001], where we show the importance of national origins for
long run outcomes through a new mechanism: the policy response of natives.
By providing micro-foundations for compulsory schooling, our findings also have
implications for the large literature examining the impacts of compulsion on the hu-
man capital of American-borns. As summarized in Stephens and Yang [2014], this
literature has found rather mixed evidence. Our results suggests this is partly because
American-borns were not the intended marginal beneficiary, and that the core purpose
of compulsion was to instill civic values among the children of migrants. Indeed, our
findings build on and complement Lleras-Muney and Shertzer [2015] who show that
compulsory schooling laws had significant impacts on the enrolment rates of migrant
children (increasing them by around 5% overall), with smaller impacts on native chil-
dren.
We conclude by highlighting two further directions for research. First, a wide set
of public policies might have been impacted by large and diverse inflows during the
Age of Mass Migration. The most natural policy dimension to study next would be
cross-jurisdiction variations in tax rates used to finance local public goods, but varia-
tions observed in the regulation and operation of financial and legal markets, say, might
also originate from differences in patterns of mass migration into those states during
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the 19th century [Burchardi et al. 2016, Fulford et al. 2015].30 It also remains im-
portant to understand other policies specifically targeted towards immigrants during
the study period. For example, during the early 20th century some states introduced
citizenship requirements for foreigners to be able to vote. Such policies presumably
held back immigrant assimilation and sustained greater heterogeneity in values among
the population. Hence there remains a need to understand the political economy trade-
offs involved that led to the simultaneous use of both nation-building efforts towards
foreigners as well as their political exclusion.
A second direction for future research is to combine the ideas underpinning this
analysis with earlier work that documented high rates of out-migration from the US by
Europeans during the Age of Mass Migration [Bandiera et al. 2013]. This opens up an
agenda examining whether returning Europeans drove institutional and legal change in
their home country after having been exposed to American society.
30This emerging body of work indeed suggests that migration during the Age of Mass migration is
causally linked to: (i) FDI sent and received by firms across US counties [Burchardi et al. 2016]; (ii) the
evolution of county level income for a century later [Fulford et al. 2015].

Chapter 3
Stars and Brokers: Knowledge
Spillovers in Medical Science
3.1 Introduction
The importance of technological progress for economic growth is well understood, yet
the process of knowledge creation remains elusive. Opening the black box of inno-
vation requires an understanding of the creativity process itself. Endogenous growth
models suggest that the production function of new knowledge depends on new (re–
)combinations of the existing stock of knowledge by researchers (Jones, 2009, Mokyr,
2002, Romer, 1990a, Weitzman, 1998, Wuchty et al., 2007).
If creativity requires a fresh perspective on existing knowledge, then access to a diverse
pool of knowledge plays a crucial role for the productivity of a researcher. Being aware
of breakthroughs will alert original and creative individuals to gaps and opportunities
in the existing stock of knowledge. As highlighted by Mokyr (2005), the progress in
exploiting the existing stock of knowledge will depend first and foremost on the ease
and cost of access to knowledge. In sociology, it has long been recognised that the
structure of network ties and one’s position therein are important determinants of a
researcher’s access knowledge and the diversity of it (Borgatti, 2005, Wellman and
Berkowitz, 1988). Scientists are embedded in a larger scientific community within
which knowledge is shared. The structure of the community shape the connections
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between scientists, each embodying specialised skill and knowledge.
This paper investigates the importance of network position for the productivity of
scientists. Specifically, I study the influence a star has on the productivity of a given
scientist and allow for heterogeneity in the effect by network positions. To capture
the idea that network positions provide access to different knowledge embodied in
researchers, I measure to what extent a scientist is near a so–called “structural hole”
(Burt, 2004). Structural holes are gaps in the network at which people on either side
of the hole have access to different information flows. Brokers occupy an exclusive
intermediate position acting as a “bridge” across structural holes. Through such in-
termediation, they reduce the cost of accessing new knowledge and provide research
opportunities by brokering the flow of information between contacts who differ in their
skills and knowledge. Put differently, brokers are potential amplifiers for innovation
since they are well–positioned to synthesize ideas arising from different groups (Burt,
2004, Granovetter, 1973).
I propose a new measure of brokerage motivated by the idea that scientists embed-
ded in a collaborative network meet and freely share ideas. Scientists embody unique
specialized information and research skills. Knowledge flows along coauthorship links;
scientists can get access to the knowledge of their immediate coauthors and scientists
further away through mutual contacts. The connections received via a coauthor are
beneficial to the extent that they provide access to new knowledge that differs from
previously available information. This means that the relative position of coauthors to
one another will determine how much they rely on the other to provide non–redundant
information. Brokerage degree is a pair–specific and asymmetric measure defined for
a local neighborhood (up to three links away) that quantifies this dependency. More
precisely, the brokerage degree of B to A is defined as the share of scientist B’s links
that offer a unique and exclusive access to new scientists (or new knowledge) for A.
The analysis is based on stars in medical science for whom collaboration is the norm
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and information on quantity of output is easily measured by publications. Moreover,
knowledge, at least when it is new, often remains tacit and confined to tightly-knit
groups. Therefore scientific collaborations play an important role as they involve the
exchange of ideas and opinions and facilitate the generation of new ideas. The focus
on star scientists is driven by the observation that high performers account for the
generation of a large share of total research output(Lotka, 1926, Narin and Breitzman,
1995, Rosen, 1981, Zucker and Darby, 1996). Moreover, recent evidence suggests that
only colleagues of very high quality affect the productivity of scientists (Azoulay et al.,
2010, Borjas and Doran, 2013).
One of the main empirical challenges to establishing the presence of spillovers is
the sorting of individuals into collaborations. A scientist’s decision to coauthor and
therefore his position in the overall network is often strategic with the consequence that
networks are endogenously determined. Given that people appreciate that brokerage
advantages are possible, they implicitly seek out opportunities to realize them. This
is exacerbated by the presence of unobservable factors that affect a researcher’s pro-
ductivity but also the productivity of his peers. I use a well–established identification
strategy exploiting the sudden and unexpected deaths of scientists to obtain exoge-
nous shocks to the collaborative network allowing one to uncover the causal impact
of the loss of a coauthor on the productivity of a scientist (Aizenman and Kletzer,
2008, Azoulay et al., 2014, 2010, Becker and Hvide, 2013, Bennedsen et al., 2007,
Fadlon and Nielsen, 2015, Fracassi and Tate, 2012, Isen, 2015, Jaravel et al., 2015,
Jones and Olken, 2005, Nguyen and Nielsen, 2010, Oettl, 2012, Patnam, 2011). For
this purpose, I search for the deaths of medical star scientists from obituaries and
memoires and gather 1,111 deaths of star scientists, 127 of which were sudden and un-
expected. I build the coauthorship network from a panel of 9 million medical scientists.
This dataset derives from the combination of MedLine, a comprehensive database on
biomedical publications covering the period from 1965 to 2013, and Author-ity (2009),
a database resulting from a name disambiguity algorithm that estimates the probability
that two articles in MedLine that share the same author name were actually written by
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the same individual.
To examine the performance of scientists had they not lost a star–coauthor, I create
an appropriate control group through a propensity score matching procedure. I match
on the characteristics of the star, the coauthor and their relationships up to the year of
the death. In a difference-in-difference regression, I examine the change in research
output of scientists following the sudden death of a star–coauthor. To assess the het-
erogeneity in the effect by network position, I exploit the variation in the brokerage
degree between the deceased stars and their coauthors. It is important to emphasize
that I do not model the formation of the network. I take the initial configuration of
scientists in the network as given. Given that scientists are not randomly assigned to
network positions, this means that results cannot be interpreted as the causal effect
of losing a broker. The variation in the network position allows me to quantify how
the effect of the treatment (i.e. the death of a star–coauthor) varies by brokerage degree.
The main findings are as follows. First, the sudden and unexpected death of a coauthor
leads to decrease in output quantity and quality. The loss of a coauthor represents
an 8% decrease in annual publications. The number of publications where the star
is not a coauthor are also affected confirming that knowledge spillovers might be at
play. The effect is long–lasting and mainly affects younger coauthors who are still
acquiring skills. Second, network position matters. The higher the brokerage degree
(i.e. the greater the dependence of the coauthor on his star to provide access to sci-
entists further away) the greater the decline in productivity following his death. The
loss of a star providing only non–redundant links (i.e. broker) compared to a star
providing only redundant links (i.e. non–broker) is associated with a 31% decrease in
the yearly number of publications. Third, the decline in productivity is consistent with
an increase in the cost of accessing knowledge embodied in scientists further away.
To examine the access to knowledge as a primary explanatory mechanism, brokerage
degree is measured based on the number of new topics access only via the star (rather
than coauthors further away), taking care to remove any topic known to the scientists
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and/or the star. The death of a star who provided access to only non–redundant topics is
associated with a 16% decrease in the yearly number of publications. The importance
of brokerage degree remains remarkably robust to alternative mechanisms. The fact
that coauthors with a high brokerage degree to their star are significantly more severely
affected by their death can be an indication that brokerage degree is correlated with
some unobserved characteristics of the star, the coauthor, the local network and the
type of coauthorship. The death of a star involves the loss of knowledge and access to
resources provided by the star himself. More able or better connected coauthors may
have an easier time to recover from the loss. The local network, measured by other
centrality measures, may in fact serves as a conduit of knowledge. Finally, certain ties
yield better or more output.
From a general perspective, these results are indicative, in both significance and mag-
nitude, of the potential importance of network externalities in productivity and provide
insight into the mechanisms behind the creation of knowledge. Uncovering the in-
fluence of network position is important given the policy implications for the optimal
allocation of public research and development funds, and the design of research in-
centives that foster innovation and potentially economic growth. Biomedical research
receives large public subsidies. The United States allocated $30.4 billion in 2015 to
research conducted by the National Institute of Health (NIH). Public funding bodies,
like the NIH, whose aim is the overall advancement of science and the diffusion of
knowledge may want target public funds towards “key scientists”, i.e. scientists who
generate the highest possible aggregate scientific output in a network. Given the role
of a scientist’s position, key players are not necessarily the scientists with the highest
number of publications (Ballester et al., 2006). Moreover, policy measures aimed at
fostering partnerships, networking and knowledge sharing are generally assumed to
increase the effectiveness of the system.
This paper contributes to the growing empirical research on peer effects in scien-
tific research. A number of recent empirical studies exploit supply shocks generated
80 Chapter 3. Stars and Brokers: Knowledge Spillovers in Medical Science
by a variety of natural experiments to single out a causal relationship. The papers that
are closest to the research presented here are Azoulay et al. (2010) and Oettl (2012).
Both investigate medical scientists and, utilising unexpected deaths of stars as a natural
experiment, report significant reduction in output among those who remain. Azoulay
et al. (2010) finds that coauthors suffer a 5 to 8% decline in their quality-adjusted pub-
lication rates after the death of a superstar coauthor. Oettl (2012) builds on Azoulay
et al. (2010) and distinguishes between helpfulness and productivity of a star. Coau-
thors of highly helpful (not highly productive) scientists that die experience a decrease
in output quality but not output quantity. Using the same research design, I present
another dimension of heterogeneity in the loss of a star by providing evidence for the
role of network position. Although the death of high–productivity stars has a negative
impact on the performance of their coauthors, the differential effect between brokers
and non–brokers is stark: brokers negatively affect the performance of their coauthors
when they die whereas non–brokers do not. Using the the dismissal of scientists in
Nazi Germany as an exogenous change in the peer group, Waldinger (2010, 2012) find
that the quality of Ph.D. students declined in affected departments while the produc-
tivity of colleagues left behind was unaffected. Borjas and Doran (2012b) examine
the impact of the large influx of Soviet mathematicians into the United States after
the collapse of the Soviet Union and find that the output of American mathematicians
with the most Soviet-like research programs fell dramatically. In considering the peer
effects in science, most studies have focused their attention on one-degree, egocentric
coauthorship or colleague network without specifically examining the wider network
these scientists are embedded in. Peer effects are generally conceived as an homoge-
nous dependence across members, and correspond to an average intra–group influence.
I extend these studies by studying peer effects through the lens of network position.
Despite the growing consensus that social interactions as encoded by a network of
relationships matter, the specific effect of different elements of network structure on
innovation remains unclear.
This paper also fits into the literature on how information flows through a social
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network, how different nodes can play structurally distinct roles in this process, and
how these structural considerations shape the evolution of the network itself over time.
The sociology literature on social network is well–established (Borgatti, 2005, Wasser-
man and Faust, 1994). Many studies show the powerful impact of social structure
and networks on the extent and source of innovation and its diffusion as reviewed by
Rogers (2003). In particular, the notion of structural holes (Burt, 2009), which pro-
vides brokerage opportunities and brings social capital, draws on network concepts
that emerged in sociology during the 1970s; most notably Granovetter (1973) on the
strength of weak ties, Freeman (1977) on betweenness centrality, Cook and Emerson
(1978) on the benefits of having exclusive exchange partners, and Burt (1980) on the
structural autonomy created by complex networks. Unlike other centrality measures,
brokerage is pair–specific and asymmetric and captures flows which are local in nature.
In economics, most empirical studies find that better connected or better positioned in-
dividuals benefit from their network position in a variety of settings.1 Calvo-Armengol
and Jackson (2004) describe a network model of information exchange about job op-
portunities. They show that peer effects in drop–out decisions vary in equilibrium with
network location. Ballester et al. (2010), Calvo´-Armengol and Zenou (2004), Patac-
chini and Zenou (2012) embed criminal activities in a social network model. They
study the effect of the structure of the network on crime and show that the location
in the social network of each criminal not only affects his/her direct friends but also
friends of friends, etc. Banerjee et al. (2013a) highlight the role of entry points and
document that in villages where leaders occupy central positions in the village network,
adoption of a micro finance product is higher. In the context of scientific research, Duc-
tor et al. (2014) show that an important determinant in the prediction of future research
1Centrality is important in explaining job opportunities Granovetter (1995), Hellerstein et al. (2015),
exchange networks Cook et al. (1983), Marsden (1982), peer effects in education and crime Calvo´-
Armengol et al. (2009), Hahn et al. (2015), Haynie (2001), power in organisations Brass (1984), the
adoption of innovation Coleman et al. (1966), the creativity of workers Perry-Smith and Shalley (2003),
the diffusion of micro finance programs Banerjee et al. (2013b), the flow of information Borgatti (2005),
the formation and performance of R&D collaborating firms and inter-organisational networks Uzzi
(1997), the success of open-source projects Grewal et al. (2006) as well as workers’ performance Mehra
et al. (2001).
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output over and above the information contained in past performance is a researcher’s
coauthorship links. My results confirm the importance of network position, quantified
through a new measure of brokerage, on scientific productivity.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. The next section presents the
brokerage measure and the intuition behind its importance on the productivity of sci-
entists. The construction of the dataset is described in section 3.3. Section 3.4 outlines
the identification strategy. Section 3.5 presents results on the productivity of scientists
following the sudden death of a coauthor and then examines the heterogeneity in the
effect across the network position of the deceased scientist. To establish the loss of
network spillovers as the primary explanatory mechanism, I first rule out alternative
mechanisms by looking at characteristics of the coauthor, the star himself, the network
and the coauthorship. I then show that the decline in productivity following the death
of a co-author is driven by the fact the scientists lost a coauthor who provided access to
knowledge embodied in scientists further away. Section 3.6 concludes. Details of the
dataset construction, additional descriptives statistics, results and robustness checks are
deferred to the Appendices.
3.2 Motivating and Defining Brokerage
To help motivate the importance of network position within a scientific community,
consider the discovery of the double helix structure of DNA. Rosalind Franklin, an
English biophysicist and X–ray crystallographer, was studying DNA at King’s College
London. Her experimental work proved to be crucial for the work done by Francis
Crick and James Watson, two molecular biologist at the University of Cambridge.
Their work resulted in the correct molecular model for the structure of DNA –the
double helix– for which they won the Nobel Prize in 1962. By all accounts, Crick
and Watson had little interaction with Franklin. They exploited some of Franklin’s un-
published work, which was shown to them, without her knowledge, by her colleague,
Maurice Wilkins (Watson, 2012).
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The controversy surrounding the discovery of the double helix illustrates three key
features of the nature of scientific research. First, scientists do not work in isolation.
They are part of a wider network of scientists within which knowledge is shared.
Second, despite the importance of written communication in science, the majority of
scientific communication still takes place through private conversation as knowledge
remains tacit long after discoveries are made (Newman, 2001c). In this way, knowl-
edge, at least when it is new, is embodied in particular individuals; it cannot diffuse
rapidly, and it cannot be easily-duplicated. Therefore personal scientific collaborations
play an important role in the exchange of ideas and opinions and facilitates the gen-
eration of new ideas. Third, innovations can arise from the unexpected synthesis of
multiple ideas, each of them on their own perhaps well–known, but well–known in
distinct and unrelated bodies of expertise.
Now consider these observations in the context of a simple network illustrated in
the figure 3.1. The network represents a community of scientists consisting of nodes
(i.e. the scientists) and edges (i.e. coauthorships). Each scientist embodies unique
ideas, knowledge and specialized skills. Knowledge circulates from one scientist to
the next along the edges. Scientists can thus receive knowledge not only from direct
coauthors but also from scientists further away through common coauthors. The node
B is connected to four other nodes: A, C, D, and E but the link between B and A is
different from B’s other links. The links to C, D and E connect her to a tightly–knit
group. Given that knowledge is more homogeneous within a tightly–knit group than in
a more open group with few overlapping links, these links expose B to similar opinions
and ideas. The link to A however reaches into different parts of the network, offering
access to knowledge B would not otherwise hear about. Given the opportunity to gen-
erate novel ideas by combining these disparate sources of information in new ways, the
more non–redundant knowledge a scientist receives, the more productive he becomes.
This means that the link to A is especially important for B’s productivity. My aim is
to quantify the special dependency between a scientist and his neighbor in providing
access to knowledge embodied in scientists further away.
84 Chapter 3. Stars and Brokers: Knowledge Spillovers in Medical Science
The edge joining nodes A  B is defined as a local bridge. Deleting the edge be-
tween A and B would cause the distance between them, as measured by minimum
number of co–authors indirectly linking A to B, to a value strictly more than two. They
have no common coauthor. However, the A B edge isn’t the only path connecting
A and B. They are also connected by a longer path through E and F . The span of a
local bridge is the distance its endpoints would be from each other if the edge were
deleted. Here the A B edge is a local bridge with span three. An edge joining two
nodes is a bridge if deleting the edge would cause the two nodes to lie in two different
components. In other words, this edge is literally the only route between them. This is
an extreme case of a local bridge. If the cost of accessing knowledge from two nodes
is a function of the distance between them, then the dependency of one scientist to his
neighbor should be a function of the span.
AK
L
M
N
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
IJ
Figure 3.1: Example: Local bridge, neighborhood overlap and brokerage degree
The notion of local bridges is closely related to Granovetter (1973)’s “weak ties”.
Local bridges tend to be weak ties because if they weren’t, triadic closure2 would tend
to produce short-cuts that would eliminate the local bridge. Weak ties serve to link dif-
ferent tightly–knit communities that each contain a large number of stronger ties. This
means that more novel information flows to individuals through weak than through
strong ties. Burt (2004, 2009) extended and reformulated the weak ties argument by
2Triadic closure is the property among three nodes A, B, and C, such that if a strong tie exists between
A-B and A-C, there is an increased likelihood that B-C will form a link – a structure called triangle. The
terms “triadic closure” comes from the fact that the B-C edge has the effect of “closing” the third side of
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emphasizing that what is of central importance is not the quality of any particular tie
but rather the way different parts of networks are bridged. He emphasizes the strategic
advantage that may be enjoyed by individuals with ties into multiple networks that
are largely separated from one another. In his words, node A, with her multiple local
bridges, spans a structural hole – the “empty space” in the network between two sets
of nodes that do not otherwise interact closely.
A well–known measure used to measure the local bridges is the one of neighborhood
overlap.
Definition 1 Neighborhood overlap of an edge connecting A and B is the ratio
NOAB =
# nodes who are neighbors of both A and B
# nodes who are neighbors of at least one of A or B
(3.1)
where in the denominator we don’t count A or B themselves.3
In the example 3.1, the neighbourhood overlap between A and G (NOAG) is 1/6 as only
J is a common neighbour of both A and G. If the bridge between A and G were to
disappear, the distance between A and G would be two. Therefore the neighborhood
overlap is the continuous measure of a local bridge of span of two. A has no common
coauthors with her other neighbors (NOAB = NOAK = NOAF = 0). This means that
these edges acts more as a local bridge than the edge between A and G.
Neighborhood overlap is a pair–specific and symmetric measure which takes into
account the network up to two links away. It measures how much common knowledge
they share. However, my interest lies in how much one scientist depends on a coau-
thor to provide him access to new knowledge embodied in scientists further away. To
quantify this dependency, I propose a pair–specific and asymmetric measure, called
brokerage degree, which takes into account a larger local network than neighborhood
overlap.
3The numerator of the neighborhood overlap ratio is known as the embeddedness of a edge (i.e. the
number of common neighbors the two nodes share).
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Definition 2 The brokerage degree 0 bAB  1 is a continuous measure defined at the
coauthorship level.
bAB =
# nodes who are neighbors of B but not A
# links of B - 1
(3.2)
where the numerator will be called # of non–redundant nodes. Dividing the number
of non–redundant nodes scientist B offers to A by the number of coauthors of B allows
us to take into account the local neighborhood of B, making it a scale–free measure.
Brokerage degree therefore represents the share of non–redundant nodes scientist B
offers to A. Specifically, it counts the number of new coauthors a specific coauthor
offers access to, taking care to eliminate coauthors with direct links to one another and
coauthors with a middleman linking them (as illustrated by the three examples in the
figure 3.2). Unlike neighborhood overlap, brokerage degree is based on the network
up to three links away whereas neighborhood overlap is based on a local network up to
two links away. In the example, bAB = bAG = 23 , bAK =
3
3 , bAF = 0, bGA = bBA =
3
4 . K
only provides non–redundant links to A whereas F provides only a redundant one.
A
B C
D E
A
B C
D E
A
B C
D E
F
bBA = 1
bCA = 1
bDA = 1
bEA = 1
bBA = 1
bCA = 1
bDA = 23
bEA = 23
bBA = 1
bCA = 23
bDA = 1
bEA = 23
Figure 3.2: Degree of brokerage
This measure of brokerage is closely related to the the density of a “local” network
(close or loose–knit network) (Harary, 1969). Counting the number of ties observed in
the network formed by a scientist and his immediate coauthors and dividing it by the
ratio of possible ones. It rests on the fact that the denser the network, the more alter-
native paths there are along which information, ideas and influence can travel between
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any two nodes. Pairs of scientists with high degree of brokerage tend to form in less
dense networks. Yet another closely related measure is betweenness (Freeman, 1979).
This measure counts the number of times a given scientist falls along the shortest path
between two others scientists. Although closely related to these measures, brokerage
degree is pair–specific and measures a feature of the relationship between two nodes
within a very local network.4
Scientists with high brokerage degree to their coauthors benefit in a number of ways.
The first benefit is an informational one: they receive earlier access to a valuable pieces
of information originating from multiple and non–interacting parts of the network
(Burt, 1997, 2004). Moreover, scientists can benefit from referrals. It is easier for two
scientists to meet and connect if they have a mutual coauthor. A long line of research
in sociology has argued that if two individual are connected by an embedded edge,
then this makes it easier for them to trust one another, and to have confidence in the
integrity of the transaction (Coleman, 1988, Granovetter, 1985, Uzzi, 1996). In section
3.5, I examine the importance of brokerage degree on the productivity of a scientists,
the new links formed and new topic explored through potential referrals.
3.3 Data and Descriptives
3.3.1 Publications
Publication information is taken from the MedLine, the National Library of Medicine’s
bibliographic database. It contains over 20 million publications in leading biomedical
journals over a period covering 1965 to 2013. The following information on each
publication is provided: title of article, abstract, journal name, author list, medical
subject heading (MeSH)5, language, and affiliation. In order to capture the quality of
scientific output, I also examine the number of publications weighted by the journal
4Formal definitions can be found in Appendix B
5Medical Subject Headings (MeSH) thesaurus is a controlled vocabulary produced by the United
States National Library of Medicine to index all the articles in MedLine and consists of 24,767 terms
arranged in a hierarchical structure.
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impact factor and the number of citations received.6
A well-known problem with this dataset is that authors are not uniquely identified. In
the case of MedLine, almost 2/3 of authors have an ambiguous name (where their last
name and first initial is shared with one or more other authors) (Torvik and Smalheiser,
2009). The “John Smith” issue has been the topic of many disambiguate algorithm (i.e.
the identification of individuals from author names, or equivalently, the identification
of author oeuvres within a literature).7 I rely on the disambiguate algorithm “Author-
ity” developed by Torvik et al. (2005). It is based on the idea that different articles
written by the same individual will tend to share certain characteristic article attributes,
much more so than pairs of articles authored by different individuals.8 The resulting
database, Author-ity 2009, based on a snapshot of PubMed9 taken in July 2009, assigns
each article to one of 6.7 million inferred author-individual clusters.10
Combining the MedLine and Author-ity datasets, I trace the publication record of
9 million scientists over their entire career and extract the coauthorship network from
6I use journal ranking developed by SCImago which is based on the Google PageRank algorithm.
The indicator shows the visibility or prestige of the journals contained in the Scopus database from
1996 by the frequency the average article in the journal has been cited in a particular year. Subject field,
quality and reputation of the journal have a direct effect on the value of a citation. SJR also normalizes for
differences in citation behavior between subject fields. The number of citations received per publications
is retrieved from Scopus. One drawback is that the journals covered in the Scopus and MedLine do not
perfectly overlap. Therefore there are publications in journals without any impact factor or any forward
citations.
7Author name disambiguation is one of the great unresolved issues in bibliometrics. Kang et al.
(2009) provide an excellent review of the problem and of the literature that explores approaches for
dealing with it.
8The algorithm is based on an unsupervised machine learning algorithm, fed with information ex-
tracted from each record in PubMed using, among others, text processing on several fields of the record.
They present a probabilistic model that describes how two articles in MedLine, sharing the same au-
thor name (last name and first initial), were written by the same individual given how similar the two
articles are across 8 dimensions: middle initial match, suffix match, journal name, language of article
match, number of coauthor names in common, number of title words in common after preprocessing
and removing title-stopwords, number of affiliation words in common after preprocessing and remov-
ing affiliation-stopwords, and the number of MeSH words in common after preprocessing and removing
mesh-stopwords. The method is applied to the entire PubMed/Medline database of roughly 15 million
records, and is computationally expensive.
9PubMed includes MedLine and PubMed-not-records.
10The Author-ity 2009 database is available for nonprofit academic research, and can be freely queried
via http://arrowsmith.psych.uic.edu
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the joint publications. I consider two scientists to be linked if they have ever published
together. Links can never be broken. To guarantee that the sample represents actual
researchers and not practitioners with an “accidental” publication, I keep authors who
have at least five years of career, a minimum of two publications and at least one coau-
thor.
The general descriptives of the publication and patent datasets are presented in B.5
in the Appendix. The patterns described have been widely documented. The average
number of authors on a publication and the specialisation of scientists has increased
over time. These patterns hint at the rising burden of knowledge as documented by
Jones (2009). The number of publications per scientists has remained stable over time.
The number of clusters has increased and so has the assortative coefficient. There
are few very large collaborations in the database, and yet there are a small number
of individuals with very large numbers of collaborators. One possibility is that it is
the result of the practice in the biomedical research community of laboratory directors
signing their name to all (or most) papers emerging from their laboratories. One can
well imagine that, with some individuals directing very large laboratories, this could
generate authors with a very high number of collaborators.
3.3.2 Obituary Records
In an attempt to collect as many obituary records as possible, manual searches and
web scraping of medical obituaries and memoires are performed. Information on the
deceased, the year of birth and death, and the cause of death are gathered.11 I categorise
the cause of death in “sudden” and “anticipated” groups.
I then identify the deceased scientists in the Author-ity publications through first
and last names, and the publication years relative to the age (proxied by the year of
first publication) and the year of the death. The matching is by no means trivial and its
11Obituary sources are detailed in the Appendix B. In contrast to Azoulay et al. (2010), who start
from a pool of scientists and search for the cause of death, I gather obituary records relevant to medical
scientists and match these records to publication.
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validity is essential to the credibility of this exercise. I initially eliminate the following:
(1) all individuals younger than 18 years old the year of their first publication, (2)
individuals whose first publication occurs within five years preceding their death if
they were 50 years old or older at the time of their death and, (3) individuals whose
last publications are more than 10 years before or after their death. I then proceed by
iterations until a unique identifier is found for an obituary record. First, I match the
first and last name. Second, I restrict the sample to individuals with a first publication
between the ages of 25 and 40 and a last publication within 5 years pre– or post–death.
Finally, I select the scientists with the largest number of publications. Details of the
procedure to link the can be found in Appendix B.12
In Appendix B, I present an example of a deceased scientist and the match to a pub-
lication record. “Jane Doe” and her husband, both researchers at the Johns Hopkins
University School of Hygiene and Public Health, died in a plane crash in 1998. They
were both leaders in the research on AIDS. The New York Times and the Gazette of
the Johns Hopkins University both feature news of the accident. “Jane Doe” published
in May of the year of her death in the Journal of Infectious Disease as a lead author.
All coauthors of this articles are the focus of my analysis. For instance, Weinhold K.,
the second author if this article, later published in 2011 in the PLOS pathogens.
The final dataset contains 1111 deaths of star scientists and among the ones with a
cause of death, 127 are sudden and 224 are anticipated. Researchers recorded in the
obituaries die on average at the age of 56 due to some form of cancer. The leading
causes of sudden death are heart attacks and car accidents (see tables B.3 and B.4 in
the Appendix).13
12The fuzzy string matching may lead to false positives. These measurement errors relate to the name
matching of the obituary records to the MedLine publication database. To alleviate these concerns, I also
examine a subsample only including deceased star scientists for which the quality of the string matching
was perfect. Reassuringly, the results do not seem to be driven by the quality of the string matching (see
table B.9 in the Appendix).
13The deaths collected represent approximately 1% of deaths in my sample assuming that medical
scientists are as likely to die as the average American.
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3.4 Empirical Strategy
3.4.1 Estimating Knowledge Spillovers
My aim is to observe whether, and if so to what extent, the relative position of two
neighboring scientists in the local co–authorship network affects their productivity
through knowledge spillovers. The evolution of a coauthorship (i.e. the links formed or
broken) are endogenous. Given that there tends to be strong similarities across linked
individuals, the endogeneity could generate correlations in their productivities even
when there are no spillovers. The sudden and unexpected death of a coauthor provides
a quasi–natural experiment which exogenously breaks network links and changes the
local network structure for reasons unrelated to the productivity of surviving scien-
tists.This allows us to examine the causal effect of the loss of a coauthor on the produc-
tivity of a scientists in a difference–in–differences strategy.14 I estimate the following
equation for a scientist i who coauthored with scientist j,
yi,t = a post death j,t +b post death j,t ⇤bi j,death+ agei,t +rt + ti j+ ei,t (3.3)
where yi,t is the outcome variable of scientist i at time t. The variables of interest are
post death which is equal to one for coauthors of scientists who die for years after the
death and the variable bi j,death is the brokerage degree from j to i at the time of death
as defined in section 3.2. Because brokerage degree is time–invariant, I only identify
brokerage degree through the interaction with post death. The coefficient a captures
the causal effect of coauthor j’s death on the net change in scientist i’s productivity.
The coefficient b captures the change in productivity of scientist i if the brokerage
degree of j to i is one at the time of his death (i.e. all of j’s links are non–redundant
for i) relative to the productivity change when the brokerage degree is zero (i.e. all of
j’s links are redundant for j).
14I take the initial network as given and do not model the strategic formation of the coauthorship
network. There has been an active area of research on strategic network formation (see e.g. Aumann
and Myerson (1988), Bala and Goyal (1999), Bramoulle´ et al. (2014), Dutta et al. (2005), Jackson and
Wolinsky (1996)) including papers that explicitly incorporate the notion of structural holes (Buskens and
Van de Rijt, 2008, Goyal and Vega-Redondo, 2007). These theoretical papers are highly stylized, and
hence difficult to directly apply to empirical work.
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I evaluate a researcher’s productivity through several measures. First, the annual
number of publications15 is used to capture the quantity of scientific output. Second,
I examine the quality of scientific output by weighting the number of publications by
the journal impact factor and the number of citations received. Both these measures
are widely employed as tools for evaluating performance. The citation weighted pub-
lication has the advantage over the journal impact factors to differentiate between the
quality of publications within the same journal. However, citations as a proxy for
quality is not without problems (Coupe´ et al., 2010, Torgler and Piatti, 2011). Some
fields attract more citations (Arrow et al., 2011, Cole and Cole, 1971) and citations can
be driven by fashion (Van Dalen and Klamer, 2005). Moreover, due to censoring publi-
cations near the end of my period each publication does not have the same opportunity
of being cited. Nevertheless, citations are highly correlated with the assessed quality
of papers and remain a valuable metric for evaluating the significance of a publication
through peer–ratings. Lastly, for a subset of the scientists the number of patents are
used as a measure of innovative output. In addition to the productivity of scientists,
I look at the effect of the death on other margins, for instance the number of new
coauthorships formed and the number of new MeSH codes explored.
A set of career age brackets dummies are included to control for life–cycle changes in
productivity. The career age is measured by the number of years since the first publi-
cation.16 The calendar year fixed effect rt is included to take care of yearly fluctuation
in publications that affect all researchers in the same way. Research fields may exhibit
rapid growth or decay which has a direct impact on the probability of publishing or col-
laborating (Levin and Stephan, 1991). ti j is a coauthorship fixed effect which soaks up
all unobserved time-invariant characteristics such as complementarity and social prox-
imity effects (age, gender, ethnicity, month tongue, place of education, stable research
15The number of publications per author is highly skewed with a few outliers. MedLine contains many
journals which do not have any journal impact factor. Therefore the number of publications is winsorized
at the 1% level. The results are robust to winsorizing at the 5% level.
16I do not observe the start of a career (end of Ph.D. or first job). I will examine how this assumption
affects results in section 3.5.1.1.
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interest, mutual empathy, complementarity in skills etc.). In particular, it accounts for
the level of brokerage degree as it is measured at the time of death.
I estimate equation 3.3 using OLS with robust standard errors clustered at the star
level. This takes into account the possible serial correlation in a scientist’s outcomes
over time and the possible correlation in the outcomes of scientists linked to the same
star. 17
3.4.2 Appropriate Control Group
The aim of my analysis is to examine what would have happened to the performance of
scientists had they not experienced the sudden and unexpected death of a coauthor. One
possible strategy is to estimate equation 3.3 for the treated group only (i.e. scientists
who are affected by the death of a star–coauthor). In this specification, the control
group for scientists who have experienced the death of a star–coauthor consists of sci-
entists who have experienced the loss of their star in the past or will in the future. The
life–cycle patterns of control scientists would not be appropriately captured, especially
if there is indeed a negative effect on the productivity following the death.18
An alternative specification is estimating equation 3.3 over the entire sample of scien-
tists. However this could potentially lead to biased estimates due to selection. Figures
B.1 and B.2 in the Appendix show that the deceased star scientists are at the top end of
the distribution in terms of the number of publications and the number of coauthors.19
These figures point to the lack of balance and only partial overlap between the dis-
tribution of the deceased stars and the general population of scientists. Having been
17Given the nature of the outcome variables which are highly skewed and nonnegative, one may
prefer to perform a conditional quasi-maximum likelihood Poisson specification (Hausman et al., 1984).
Results are robust to this specification
18Results of this specification are similar to the baseline ones and can be found in table B.13 in
Appendix.
19The distribution of the number of publications and coauthors are highly skewed. One possible
explanation is that it is the result of the practice in the biomedical research community of laboratory
directors signing their name to all (or most) papers emerging from their laboratories. One can well
imagine that, with some individuals directing very large laboratories, this could generate authors with a
very high apparent number of collaborators.
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archived in an obituary or a memoire, it is likely that the group of deceased scientists
are a highly selected group of “star” scientists, meaning that they were at the time of
their death of relatively higher productivity or had promising careers. Moreover, this
selection bias is likely to spill over to the coauthors of the deceased scientists due to
homophily. This is problematic as the full population of scientists in the data may not
be the appropriate counterfactual for the coauthors of deceased star scientists.
One method for dealing with this selection issue is to find other stars who exhibit
no systematic difference in output trends to the treated group up to the time of death.
Matching will discard observations so that the remaining data show good balance and
overlap. I match deceased scientists to five scientists that are as likely to be archived
in an obituary when they die, conditional on a vector of observable characteristics.20
For every year of death and cohort (proxied by the year of first publication), a nearest
neighbour propensity score matching without replacement is implemented. First, I
collected the pool of potential controls consisting of all researchers who have started
their career around the same time as the deceased star: their first publications is within
a three years window of the deceased star’s. From this set, I rule out (1) all deceased
scientists, (2) scientists that have already been matched to deceased stars in previous
rounds of matching, and (3) all scientists who are coauthors of the deceased scientist.
Given the organisation of research with large components and coauthorship networks
often being tight-knit, the last criteria creates a “buffer” between the treated and con-
trols. For the remaining potential control pairs, I then measure their productivity up to
the year of death. Last, I estimate the propensity of a scientist to be treated (i.e. to be
mentioned in an obituary), using a logistic regression of the likelihood of a scientist
being recorded in an obituary record as a function of the characteristics measured at
the year of death for the deceased star and the pseudo–year of death for the potential
controls. The variables include the cohort, the cumulative number of JIF–weighted
publications, and the cumulative number of coauthors. In choosing the covariates I
20The decision to match each deceased star to five scientists is motivated by the fact that there will be
a second matching procedure for the coauthors of the deceased and matched stars. Having five matched
stars allows for a trade–off between the two matching procedures.
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control for systematic differences between stars and scientists on dimensions that are
possible sources of status. The matching procedure results in a pool of stars: each of
the 701 deceased star scientists is matched to five other star scientists.21
A series of QQ–plots are presented in figures B.3, B.4, and B.5 in the Appendix.
They compare the empirical distribution of treated and matched pairs on a few key
variables used to construct the match. The quantities of the treated and control samples
are calculated and plotted against each other. If the empirical distributions are the
same in the treated and control groups, the points in the QQ–plots should all lie on
the 45 degree line. We can see that the central points seem to agree fairly well for all
three variables of the first matching, but there are some discrepancies at the tails of
the distributions for the number of publications. I also examine the QQ–plots on other
variables for which I do not match on in figures B.6, B.7, B.8, B.9, B.10, and B.11) of
the Appendix. They show that the matching procedure appears to have improved on
the fit on other network centrality measures.
All scientists who have coauthored with these stars (the deceased stars and the matched
stars) are gathered. I remove all coauthors who are associated with two or more
stars. I also eliminate from the sample all coauthors who are both treated and control.
However, simply comparing the two groups of coauthors might still lead to erroneous
conclusions. First, there are many reasons to believe that there is a life-cycle to collab-
oration, with their productive potential first increasing over time, eventually peaking,
and thereafter slowly declining (Levin and Stephan, 1991). Second, coauthorship pairs
are embedded in local communities of researchers which can be more or less dense.
In a dense community, all researchers are connected to one another and the degree of
brokerage is likely to be very low. Since I have not controlled for any local network
21I have assumed that the star status is a time–independent characteristic of a scientist. That is, a
deceased scientist is considered a star throughout the analysis if s/he is recorded in an obituary record.
The “star” status and health conditions or early death may be correlated. For instance, stars may be more
likely to experience stress leading to adverse health conditions and eventually early death. The issues of
immortality time bias and healthy survivor bias have been examined by Han et al. (2011), Redelmeier
and Singh (2001) and, Rablen and Oswald (2008). Work in medical science has shown that, on the
contrary, measures of socio–economic status are associated with better health and longer life.
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characteristics, the brokerage relationship may be very different between coauthors of
deceased star scientists (the treated group) and coauthors of the matched scientists (the
control group). Finally, a more able coauthor is probably better able to turn the ideas
accessed through their associated star into publications than a less able researcher and
a well–connected coauthor can more easily replace the lost coauthor.
Taking these possible biases into consideration, I perform a second matching pro-
cedure on coauthorship pairs within the pool of coauthors of the deceased and matched
stars. Ideally, the two separate matching procedures would be implemented directly
in one step based on coauthorships characteristics and characteristics of individual
researchers within the team. However, this is computationally infeasible due to the size
of the dataset. Matching each deceased star to five matched stars in the first matching
allows for a trade–off between the two matching procedures. The second matching
is based on the characteristics of the coauthors (the cumulative number of quality–
weighted publications, the cumulative number of coauthors at the time of the death of
their associated star, the cohort and the age at the time of death) and the characteris-
tics of the coauthorship itself (the brokerage relationship, recency of the coauthorship
measured as the number of years since the last coauthorship, and the strength of the
coauthorship measured as the number of joint publications). For each year of death,
a one–to–one nearest neighbour propensity score matching is implemented. Calipers
are applied to ensure that no matched group is too dissimilar (all matches not equal
to or within 0.25 standard deviations are dropped). Out of the 304,703 coauthors of
stars, I match 80,284 (40,142 treated and 40,142 control). Figures B.12 to B.17 in the
Appendix show that the second matching procedure resulted in a good balance and
overlap.
Table 1 presents summary statistics for the variables of interest in the samples build in
the first and second matching for sudden deaths (table D2 in the Appendix presents the
same statistics for sudden deaths only). All variables are computed based on years prior
to the year of death (or pseudo–year of death for the controls). I define a scientist’s
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cohort as the first year he appears in the dataset (i.e. the year of his first publication).
Deceased star scientists have 62 publications and 82 coauthors by the time of their
death. Coauthors are approximately 8 years younger than their associated stars and
lag behind them both in terms of publications and number of coauthors. Overall, the
matched group is not systematically different from the treated group on aspects relevant
to their publishing behaviour, except for the death of a coauthor.
Table 3.1: Descriptives
Mean Median Std. dev. Mean Median Std. dev.
A. Star Level Deceased stars (701 Obs.) Matched stars (3,505 Obs.)
Age at death 55.87 57.00 8.49
Cohort 1976.05 1973 9.77 1976.02 1973 9.89
Cum. # publ. 61.72 26.00 84.21 61.56 20.00 98.02
Cum. # JIF-weighted publ. 120.17 28.59 210.90 118.83 25.58 214.44
Cum. # cit.-weighted publ. 2910.04 629.50 5586.48 2563.94 462.50 5277.22
Cum. # grants 11.51 1.00 19.01 8.91 1.00 17.49
Cum. # R01 grants 0.47 0.00 1.10 0.32 0.00 1.09
Cum. # coauthors 82.42 40.00 112.22 81.07 30.00 127.68
Closeness 1.83E-06 2.02E-06 9.26E-07 1.85E-06 2.11E-06 9.27E-07
Betweenness 3.84E+05 4.68E04 1.14E06 5.76E+05 6.28E04 2.99E06
Eigenvector 4.68E-03 1.98E-07 5.41E-02 5.55E-03 9.43E-07 6.17E-02
Clustering coefficient 0.18 0.11 0.20 0.15 0.10 0.19
Triangle 3.54E+03 1.68E02 3.20E04 3.38E+03 1.98E02 3.29E04
B. Coauthor Level Treated coauthors (40,142 Obs.) Matched coauthors (40,142 Obs.)
Cohort 1984.74 1985 10.92 1984.62 1985.00 11.18
Cum. # publ. 19.64 7.00 34.09 19.83 7.00 33.79
Cum. # JIF-weighted publ. 30.27 9.77 58.92 30.98 9.16 62.36
Cum. # cit.-weighted publ. 702.31 189.00 1630.84 673.95 173.00 1582.42
Cum. # MeSH codes 153.62 102.00 156.87 161.52 108.00 163.42
Cum. # coauthors 43.57 18.00 83.57 44.60 19.00 85.84
C. Coauthorship Level Treated pairs (40,142 Obs.) Control pairs (40,142 Obs.)
Strength of coauthorship 2.51 1.00 5.34 2.53 1.00 5.80
Recency of coauthorship 8.75 6.00 7.72 8.81 6.00 7.82
# non-redundant nodes 29.75 10.00 51.45 30.43 11.00 52.00
Brokerage degree 0.21 0.07 0.30 0.20 0.06 0.29
Embeddedness 10.84 4.00 55.86 11.21 4.00 56.61
Notes: The unit of observation is the star (panel A), the coauthor of a star (panel B) and the star-coauthor pair (panel C).
The cohort is the year of first publication. All variables apart from the cohort are defined at the time of the death of the star
or pseudo-death of the matched star. The R01 grants are NIH grants awarded to individual researchers. The strength of the
coauthorship is the number of joint publications between the star and the coauthor, the recency of the coauthorship is the
number of years since the last joint publication before the death. The brokerage degree is the fraction of non-redundant
nodes offered by the star to his coauthor over all the links of the star as defined by equation 2.
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The most intuitive way to view the results is by plotting the output trend before
and after the death for the treated and control group without any adjustment for age
and calendar time effects. Figures 3.3 plots such a graph (figure B.18 can be found in
the appendix for sudden deaths only). The pattern of the treated and controls appear
similar up to the year of death from which point the treated exhibit a decrease in their
productivity compared to the control group. Ten years prior to the death/pseudo–death,
both groups of coauthors publish approximately 1.5 publications per year. The publi-
cation rate of both treated and control groups increases steadily over the next few years
reaching 1.9 right before the death/pseudo–death. Scientists who suffer the loss of a
star–coauthor experience a decrease in productivity in comparison to those who do not
suffer this lost. There is no evidence of recovery.
Figure 3.3: Publication Trends for Treated and Control Coauthors
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Notes: Mean number of publications around the time of the death. The solid red line corresponds
to treated group (coauthors of star scientists who suddenly die) and the green line corresponds to the
control group (matched coauthors of star scientists).
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3.5 Results
3.5.1 Main Results
Table 3.2 presents the main results on the productivity of scientists both in terms of
quantity (columns 1 and 2) and in terms of quality (columns 3 to 6). The quantity
is measured by the annual number of publications. The quality is captured by the
annual number of publications weighted either by the journal impact factor or by the
number of citations received. I focus on sudden deaths only to remove any possible
anticipation effects.22 Columns 1, 3 and 5 first show the direct effect on productivity
following the death of a coauthor. Consistent with previous results (Azoulay et al.,
2010, Jaravel et al., 2015, Oettl, 2012), coauthors suffer significantly both in terms of
the quantity and quality of their productivity following the death of their associated
star. The coefficient on post death is -0.136, which translates into an 8% decrease in
the yearly number of publications coauthors produce after the star dies.
In the other columns of table 3.2, I examine the heterogeneity in the effect of the
death of a coauthor by brokerage degree. The baseline death coefficient becomes in-
significant in column 2, indicating that the death of a star providing only redundant
links (i.e. brokerage degree equal to 0, also called “star non–brokers”) have no neg-
ative effect on the number of publications of their coauthors, whereas the death of a
star providing only non–redundant links (i.e. brokerage degree equal to 1, referred to
as “star–brokers”) appears to have a large negative impact. A scientist experiencing
the loss of a broker instead of a non–broker will experience a significant relative loss
of 0.87 publications per year. This represents a 31% decrease in the yearly number of
publications for scientist associated to a star with a brokerage degree of 1. Columns 4
and 6 show that the loss of any star, broker or non–broker, is detrimental to the number
of quality–weighted publications. However, coauthors linked to stars providing greater
22Unlike anticipated death, sudden deaths do not leave time for the coauthors to react in order to
soften the blow by starting new projects or seeking out new coauthors to replace him/her. Therefore I
have focused the main results on scientists who have experienced the sudden loss of a coauthor. Column
8 of table B.9 and figure B.22 present the results for anticipated deaths separately and show similar
results as in the case of sudden deaths.
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brokerage degree suffer an even greater decrease in the quality of publications follow-
ing the death. These results confirms that the heterogeneity in the treatment effects is
relevant for both the quantity and quality of scientific output.23 24
Table 3.2: Main Results
Sample: Sudden deaths
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
# publ. per year # JIF-publ. per year # citations-publ. per year
post death -0.136⇤⇤⇤ 0.036 -0.271⇤⇤⇤ -0.031 -13.221⇤⇤⇤ -8.221⇤⇤
(0.023) (0.027) (0.065) (0.084) (2.242) (2.596)
post death⇤bi j,death -0.866⇤⇤⇤ -1.208⇤⇤⇤ -25.171⇤⇤
(0.115) (0.237) (8.055)
R2 0.066 0.068 0.036 0.037 0.031 0.031
Nb. of obs. 503,748 503,748 503,748 503,748 503,748 503,748
Nb. of coauthors 17,272 17,272 17,272 17,272 17,272 17,272
Notes: *** denotes significance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10%. OLS specifications includes a full set of dyad fixed
effect, age and year dummies. Robust standard errors, clustered at the level of the star, are reported in the parenthe-
ses. The dependent variables are the annual number of publications (winsorized at the 1% level) in columns 1 and
2, the annual number of publication weighted by their journal impact factors in columns 3 and 4 and the number of
publications weighted by the number of citations received in columns 5 and 6. The sample includes the coauthors of
star scientists who died suddenly (see table C2 in the appendix for a list of sudden causes of deaths) along with their
appropriate control coauthors. The variable post death is a dummy equal to one after the death of a star for all his
coauthors. The variable bi j,death is the fraction of non-redundant nodes offered by the star “j” to his coauthor “i” at
the time of his death.
Figure 3.4 plots the interaction between a set of indicator variables corresponding
to different levels of brokerage and the treatment status. For brokerage degree ranging
from 0 to 0.5, this figure clearly show that the higher the brokerage degrees the larger
the negative effect on output. For higher brokerage degree, the coefficients are not
significantly different from one another.
Given the significant and negative effect of the death, it is interesting to investigate
23In table B.9 in the Appendix, I replicate the main specification using Azoulay et al. (2010)’s death
and my data. The death of a superstar is associated with a 6% decrease in the performance of their
coauthors. This point estimate is only slightly smaller than the estimate provided in Azoulay et al.
(2010), who report a decrease of 8% in their base specification. Azoulay et al. (2010) examines the
hypothesis that their superstars broker relationships by computing the betweenness centrality of the
deceased superstars. They do not find a significant differential effect between coauthors of centrally
located superstars with high betweenness centrality and coauthors of less central superstars.
24Instead of using the brokerage degree (as defined in equation 2), one could use the number of non–
redundant nodes offered exclusively by the star (i.e. the numerator of brokerage degree). The number
of coauthors of the star at the year of the death is included in order to control for the size of the local
network. The loss of a star offering an additional non–redundant link is associated with a significant
decrease of -0.007 in annual publication (see table B.12 in the Appendix).
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Figure 3.4: Results by Brokerage Degree
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Notes: The solid lines in the above plots correspond to coefficient estimates of OLS specifications in
which the number of publication (winsorized at the 1% level) of a scientist is regressed onto year effects,
indicator variables corresponding to different career age brackets, and interactions of the post death
with 10 indicator variables corresponding to different levels of brokerage degree. The bars around these
estimated correspond to the 95% confidence interval (corresponding to robust standard errors, clustered
around the stars).
how persistent this effect is over time. Figure 3.5 plots the interaction between a set
of indicator variables corresponding to a particular year relative to the coauthor’s death
and the treatment status (having a coauthor who eventually dies) along with the 95%
confidence interval.25 This shows that the estimated causal effects of the death of a star
is significant only after the year of death, which alleviates any concerns that death was
not really exogenous of collaboration. There is no evidence of recovery. Researchers
who are still acquiring skills are presumably more sensitive to changes in peer quality.
I therefore explore the time pattern of young and experienced coauthors in figures B.23
and B.24. The cutoff between young and experienced coauthors is defined at 27 years
25This is based on a regression which include a full set of leads and lags around the death interacted
with the treatment status (i.e. experiencing the death of a coauthor)
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of career. Young coauthors suffer a persistent effect whereas experienced coauthors do
not appear to be significantly affected by the death.
Figure 3.5: Dynamics of the Treatment Effect
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Notes: The solid lines in the above plots correspond to coefficient estimates of OLS specifications in
which the number of publication (winsorized at the 1% level) of scientist is regressed onto year effects,
seventeen indicator variables corresponding to different age brackets, and interactions of the treatment ef-
fect with 30 indicator variables corresponding to years around the year of the death. The 95% confidence
interval (corresponding to robust standard errors, clustered around superstars) around these estimates is
plotted with dashed lines.
In table 3.3, I look at the impact of the death of the star taking into account the in-
put of other coauthors on each publications. The death of any coauthor generally leads
to a mechanical decrease in publications because the coauthor was a direct input in the
joint publications. Star scientists, regardless of their degree of brokerage to their coau-
thors, provide input in terms of time and effort into their joint publications. The number
of publications where the star is not a coauthor removes the direct input of the star in
the productivity of his coauthors. Examining publications without the star (columns 1
and 2) also sheds light onto the ability to substitute toward new coauthorships or place
more time on existing ones upon the death of the star. The death significantly decreases
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these publications as well suggesting that coauthors provide more than a direct input
into the joint research and actually transfers knowledge useful for other projects and
are not easily replaced. The death of star who provided only redundant links actually
significantly increases the number of publications not involving the star. One expla-
nation is that coauthors of non–broker stars worked in teams involving the star at the
head of the lab. Such stars might have been particularly demanding in terms of time.
After the death, coauthors now have more time to dedicate to other projects. The loss
of a star–broker is associated with a significant decrease in publications without the
star. This result hints to the fact that knowledge spillovers might be at play.
The increasing tendency across scientific disciplines to write multi–coauthored pa-
pers makes the issues of the sequence of contributors’ names a topic of research in
terms of reflecting actual contributions (Baerlocher et al., 2007, Laurance, 2006). To
control for co-author influence (not only the star’s input as in columns 1 and 2), I
divide each publications by the total number of authors to reflect the fact that a single
author’s contribution is smaller in larger teams (Hollis, 2001, Lindsey, 1980, Long and
McGinnis, 1982). Columns 3 and 4 confirm the previous results. The loss of a star
non–broker has a significant and positive effect while the loss of a star–broker has a
significant and negative effect on the number of publication even when controlling for
the team size.
Finally, I examine the number of publications for which the scientist appears as a
first and/or last authors in the author list. Traditionally, the first author contributes
the most and also receives most of the credit. In biomedical sciences, the last author
generally gets as much credit as the first author because he or she is assumed to be the
driving force, both intellectually and financially, behind the research.26 I find that the
loss of a star–brokers has a significant impact on both these measures. In all remain-
ing specifications, I will include the interaction between post death and brokerage as
26This practice is unofficial and hence not always followed, meaning that sometimes last authors
mistakenly benefit when they are not the principal investigators.
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explained in equation 3.3.
Table 3.3: Alternative Productivity Measures
Sample: Sudden deaths
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
# publ. # publ. # publ. # publ.
w/o star per year weighted by team size as first author as last author
post death -0.090⇤⇤⇤ 0.088⇤⇤⇤ -0.027⇤⇤⇤ 0.035⇤⇤⇤ -0.026⇤⇤ 0.068⇤⇤⇤ -0.027⇤ 0.003
(0.024) (0.026) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
post death⇤bi j,death -0.896⇤⇤⇤ -0.313⇤⇤⇤ -0.476⇤⇤⇤ -0.154⇤⇤
(0.113) (0.037) (0.040) (0.056)
R2 0.047 0.050 0.040 0.043 0.037 0.040 0.025 0.025
Nb. of obs. 503,748 503,748 503,748 503,748 503,748 503,748 503,748 503,748
Nb. of coauthors 17,272 17,272 17,272 17,272 17,272 17,272 17,272 17,272
Notes: *** denotes significance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10%. OLS specifications includes a full set of dyad fixed effect, age and year
dummies. Robust standard errors, clustered at the level of the star, are reported in the parentheses. The dependent variables are the an-
nual number of publications without the star in columns 1 and 2, the annual number of publication weighted by the number of authors in
columns 3 and 4, the number of publications as a first author in columns 5 and 6, and the number of publications as a last author in columns
7 and 8. The sample includes the coauthors of star scientists who died suddenly (see table C2 in the appendix for a list of sudden causes of
deaths) along with their appropriate control coauthors. The variable post death is a dummy equal to one after the death of a star for all his
coauthors. The variable bi j,death is the fraction of non-redundant nodes offered by the star “j” to his coauthor “i” at the time of his death.
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3.5.1.1 Robustness Check
I conduct a number of robustness checks which are reported in table B.8 in the Ap-
pendix. I first point two potential sources of biases: the data is right–censored and
truncated. Then, I check whether the empirical specification correctly capture the life–
cycle pattern of the career of a scientist and the common trends around the year of
the death. I finally examine whether the results are sensitive to medical subfields and
period of time.
The data is right–censored. I do not know whether the scientists matched to the
deceased ones are in fact still alive and active as their year of death or retirement is
unknown. This can lead to a possible contamination of the control group. In columns
1 to 3 of table B.8 I examine sudden deaths occurring at a young age for which the
matched star scientist is less likely to be deceased. The effects are still presents albeit
small in magnitude. The fact that I do not know the end of the career of scientists also
has implications for the coauthors of stars. When a scientist is no longer publishing
I cannot determine whether it is because he quit research or because he is in fact still
an active researcher but has been unsuccessful in publishing. I assume that scientists
can have up to 45 years of career (years from their first year of publication). There
should be no reason for this assumption to lead to a differential bias between treated
and control coauthors. Nevertheless, I examine different cutoffs for the length of a
career (see columns 4 and 5 of table B.8) and the main results stay significant.
Due to the limited window of observation (1965–2013), I have to deal with a trun-
cation problem as I do not witness individuals’ publications outside this period. For
example, recent deaths have many pre–death observations but few post–death observa-
tions while the opposite holds for early deaths in the sample. The dynamic specification
can confound true dynamics with the changes in the composition of the sample. Col-
umn 6 of table B.8 confirms that the results are robust to restricting attention to a
balanced panel, focusing on scientists whose star passed away between 1985 and 1993.
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A key concern is to correctly model the career of a scientists which may follow a
life–cycle pattern. However, the nature of collaboration (Agrawal et al., 2013) and the
life–cycle of a scientists (Jones et al., 2014, Jones, 2010) have changed over time. To
control for such differences across cohorts, I include the interaction between cohort
and decade for both the treated and control groups in column 8 of table B.8. The point
estimates are very similar to those obtained when not these interaction effects.
An important assumption for using the death of a scientist as an exogenous shock
to the network is that the publication trends of treated (i.e. scientists who experience
the loss of a star-coauthor) and the control (i.e. scientists who remain linked to their
star-coauthor) would have followed the same trend in the absence of the death. To in-
vestigate this identification assumption, I estimate a placebo experiment using placebo
years of death for the control group, where those years are drawn at random from the
empirical distribution of death across years for the deceased scientists. The results of
column 7 of table B.8 report a non–significant coefficient close to zero.
I examine whether my results are robust by decades and fields.The average number
of authors per paper and consequently the average number of coauthors per researcher
have been increasing over time as can be seen in B.5. Different fields may also differ
in their propensity to collaborate. These patterns may have different implications for
the importance of brokers. On the one hand, advances in communication and trans-
portation technologies have decreased the distance between scientists. It imply that
cost of meeting new scientists further away and accessing their knowledge is now eas-
ier (Rosenblat and Mobius, 2004). Therefore, the importance of brokerage may have
diminished over time. On the other, research has become increasingly complex and
research costs may have been rising over time (Jones, 1995). This in turn implies that
brokerage may have a greater role now than before. I find that the loss of a broker (i.e.
coauthor who provided only non–redundant links) leads to a decrease in productivity
in all decades although it is only significant from 1990 onwards (see table B.11 in
the Appendix). The magnitude of the broker effect is particularly large in the period
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between 1990 to 1995 and decreases afterwards. I also examine the eight most popular
topics among star scientists (see table B.10 in the Appendix) and find that effect of
brokers are not driven by any specific field of research despite the fact that research in
different subfields is conducted very differently.
3.5.2 Mechanisms
In this section, I explore potential explanations behind the decrease in productivity
following the sudden and unexpected death of a star and, in particular, the role of
network position. I first rule out alternative mechanisms by examining characteristics
of the coauthors, stars and local network measures. I then present evidence in support
of the hypothesis that brokers offer access to knowledge by provided exclusive access
to new scientists and the ideas they embody.
3.5.2.1 Coauthor Characteristics
If network position is correlated with personal characteristics of scientists, then the
results found for brokerage might simply reflect some unobserved dimension of a re-
searcher’s ability. More able scientists might have an easier time to recover from the
loss of a coauthor. It still takes ability and effort to turn a new idea into a publication.
Better–connected scientists might have an easier time to connect to new coauthors.
Researchers who are still acquiring skills are presumably more sensitive to changes in
their peer quality. Finally, the level of specialization of a researcher might reflect his
dependency on the star.
I control for the productivity, connectedness, experience and specialization based
on the number of publications, the number of coauthors, the number of years since
the first publication and the number of MeSH codes measured at the time of the death
of their associated star respectively. Less productive, isolated andyoung are indicator
variables equal to one if the coauthor is among the bottom 25% of the distribution.
Generalist is an indicator variable equal to one if the coauthor . In table 3.4, I control
for these characteristics and find that the death of a star–broker remains significant and
negative as in the baseline specification. Moreover, the coefficient remains of similar
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magnitude. Younger and more generalist scientists are more affected by the death of
a star. This is unsurprising given the fact that researchers who are starting their career
or who branch out to many different fields are more depended on their coauthors. On
the contrary, less productive and isolated researchers actually benefit from the death of
the star. This might be explained by the fact less productive and isolated scientists may
be trapped in a relationship. If the search costs for finding a new coauthor are very
high, it may be rational to stay in a relationship with the star although coauthors would
actually benefit from severing all ties to the star. The death in such cases provide an
opportunity to form more profitable collaborations.
Table 3.4: Coauthor characteristics
Sample: Sudden deaths
Dep.Var.: Number of publications per year
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
post death -0.054 -0.051 0.097⇤⇤⇤ 0.121⇤⇤⇤ 0.082⇤⇤
(0.031) (0.032) (0.026) (0.029) (0.032)
post death⇤bi j,death -0.717⇤⇤⇤ -0.722⇤⇤⇤ -0.925⇤⇤⇤ -0.892⇤⇤⇤ -0.733⇤⇤⇤
(0.118) (0.120) (0.117) (0.0113) (0.117)
post death⇤less productivei,death 0.281⇤⇤⇤ 0.305⇤⇤⇤
(0.026) (0.025)
post death⇤isolatedi,death 0.264⇤⇤⇤ 0.142⇤⇤⇤
(0.028) (0.024)
post death⇤youngi,death -0.273⇤⇤⇤ -0.323⇤⇤⇤
(0.043) (0.038)
post death⇤generalisti,death -0.195⇤⇤⇤ -0.272⇤⇤⇤
(0.036) (0.036)
R2 0.069 0.069 0.069 0.069 0.070
Nb. of obs. 503,748 503,748 503,748 503,748 503,748
Nb. of coauthors 17,272 17,272 17,272 17,272 17,272
Notes: *** denotes significance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10%. OLS specifications includes a full set of dyad fixed
effect, age and year dummies. Robust standard errors, clustered at the level of the star, are reported in the paren-
theses. The sample includes the coauthors of star scientists who died suddenly (see table C2 in the appendix for a
list of sudden causes of deaths) along with their appropriate control coauthors. The variable post death is a dummy
equal to one after the death of a star for all his coauthors. The variable bi j,death is the fraction of non-redundant
nodes offered by the star “j” to his coauthor “i” at the time of his death. This variables less productive, isolated,
young and generalist are equal to one if the coauthor is has fewer than 2 publications, 7 coauthors, less than 5 years
since the first publication, and more than 6 MeSH codes.
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3.5.2.2 Star Characteristics
Upon the death of a coauthor, a scientist loses the coauthor and all his links. This means
that the loss in access to knowledge may come from the star himself rather than from
the loss of connection to part of the network. To investigate this possibility, I control
for the quality of the star using different definitions of stars: the number of publications
(top pub), the number of citations received (top cite), and the career age (experience).
Medical science often requires labs and expensive equipment and access to funding
is crucial for research. If a coauthor provides resources, the death of such a coauthor
should lead to a negative effect on joint productions only. I control for the access to
resources of a star through the number of grants (top grant) and the share of publication
as a last author. For each of these dimensions, I use an indicator to identify stars in
the top 25% of the distribution of these characteristics.27 In columns 2 to 6 of 3.5, we
see that that brokerage degree remains significant even after controlling for these dif-
ferent characteristics. Moreover, the magnitude of the coefficient is quite stable across
all specifications and even increases when all these different star characteristics are in-
cluded. The loss of a star who had many grants is particularly detrimental, confirming
the fact that access to resources is important in medical science. It is interesting to point
out that, although not highly significant, the loss of a star who is experienced and is a
last author in many publications positively affects the productivity of scientists. These
types of stars might have been particularly demanding in terms of time. Why would a
coauthor remain in a coauthorship when severing the link would lead to an increase his
productivity? It is still economically rational to continue a collaboration if the cost of
rematching outweighs the output gain.
27This represents more than 206 publications, 995 citations, 32 years of career, 3 grants, and 60% of
publications as last author at the year of death.
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3.5.2.3 Network Characteristics
Brokerage degree tries to capture the dependency of a coauthor on his associate star
to provide him with new knowledge. If brokerage degree simply captures an aspect of
the local network structure or the structural importance of the star (power, influence,
or prestige), there are many other standard centrality measures which could potentially
also account for the decrease in productivity. For instance, less connected parts of the
network create opportunities for brokerage. So, the number and size of local networks,
and their “connection topology” may be consequential for predicting both the opportu-
nities of scientists.
Degree approaches are based on the idea that having more ties means being more
important. Closeness measures go slightly further and assumes that actors who are able
to reach other actors at shorter path lengths, or who are more reachable by others at
shorter path lengths, are in favoured positions. In an information flow context, we can
interpret closeness as an index of the expected time until the arrival of new information.
Nodes with low closeness have short distances from others, and will receive informa-
tion sooner. When using betweenness approaches (Freeman, 1977, 1979), it is being
an intermediary between many other actors that makes an actor central. Betweenness
can be thought of as measuring the volume of traffic moving from any one node to
every other node that would pass through a given node. It measures the amount of
network flow that a given node controls in the sense of being able to shut it down if
necessary. Eigenvector centrality captures indirect reach so that being well-connected
to other well-connected nodes makes one more central. Triangles counts how many
times a node is part of a triangle.The clustering coefficient goes one step further and
measures the probability that a node a part of a triangle. It is the ratio of existing links
connecting the node’s neighbours to each other, to the maximum possible number of
such links. The clustering coefficient is a measure of the extent to which the friends
of my friends are my friends. Finally, neighborhood overlap is a pair–specific measure
of the number of common neighbors as defined in Section 3.2. All these measures are
detailed in the Appendix B along with a correlation matrix in table B.7. The negative
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correlation between the mean brokerage degree and degree can be explained by the fact
that it is “easier” for a node with two neighbors to get a score of 1 (only one tie is need)
than for a node with 10 neighbors.28
Table 3.6 reports the estimation results obtained when using these alternative network
measures as an additional explanatory variable in the regression. With the exception
of clustering coefficient, all centrality measures show a significant negative effect on
the productivity after the star dies. In particular, once we control for the degree of the
star (i.e. the denominator of the brokerage degree), brokerage degree remains negative
and significant and even larger in magnitude. This means that the result is not only
driven by the size of the network of the star or the centrality of the star. The loss of a
star–coauthor with a high number of triangles is particular detrimental to productivity.
When all these network characteristics are included, brokerage degree remains signif-
icant (column 9) and of similar magnitude. More generally, these results validate the
importance of localized network measures.
As discussed in Bloch et al. (2016), Borgatti (2005), Wasserman and Faust (1994),
these different measures each make implicit assumptions about the manner in which
information flows through the network. For instance, closeness and betweenness are
based on the assumption that flows moves along the shortest path, taking one path or
the other. Eigenvector centrality counts walks which assume that the trajectories can
not only be circuitous, but also revisit nodes and lines multiple times along the way.
It assumes that the information can take multiple paths simultaneously. Neighbor-
hood overlap and clustering coefficients are the measures closest in spirit to brokerage
degree. However neighborhood overlap restricts the neighborhood of interest to first
degree links while clustering coefficient is defined at the node level. Brokerage degree
not only captures flows which are local in nature, but also specific to a coauthor. It
28All network measures are computed each year based on the network of coauthorship in the last five
years. In other words, the network measure at the time of death takes into account all joint projects
published in the last five years prior to the death. The betweenness centrality measures have a cutoff of
4 links away.
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assumes that information need not take the shortest path and can travel simultaneously
through different paths.29
29For computational reasons, I limit myself to nodes that are up to two links away. An implicit
assumption is that flows can only be reached up to two links away. However, conceptually one could
easily extend the brokerage degree definition to include flows from further network distances.
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3.5.2.4 Coauthorship Characteristics
If a key feature of brokerage degree is that it is pair–specific, it may be confounded by
other characteristics of the tie between the star and the coauthor. I distinguish between
different type of ties using the frequency and recency of the joint publications and the
overlap in research interest. The recency and strength of coauthorships are defined by
the number of years since the last publication and the length of exposure to the star
prior to the death. The variables recent and weak are indicator variables equal to one
when the last joint publications was less than 2 years ago and they have fewer than 2
years of joint collaboration. I measure whether the coauthors were specializing in the
same research area at the time of the death.
Table 3.7 presents results controlling for these tie characteristics. The loss of a star–
coauthor with recent and weak ties significantly decreases publications rate of the
surviving coauthors. The loss of a star–coauthor working in the same field also signifi-
cantly decreases publications rate. In all specification, the coefficient on the interaction
between the treatment and brokerage degree remains negative and significant. The
magnitude of the effect of losing a star–broker is even larger when controlling for the
characteristics of the tie. These results are suggestive that recent ties, which can be
considered as active ones, are especially important because the star still has knowledge
which hasn’t already been shared to his coauthor. The fact that the loss of a star with
weak ties has a negative effect goes against a possible grief mechanism. Under this
mechanism, we would expect scientists with long–standing collaboration to a deceased
coauthor to be more grief stricken than scientists with more distant ties to a deceased
coauthor. The importance of weak ties for brokerage is consistent with Granovetter
(1973)’s argument that weak ties act as bridges which are particularly valuable for the
transmission diverse information. Brokers are also especially important when coau-
thors have common research focus. One explanation is that coauthors sharing common
research interests are more likely to transmit relevant information and information that
is understand by the recipient.
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Table 3.7: Coauthorship characteristics
Sample: Sudden deaths
Dep.Var.: Number of publications per year
(1) (2) (3) (4)
post death 0.052⇤ 1.574⇤⇤⇤ 0.065 1.664⇤⇤⇤
(0.026) (0.056) (0.034) (0.059)
post death⇤bi j,death -0.853⇤⇤⇤ -1.044⇤⇤⇤ -0.881⇤⇤⇤ -1.035⇤⇤⇤
(0.114) (0.117) (0.117) (0.116)
post death⇤ recent tiei j,death -0.089⇤ -0.193⇤⇤⇤
(0.045) (0.044)
post death⇤weak tiesi j,death -1.606⇤⇤⇤ -1.632⇤⇤⇤
(0.056) (0.056)
post death⇤ same researchi j,death -0.111⇤ -0.115⇤⇤
(0.045) (0.044)
R2 0.068 0.079 0.069 0.080
Nb. of obs. 503,748 503,748 503,748 503,748
Nb. of coauthors 17,272 17,272 17,272 17,272
Notes: *** denotes significance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10%. OLS specifications including a full
set of dyad fixed effect, age and year dummies. Robust standard errors, clustered at the level of the
star, are reported in the parentheses. The dependent variable is the annual number of publications
(winsorized at 1%). The sample includes the coauthors of star scientists who died suddenly (see table
C2 in the appendix for a list of sudden causes of deaths) along with their appropriate control coau-
thors. The variable post death is a dummy equal to one after the death of a star for all his coauthors.
The variable bi j,death is the fraction of non-redundant nodes offered by the star “j” to his coauthor “i”
at the time of his death. The variables interacted with post death are indicator variables measured at
the time of the death: recent ties takes the value of one when the last joint publication was within 2
year of the death, weak ties is equal to one when there has been fewer than 2 years of collaboration,
and same research interest is equal to one if the star and his coauthor wok in the same field. The
specialty is defined as the modal topic (defined through MeSH codes) a scientist has published in.
3.5.2.5 Knowledge transmission via star-brokers
Stars in a brokerage position connect coauthors to other parts of the network thereby
providing access to knowledge spillovers from further away. The broker may serve as
information conduit through which knowledge and ideas is transmitted. To establish
the access to knowledge flow via the star as a primary explanatory mechanism, I create
a brokerage degree measure based on the new topics (instead of the number of new
coauthors as in equation 2) a coauthor provides unique and exclusive access to.
Given that research is generally done in teams, determining an individual scientist’s
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field of expertise or knowledge, which may evolve over the career, poses a challenge.
Moreover, fields are assigned to publication and not to individual researchers. I use
all topics associated to the MeSH codes assigned to publications as a measure of a
scientist’s knowledge.30 A scientist can access knowledge directly from his immediate
coauthors and indirectly from his coauthors’ coauthors (i.e. coauthors two links away).
The pool of knowledge a scientist has access to is therefore defined as all the topics
scientists up to two links away have worked in. From this set, I remove all the topics
of the scientist in question and his direct coauthors. This eliminates any direct access
to knowledge either through joint publications or knowledge embodied in immediate
coauthors. This also removes any confounding factors associated to the characteristics
of a collaboration. Two coauthors who share many common topics (i.e. low brokerage
degree in terms of topics) may be a sign of a close and fruitful collaboration rather than
a potential knowledge transmission. Two coauthors with many joint publications will
inevitably have a large overlap in their fields of work.
The equivalent to the brokerage degree in section 2 using the number of topics (rather
than coauthors) is defined as the share of new topics a star provides unique and exclu-
sive access to. Specifically, from the pool of indirect knowledge offered by a star j
to i, one can count the topics j is the only one among i’s coauthors who provides this
indirect link. As previously done, brokerage degree in terms of topics is measured at
the time of death for the star (and the pseudo time of death for the matched stars). The
histogram of brokerage degree in terms of topics can be found in figure B.21 in the
appendix.
I find a significant and sizeable decrease in the number of publications after the death of
a broker in terms of topics. The death of a star who provided only non–redundant indi-
rect links to topics at the time of his death is associated with a 16% decrease in annual
publications compared to a star who provided only redundant links to topics. Once we
30One could use the MeSH codes directly, but for computational reasons I use subfields. There is a
total of 107 fields.
118 Chapter 3. Stars and Brokers: Knowledge Spillovers in Medical Science
control for both measures of brokerages, the magnitude of the brokerage degree based
on the number of coauthors is smaller and no longer significant. Brokerage degree
based on topics on the other hand is significant and remains of similar magnitude. This
suggests that brokerage degree previously used indeed captured knowledge embodied
in scientists and that access to topics further away is important for the productivity of
scientists.31
Table 3.8: Brokerage in terms of topic
Sample: Sudden deaths
(1) (2)
post death 0.409⇤⇤⇤ 0.399⇤⇤⇤
(0.036) (0.034)
post death⇤btopici j,death -0.603⇤⇤⇤ -0.559⇤⇤⇤
(0.072) (0.067)
post death⇤bi j,death -0.136
(0.202)
R2 0.069 0.070
Nb. of obs. 248,231 248,231
Nb. of coauthors 9,376 9,376
Nb. of deceased stars 107 107
Notes: *** denotes significance at 1%, ** at 5%, and *
at 10%. OLS specifications including a full set of dyad
fixed effect, age and year dummies. Robust standard er-
rors, clustered at the level of the star, are reported in the
parentheses. The sample includes the coauthors of star
scientists who died suddenly (see table C2 in the appendix
for a list of sudden causes of deaths) along with their ap-
propriate control coauthors. The variable post death is a
dummy equal to one after the death of a star for all his
coauthors. The variable bi j,death is the fraction of non-
redundant nodes offered by the star “j” to his coauthor “i”
at the time of his death. The variable btopici j,death is the num-
ber of non–redundant topics offered by the star “j” to his
coauthor “i” at the time of his death.
31The number of observations differ from previous tables because some scientists do not have any
MeSH codes associated to their publications leaving them with a missing btopici j,death
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3.6 Conclusion
This paper is built on the argument that brokers – individuals in network positions
that connect otherwise unconnected network members – benefit from the access to
non-redundant information (Burt, 2008, Reagans and Zuckerman, 2008). Focusing on
star medical scientists and their coauthors, I provide empirical evidence that brokerage
relationships, measured by the number of scientists who can be reached solely through
a given coauthor, induces heterogeneity in peer effects on publication rates. To circum-
vent the identification problems caused by endogenous collaborative link formation,
I use the sudden and unexpected deaths of coauthors which induces changes in the
network structure for reasons that are unrelated to his abilities as a researcher and/or
network position.
My results validate the importance of star scientists and produce new evidence that
the network position plays an important role in the productivity of scientists. Re-
searchers suffer a 8% decrease in publication following the death of a coauthor. Losing
a star–coauthor who offered only non–redundant links (i.e. a “broker”) instead of a
star–coauthor who offered only redundant links (i.e. a “non–broker”) is associated with
a significant loss of 0.24 publications per year. This represent a 31% decrease in the
yearly number of publications for the average scientist. Measuring brokerage degree
based on the number of topics (rather than the number of links to coauthors) reveals
that the loss of a star who provided access to only non–redundant topics is associated
with a 16% decrease in annual publication. Taken together, my results support the
hypothesis that access to novel knowledge embodied in researchers is an important
determinant of the productivity of a researcher. Moreover, network position and the
access to flows in the network can be captured by a measure which is is local in nature.
It is important to emphasize that the focus of this paper has been to characterize
the heterogeneity in the causal impact of the loss of a coauthor in terms of network
position. The causal effect of network position (i.e. what would have happened to a
coauthor’s productivity after the death of a coauthor if he had been located in another
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network position) would need to take into account the endogeneity in network position.
It is hard to think of a natural experiment which would provide exogenous variation in
the network position. Alternatively, the formation of network would need to be directly
modeled. However, given the current state of theoretical research on network formation
such an exercise
Uncovering the influence of immediate peers, and more generally, the network struc-
ture on productivity has important implications, not just for the creation of scientific
knowledge, but also for long–run growth potential. The creation of knowledge appears
to be a “social” production. The role of peer learning in promoting innovation and
potentially growth has been featured in the endogenous growth literature (Aghion and
Howitt, 1992a, Romer, 1990a). Growth is driven by technological change that results
from research and development effort. This leads to the prediction that an increase
in the level of resources devoted to R&D, as measured by the number of scientists
engaged in research, should lead to a proportional increase in the per capita growth rate
of output. However, this “scale effect” is known to be at odds with observed trends
(Jones, 1995, Segerstrom, 1998). Using the number of scientists engaged in research
may be misleading if their configuration is not taken into account. An increase in
scientific output may not follow from an increase in the number of scientists if the
additional scientists are isolated or not well–positioned. Therefore, any policy which
increases the level of resources devoted to R&D should take the network topology into
account.
The death of a star has wider repercussion than the performance of immediate coau-
thors. Stars influence colleagues, competitors (Borjas and Doran, 2013), PhD students
(Waldinger, 2010), new hires (Agrawal et al., 2013), scientists further away in the
network (Jaravel et al., 2015), and can shape entire fields (Azoulay et al., 2014). An
interesting extension to this paper would be to examine how the death of stars affect
the community of scientists. Network–level characteristics, and particularly the sorting
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2005). Different elements of the network structure such as its size, density, and average
path length can aid or hinder the creation and the diffusion of knowledge. Certain
network structures may be more resilient to such productivity shocks and offer an
environment fostering the creativity of its members and consequently promote social
capital.

Chapter 4
Knowledge Spillovers from Clean and
Dirty Technologies
4.1 Introduction
It is commonly recognized that knowledge spillovers from innovative activities provide
a case for government intervention in the market because private R&D investments are
likely too low. It has also been recognized that not all innovations create spillovers
to the same extent. In particular more basic research is assumed to create stronger
spillovers and therefore should attract more government support. However, for better
or worse governments often champion specific technological areas – rather than types
– such as defence, IT, aerospace, bio–technology etc. Often this is because a certain
area promises auxiliary (i.e. not necessarily economic) benefits such as security, health
or simply prestige. If the level of spillovers generated by these different areas are the
same, then the choice to target a specific technological area does not matter. However,
if the spillovers vary substantially across areas then the distribution of government
intervention can affect the level and growth of economic well being. To the best of
our knowledge, this study is the first to systematically compare spillovers between
different technology areas. Our main focus is what we have dubbed dirty and clean
technologies; i.e. technologies that are associated with GHG gas pollution and alterna-
tive technologies that can replace them. We also examine other emerging technologies
and develop a methodology that will be relevant for comparing spillovers between
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technological areas more generally. We focus on clean and dirty technologies because
they are an important example of deliberate differential treatment of technology areas
by government policies. Increasingly, governments are deployment carbon pricing
policies which incentivize clean and hamper dirty technology development. This in-
cludes carbon and energy taxes (Aghion et al., 2016) but also direct subsidies for clean
innovation. In 2012, OECD countries spent over 3 billion euros to support the devel-
opment of new clean technologies such as renewable energy or hydrogen cars. This
is motivated by the desire to mitigate climate change in the long run. However, many
policy makers – often in an effort to make climate change policy attractive to the public
– have suggested that this could also have a beneficial impact on economic outcomes
such as growth or employment in the short run. Theoretically, this can only be the
case if clean technology innovations lead to larger spillovers than the dirty technology
innovations that it replaces. Hence, the main objective of this paper is to measure and
compare the amount of knowledge of spillovers from clean and dirty technologies.
Following a long tradition in the literature, we derive our measure of knowledge
spillovers from patent citation data (Caballero and Jaffe, 1993, Hall et al., 2005, Jaffe
and Trajtenberg, 1999, Trajtenberg, 1990). Patent documents offer a paper trail of
knowledge flows as inventors are required to reference previous patents which have
been useful for developing the new knowledge described in the patent. Patent citations
are not without limitations, but an important advantage of our dataset is that it allows
us to deal with most of the problems usually associated with their use. For example,
we can identify (and discard) self-citations by inventors, as well as citations added
by patent examiners, which might not capture external knowledge spillovers. We rely
on the PATSTAT database, a new dataset assembled by the European Patent Office
in collaboration with the OECD. It provides information on nearly all patents filed
worldwide in almost all national patent offices. It also provides information on patent
families; i.e. when the same innovation is filed repeatedly in different jurisdictions.
This allows us to use an innovation, rather than a patent as the unit of analysis avoid-
ing any double counting. Our main analysis focuses on two technology fields – cars
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and energy generation – and within each field on two main areas: fossil fuel based
technologies (dirty) and alternative (clean) technologies. Cars and power generation
account for about 40% of global carbon emissions (IPCC, 2007). PATSTAT also allow
an easy distinction between dirty - i.e. everything related to fossil fuel combustion
- and clean - i.e. alternative technologies such as electric vehicles and solar power
generation. As an extension we also consider “grey” technologies; i.e. innovation to
improve the pollution efficiency of fossil technologies.
There are a variety of confounding factors that might lead to differences in citations
between technology areas such as clean and dirty that are unrelated to spillovers in an
economic sense. Citations in patent documents are driven by legally binding defini-
tions on what constitutes prior art. These differ over time and between jurisdictions.
Clean and dirty innovations are not uniformly distributed across space or time. Hence,
average citation counts for the two technological areas can differ because one technol-
ogy tends to file more in patent offices that require more citations. We address a wide
range of such concerns by including a set of control variables including patent office
by year fixed effects. However, this will not deal with variation in citation practices
between different technological areas; e.g. suppose that in some technological areas,
it is customary to cite more by referring to more remote underlying ideas. Because
most innovations receive their citations from within their own technological area, this
could lead to differences in citation counts that reflect “cultural” differences between
technological fields rather than economically meaningful spillovers. We address this in
two ways. Firstly, we examine spillovers differences relying only on citations outside
an innovation’s technological area. Secondly, we use a new measure, called Paten-
tRank, rather than the mere citation count. PatentRank is derived from the Page-rank
algorithm developed by Google’s Larry Page to rank the relevance of webpages on the
basis of how they are hyperlinked; i.e. cited. It is recursively computed as the weighted
average of all citing patent page ranks weighted by the inverse ratio of citations in a
citing patent. Hence, a patent receives a high page rank if it is cited by many other
patents that are themselves cited a lot but do not cite many others themselves. This not
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only deals with potential variation in citation culture between technological areas but
also considers indirect spillovers; i.e. an innovation can create spillovers because it is
cited a lot by itself or because it is cited by another innovation that is cited a lot. We
are one of the first to apply this to patent data.
Our results suggest that clean innovations generate significantly more knowledge
spillovers than their dirty counterparts. All other things being equal, clean patented
inventions receive 43% more citations than dirty inventions. The gap is larger in the
electricity production sector (49%) than in the transportation sector (35%). Interest-
ingly, the gap between clean and dirty technologies has been constantly increasing
during the past 50 years. We show that clean patents are not only cited more often,
they are also cited by patents that are themselves cited more often (irrespective of
their technological area). When considering our new PatentRank index, we also find
strong evidence of larger spillovers from clean technologies. Our conclusions are ro-
bust to a large number of sensitivity tests. These include discarding citations added by
patent examiners, correcting for self-citations at the applicant level, including inventor
fixed effects, looking at different subsamples and including additional control variables.
How can we account for the larger knowledge spillovers from clean technologies?
One explanation stands out from our investigation: clean technologies seem to ben-
efit from steep learning curves associated with new technological fields.1 When we
control for the age of the technology, the clean premium decreases by 14%. We then
compare knowledge spillovers between clean, grey and “truly dirty” innovations. The
analysis suggests a clear ranking: clean technologies exhibit significantly higher levels
of spillovers than grey technologies, which themselves outperform truly dirty tech-
nologies. We also compare clean inventions with other emerging technologies such as
biotechs, IT, nanotechnology, robot and 3D, and find that clean patents appear much
closer in terms of knowledge spillovers to these radically new fields than to the dirty
1We partially control for the novelty of a technological field by including a measure of previous
patenting within the technology class of a given patent in our regressions. However, the number of
patents might not capture novelty entirely.
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technologies they replace. Interestingly knowledge spillovers from clean technologies
appear comparable in scope to those in the IT sector, which has been the driver behind
the third industrial revolution. When comparing clean, dirty and emerging technolo-
gies to all other inventions patented in the economy, we find a clear ranking in terms
of knowledge spillovers: dirty technologies have lower knowledge spillovers than the
average invention, while clean and other emerging technologies exhibit larger knowl-
edge spillovers. With the exception of biotechs, all other emerging technologies (IT,
nanotechnology, robots and 3D) show larger knowledge spillovers over the average
invention than clean inventions. Taken together, these pieces of evidence suggest that
the clean advantage might be a feature of the radical novelty of the field.
Our results have a number of immediate implications. Firstly, our results highlight
the large and economically relevant spillover differences between technology areas.
This means that any meaningfully growth policy design should take these spillovers
into account. Secondly, with respect to climate change policy, our findings provide sup-
port for the idea that pollution pricing should be complemented with specific support
for clean innovation that goes beyond standard policies in place to internalize knowl-
edge externalities. Indeed, the spillover advantage of clean innovations compared to
dirty innovations (including “grey” energy efficiency technologies) uncovered in this
paper justify higher subsidies to clean R&D in a first best policy setting. Radically new
clean technologies should receive higher public support than research activities targeted
at improving on the existing dirty technologies. However, such specific support could
equally be justified for a range of other emerging areas, such as nanotechnologies or IT.
Therefore our results go some way into supporting the recommendation by Acemoglu
et al. (2012) that only clean (and not dirty) technologies should receive R&D subsidies.2
Thirdly, our results lend support to the idea that a redirection of innovation from
2Acemoglu et al. (2012) do not assume different spillovers from clean and dirty technologies. The
crucial assumption on which the results hold is that patents last only for one period. Greaker and
Heggedal (2012) show that it is possible to obtain similar results when relaxing this assumption if one
assumes that clean technologies exhibit larger knowledge spillovers than dirty technologies.
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dirty to clean technologies not only reduces the net cost of environmental policies but
can also lead to higher economic growth in the short run, if the benefits from higher
spillovers exceed these costs. Indeed, if the factors leading to an under-provision of
knowledge are more severe for clean technologies and if new clean technologies are
induced by environmental regulation, environmental policies could generate growth
by un–intendedly correcting a market failure that has been hampering the economy,
irrespective of the environmental problem (Neuhoff, 2005). In fact, the presence of
a market failure associated with R&D spillovers from clean innovations is one of the
possible theoretical foundations for the Porter hypothesis (Porter and Van der Linde,
1995) according to which environmental regulations may enhance firms’ profits and
competitiveness (see Ambec et al. (2013) and Ambec and Barla (2006), for a recent
review). For example, in Mohr (2002), the existence of knowledge spillovers prevents
the replacement of an old polluting technology by a new, cleaner and more productive
technology, as firms have a second-mover advantage if they wait for someone else to
first adopt. The introduction of an environmental regulation may thus induces firms to
switch to the new, cleaner technology. This simultaneously improves environmental
quality and eventually increases productivity. Our results however suggest that the
potential growth effects of environmental policies very much depend on the type of
displacement being induced by increasing support for clean technologies. If this leads
to less investment in dirty technologies, as evidenced by Aghion et al. (2012a), there
seems to be scope for medium run growth effects. If innovation in other emerging areas
is crowded out, such effects are less likely.
Finally, our results also have implications for the modelling of climate change pol-
icy. For example, Fischer and Newell (2008), Fischer et al. (2014) assess different
policies for reducing carbon dioxide emissions and promoting innovation and diffusion
of renewable energy, with an application to the electricity sector. They model R&D in-
vestments and learning-by-doing, but assume that knowledge spillovers have the same
intensity across clean and dirty technologies. Our paper suggests that this assumption
does not hold in practice and provides estimated parameters that can be used to more
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precisely model the difference between clean and dirty technologies.
Our paper relates to three main strands of the literature. First, our work draws on
the extensive empirical literature that has used patent data to analyze the determinants
and the effects of knowledge spillovers. Pioneers of patent citation data as a measure
of knowledge spillovers include Scherer (1965) and Schmookler (1966). Griliches
(1992), Griliches et al. (1991) survey this earlier literature. Since then, a large number
of papers have used this method to investigate knowledge diffusion (Caballero and
Jaffe, 1993, Hall et al., 2001, Trajtenberg, 1990). In particular, many papers have
focused on the geography of knowledge spillovers (Jaffe and Trajtenberg, 1996, 1999,
Jaffe et al., 1993, Thompson and Fox-Kean, 2005).
Second, in the energy literature some papers have recently attempted to compare
knowledge spillovers from energy technologies with those of non-energy technolo-
gies. Bjørner and Mackenhauer (2013) compare the spillover effects of private energy
research with those of other (non-energy) private research. They find that spillover
effects of energy research may be lower than for other types of private research. Popp
and Newell (2012) use US patent citation data to compare the social value of alternative
energy patents to that of other patents filed by the same firms. They find that alternative
energy patents are cited more frequently by subsequent patents, and by a wider range
of technologies, than other patents filed by the same firms. However, none of these
papers distinguishes between clean and dirty technologies within energy technologies
nor do they go beyond comparing simple citation counts.
Third, our paper is closely related to the literature on the impact of environmental
policies on economic growth, which is itself rooted in the endogenous growth literature
(for seminal contributions, see Aghion and Howitt (1992b, 1996, 1998), Grossman and
Helpman (1991), Romer (1990b)). Smulders and De Nooij (2003) introduce a differ-
ence in spillovers from the clean and the dirty sector into a model in which both the rate
and direction of technological change are endogenous. They discuss the implication
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of this difference for growth in the long run. In a Schumpeterian growth model where
new technologies are both more productive and more environmentally-friendly, Hart
(2004) shows that environmental policy can stimulate economic growth (see also Hart
(2007), Ricci (2007b), for similar types of models, and Ricci (2007a), for a review of
this literature).
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section we present
the datasets, explain how we measure knowledge spillovers and conduct some prelimi-
nary data exploration. In section 3, we discuss our empirical strategy in greater detail.
Section 4 reports our main results. In section 5, we estimate the market value of clean
knowledge spillovers. We discuss the implications of our findings in the final section.
4.2 Data and Descriptive Statistics
4.2.1 The Patent Database
We use data from the World Patent Statistical Database (PATSTAT), maintained by
the European Patent Office (EPO). PATSTAT includes close to 70 million patent doc-
uments from 107 patent offices. We identify clean and dirty patents using the Interna-
tional Patent Classification (IPC) and the European Patent Classification (ECLA). For
this purpose we rely heavily on work carried out at the OECD and the EPO, which has
recently developed a patent classification scheme for ”Technologies related to climate
change mitigation and adaptation” (see Veefkind et al. (2012) for more information on
how this scheme was constructed).3
We focus on two sectors where we can precisely distinguish between clean and dirty
patents: electricity production (renewables vs. fossil fuel energy generation) and au-
tomotive (electric and hydrogen cars vs. internal combustion engines). Our paper
rests primarily on a distinction between radically clean innovations (electric cars, so-
3This new scheme was defined with the help of experts in the field, both from within and outside
the EPO, including from the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). It brings together
technologies related to climate change that are scattered across many IPC sections and includes around
1,000 classification entries and nearly 1,500,000 patent documents.
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Table 4.1: Number of clean and dirty inventions by sector
Sector Clean Grey True Dirty Total
Transport 74,877 133,083 212,193 420,153
Electricity 103,659 19,827 627,590 751,076
Total 178,536 152,910 839,783 1,171,229
lar energy...) and their dirty counterparts (gasoline–fueled cars, coal-based electricity
generation...). However, an important feature of the dirty category is that some patents
included in this group aim at improving the efficiency of dirty technologies (for exam-
ple motor vehicle fuel efficiency technologies), making the dirty technology less dirty.
We refer to these energy-efficiency patents as “grey” inventions. The list of patent
classification codes used to identify clean, dirty and grey inventions is shown in table
C.1 and C.2.
Given that the same invention may be patented in several countries, our level of ob-
servation is the patent family (the set of patents covering the same invention in several
countries). In other words, we treat multiple filings of an invention as one invention
and count citations by patent family instead of individual patents.4 In total, our sample
spans from 1950 to 20055 and includes over 1 million inventions with approximately 3
million citations made to these inventions. Table 4.1 shows a breakdown of the number
of inventions in each sector. Clean inventions represent around 15% of our sample.
4.2.2 Citation Counts as Knowledge Spillovers
Patent data has a number of attractive features. First, patents are available at a highly
technologically disaggregated level. This allows us to distinguish between clean and
dirty innovations in several sectors, in particular electricity production and transporta-
tion. In comparison, R&D expenditures of a car company cannot usually be broken
down into clean and dirty innovations. Second, patent documents contain citations to
“prior art” as inventors are required to reference previous patents that have been used
4A patent family is considered clean if at least one patent within the family is clean
5We stop in 2005 to allow at least five years for patent to get cited. The majority of citations occur
during the first five years of a patent.
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to develop the new technology described in the patent. Citations are a response to the
legal requirement to determine the scope of an inventor’s claim to novelty and thus
represent a link to the pre-existing knowledge upon which the invention is built.6. In
other words, a citation indicates that the knowledge contained in the cited document
has been useful in the development of the new knowledge laid out in the citing patent
and thus represents a knowledge flow (Collins and Wyatt, 1988). It is therefore not
surprising that patent data have been widely used in empirical studies of knowledge
spillovers (Caballero and Jaffe, 1993, Jaffe and Trajtenberg, 1996, 1999, Jaffe et al.,
1993, Keller, 2004).
To give a concrete example of knowledge spillovers, take the patent entitled “X’Ray
Apparatus” (US8036340B2, see figure C.3). It was applied for in 2008, published in
2011 and belongs to the H05K class of electric techniques. The patent documents the
inventor(s), and the applicant of the invention as well as their addresses. It also lists the
claims of the invention and references other patents which will be useful in the making
of the invention, including whether these citations were added by the examiner or not.
Among its references, it lists a patent US6727670B1 entitled “Battery Current Limiter
for a High Voltage Battery Pack in a Hybrid Electric Vehicle Power train” (see figure
C.2) which was published in 2004. It belongs to the “electric motor” class (H02P). The
citation received represents a transfer of knowledge. Looking in turn at the list of ref-
6US patent law 37 C.F.R 156 establishes that ’each individual associated with the filing and prosecu-
tion of a patent application has a duty of candour and good faith in dealing with the (US Patent) Office,
which includes a duty to disclose to the Office all information known to that individual to be material
to patentability [...] no patent will be granted on an application in connection with which fraud on the
Office was practiced or attempted or the duty of disclosure was violated through bad faith or intentional
misconduct’. In contrast, the EPO has no requirement similar to the duty of candour. Rule 42 of the Eu-
ropean Patent Convention requires that the description in a European patent application should ’indicate
the background art which, as far as is known to the applicant, can be regarded as useful to understand
the invention, draw up the European search report and examine the European patent application, and,
preferably, cite the documents reflecting such art’. The different legal requirements of the two systems
have implications both in terms of who adds the citations and in the number of citations in the patents.
For EPO patents, it is the patent office’s examiner rather than the inventors or applicants who adds the
majority of patent citations. This implies that in the EPO system, inventors are more likely to be unaware
of the patents that are (ultimately) cited in their patents. However, citations in EPO patents may be less
’noisy’ than USPTO citations, since it can be assumed that they have been scrutinised and chosen by the
patent examiner, and citing-cited patent pairs might be ’closer’ both in time and technological content
than those extracted from the USPTO (Breschi and Lissoni, 2005, Michel and Bettels, 2001)
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erence, it cites the patent US6026921A (“Hybrid Vehicule Employing Parallel Hybrid
System, using both Internal Combustion Engine and Electric Motor for Propulsion”,
see figure C.1) which was published in 2000 is classified as B60K which falls under
our clean transport category. This represents a clean knowledge spillover.
For each patent family in our dataset, we compile all the citations received regard-
less of their field and whether or not they are clean. Nevertheless, there are a few
drawbacks to bear in mind. Patent citations are an incomplete measure of knowledge
flows because they only capture flows that result in a novel and patentable technology.
For this reason Griliches (1992) refers to citations as “pure knowledge spillovers”.
Since not all inventions are patented, patent citations underestimate the actual extent
of knowledge spillovers. Other channels of knowledge transfers, such as non-codified
knowledge and embodied know-how (inter-firm transfer of knowledge embodied in
skilled labor, knowledge flows between customers and suppliers, knowledge exchange
at conferences and trade fairs, etc.) are not captured by patent citations. It is however
reasonable to assume that knowledge spillovers within and outside the patent system
are correlated. Furthermore, there is a consensus that patent citations are a noisy mea-
sure of knowledge flows (Jaffe et al., 2000). First, citations made to patents by the
same inventor (referred to as self–citations) represent transfers of knowledge that are
mostly internalized, whereas citations to patents by other inventors are closer to the
true notion of diffused spillovers. This problem can be (at least partly) resolved by
excluding self-citations by the inventor. Second, some citations are added by patent
examiners during the examination process (see Cockburn et al. (2003), Lemley and
Sampat (2012) for an overview of the process). In a survey of inventors, Jaffe et al.
(2000) show that the influence of examiners on citations is considerable, and that in-
ventors were fully aware of less than one-third of the citations on their patents. Alcacer
and Gittelman (2006) find that examiners are responsible for 63% of citations on the
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average patent, and that 40% of patents have all citations added by the examiners.7
These types of citations might not capture pure knowledge spillovers if the inventor
was genuinely unaware of that invention.8 Fortunately, our patent data indicate whether
the citations was included by the applicant or the patent examiner. We can thus check
the robustness of our results to excluding citations added by patent examiners.9 Third,
inventors and applicants might be strategically referencing prior art. Citing more prior
art will make a patent more valuable in litigation, as it is much harder to prove a patent
is invalid if the patent office has already considered it and rejected the relevant prior
art (Allison et al., 2003). Most firms employ patent attorneys - many of whom were
formerly patent examiners - to maximise the chances of approval by the examiner in
order to avoid potential infringement and costly holdups. However, inventors have an
incentive not to cite patents unnecessarily as it may reduce their claims to novelty and
therefore affect the scope of the monopoly rights granted by the patent (Hegde and
Sampat, 2009, Sampat et al., 2005). Moreover, not properly referencing priori art can
lead to the invalidation of the patent and is therefore a dangerous strategy.10
7Alcacer et al. (2009) utilize a change in the reporting of US patent data that allows to separate
citations added by the inventor and the examiners to examine the examiners’ behaviour with respect to
inventor citations. In the first case, the patent examiner might add citations that differ in nature from the
inventor/applicant citations (’gap-filling’). Statistically, the gap-filling scenario would bias estimates of
inventor knowledge. In the second case, the examiner might add similar citations (’tracking’). Tracking
does not lead to any bias but it may cause standard errors in statistical estimations to be inflated. This
raises doubts about patent citations as good indicators of knowledge flows. If examiner and inventor
citations resemble each other closely, this suggests that firms and inventors choose their citations with
respect to potential infringement and holdup threats and anticipate with some error citations most likely
to be added by examiners. Moreover, examiners and inventors might exchange information during the
application process, and examiners themselves are prone to biases in favour of citing particular patents.
Using the EPO data which allows to identify the source of the citations since 1979, Criscuolo (2006)
attempt to identify the factors that influence whether an observed patent-to-patent citation was added by
the applicant/examiner.
8Of course, if the inventor has deliberately omitted to cite a relevant invention, then citations added
by patent examiners actually capture true knowledge spillovers.
9Note that even if the citations was added by the inventor, s/he might have learnt about the cited
invention only after the development of the invention. We have no way to control for this potential issue.
10“Failure of a person who is involved in the preparation or prosecution of a United States patent
application to disclose material prior art can result in the patent not issuing, or if issued, being held
unenforceable or invalid. As in many instances, the issue of whether prior art is material to patentability
can be quite subjective; it is critical that inventors, assignees, and attorneys be acquainted with the
obligations to disclose such prior art.” (Silverman, 2003)
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4.2.3 A New Measure of Spillovers: PatentRank
A potential concern with citation counts is that a citation from an obscure patent is
given the same weight as a citation from a highly-cited work. Hence it is possible
that some patents receive less citations than others but are cited by patents that are
themselves more influential (i.e., more cited themselves). In particular many ground-
breaking patents are modestly cited due to the small size of the scientific community in
their area at the time of the publication, but subsequent patents are themselves increas-
ingly cited (Maslov and Redner, 2008).
In order to take into account the whole network of patent citations, we apply the
random surfer PageRank algorithm (Page et al., 1999) to our patent dataset. This al-
gorithm was originally used by the web search engine Google to help determine the
relevance or importance of a webpage. It does so by analyzing the network of hyper-
links of web pages. The basic idea is that a webpage is considered important if many
other webpages point to it, or if many webpages point to the webpages that point to
it (or both), and so on. To date, a handful papers have applied this method to rank
the importance of patent documents (Lukach and Lukach, 2007, Shaffer, 2011). The
resulting PatentRank has the advantage to readily identify patents that are modestly
cited but nevertheless contain ground-breaking results. It also normalizes the impact
of patents from different areas allowing for a more objective comparison (Maslov and
Redner, 2008).
The PatentRank of a patent i is defined as the weighted sum of PatentRanks of all
patents citing i, where the weights depend on the number of citations made by these
citing patents. Therefore, a patent has a high rank if it is cited by many patents with
a high rank, and it is better to be cited by a patent that cites only one patent than by
a patent that has a long list of references. The PatentRank r(i) of patent i is defined
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according to the following formula and is computed recursively:11
r(i) =
a
N
+(1 a) Â
jeF(i)
r( j)
B( j)
where N is the total number of patents, F(i) is the set of patents that cite patent i (i.e.
patent i’s “forward citations”), and B( j) is the number of citations made by patent j
(i.e. patent j’s number of “backward” citations). The parameter a , the damping factor,
is used to avoid sink patents (i.e. patents that are never cited) because sink patents will
lead to an endless loop.12
When constructing the PatentRank, we use the entire population of inventions and
their citations correcting for self-citations by the inventor. We give inventions that are
never cited the smallest PatentRank and rank these PatentRanks to create a PatentRank
index. Thus the higher the PatentRank the greater impact or relevance of the invention.
Figure 4.1 shows that there is a positive correlation overall between the citation count
and the PatentRank but also a vast heterogeneity: many patents have few citations but
a high PatentRank and vice versa. As opposed to citation counts, PatentRank allows
us to capture the network centrality and in particular the influence of a patent. Hence,
both indicators are complementary measures of the intensity of knowledge spillovers.
4.2.4 Exploratory Data Analysis
The objective of this paper is to compare the extent of knowledge spillovers that arise
from clean and dirty innovations. As shown in table 4.2, aggregating both sectors to-
gether, clean inventions receive on average 3.40 citations throughout their life time
while dirty inventions receive on average 2.30 citations. This difference is highly sta-
tistically significant (see column 3). An obvious problem with this simple comparison
11The process converges very quickly. In practice we use 50 iterations but the process converges after
just a few iterations.
12The mechanism behind the ranking is equivalent to the random-surfer behavior, a person who surfs
the web by randomly clicking links on the visited pages but periodically gets bored and jumps to a ran-
dom page altogether. Therefore, when a user is on a web page, she will select one output link randomly
with probability a or will jump to other webpages with probability 1 a . It can be understood as a
Markov process in which the states are web pages, and the transitions are all equally probable and are
the links between webpages.
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Figure 4.1: Citation counts and PatentRank
is that clean patents are relatively newer, and hence have had less time to be cited.
The average age of clean patents (the time between the publication year and today)
is 22 years as opposed to 27 years for dirty patents. In order to partly deal with this
truncation issue, we look at the number of citations received within the first five years
of the patents’ publication (Hall et al., 2001). The difference between the number of
citations received by clean and dirty inventions increases: clean patents receive 74%
more citations than dirty patents within their first five years. Clean inventions also have
a significantly higher PatentRank index than dirty inventions. Looking separately at
each technological field, we find that the mean number of citations and the differences
between clean and dirty patents vary across sectors. Inventions in the transportation
sector are more cited overall and have a higher PatentRank index. Nevertheless, clean
inventions are more cited and have higher PatentRank than dirty ones in both sectors
and this difference is always significant. The “innovation flowers” in figure 4.2 show a
network diagram for a random sample of 1000 clean and 1000 dirty innovations where
the edges represent citations. This visual representation of PatentRank highlights the
greater PatentRank of clean inventions.
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Figure 4.2: Innovation Flowers
(a) Dirty
(b) Clean
Notes: The figures visualize innovation spillovoers. We draw a random sample of 1000 dirty and 1000
clean innovations corresponding to the nodes in the figures. The edges correspond to backwards citations.
An interactive version is under http://www.eeclab.org.uk/forcedirect arx.html?tojson dirlinks0 1995 15 1000 0.json and
http://www.eeclab.org.uk/forcedirect arx.html?tojson dirlinks0 1995 15 1000 2.json.
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Table 4.2: Mean number of citations and PatentRank
Clean Dirty Diff.
Transport and Electricity
Citations received 3.399 2.295 1.104***
(8.256) (5.921) [0.016]
Citations received within 5-years 1.807 1.066 0.741***
(4.754) (3.109) [0.009]
PatentRank index 2,335,270 1,920,395 414,874.3***
(3,019,924) (2,813,827) [7,354.756]
Transport
Citations received 4.275 3.215 1.060***
(9.626) (7.185) [0.031]
Citations received within 5-years 2.572 1.65 0.920***
(5.903) (4.174) [0.018]
PatentRank index 2,645,597 2,429,006 216,591.2***
(3,081,718) (3,126,471) [12,455.71]
Electricity production
Citations received 2.800 1.839 0.961***
(7.092) (5.091) [0.018]
Citations received within 5-years 1.281 0.767 0.514***
(3.681) (2.312) [0.009]
PatentRank index 2,119,068 1,666,122 452,945.3***
(2,922,871) (2,633,157) [8,948.939]
Notes: The first two columns report the mean values with standard deviation in parentheses. The last column reports a
t-test for the difference in means with standard error in parentheses. *** indicates significance at 0.1% level.
4.3 Econometric Analysis
Results from the exploratory data analysis point to larger knowledge spillovers from
clean technologies. The results from this exploratory analysis can however be driven by
some unobserved shocks to citation patterns disproportionately affecting clean patents.
For example, the number of citations received by patents have increased recently due
to the development of online patent search engines which facilitate identification of
previous patents. Since clean patents are on average younger, they are likely to have
been disproportionately affected by changes in the IT system. Moreover, the truncation
issue is exacerbated for patents of older vintage. Even if each patent have the same
amount of time to be cited, the increase in the universe of citing patents would increase
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the total number of citations made. Econometric methods allow us to control for these
potential confounding factors.
Our strategy is to estimate a simple count data model of the type
Ci = exp(bCleani+ gXi+ ei) (4.1)
whereCi is the number of citations received by invention i (excluding self-citations) or
the PatentRank index associated to invention i, Cleani is a dummy variable indicating
whether invention i is clean, Xi are controls and ei is the error term. Our sample is
the population of clean and dirty patents. Hence, the main coefficient of interest, b ,
captures the percentage difference between the number of citations received by clean
and dirty patents, all other things being equal. Given the count data nature of the
dependent variable, we estimate equation 4.1 by Poisson pseudo-maximum likelihood.
We condition out the patent office-by-year-by-sector fixed effects using the method
introduced by Hausman et al. (1984), which is the count data equivalent to the within
groups estimator for OLS.13
We include a number of control variables to purge the estimates from as many po-
tential confounding factors as possible. First, as explained above, the average number
of citations received and made has been rising over time (Hall et al. (2001)). Moreover,
differences in patent office practices across time and technological areas may produce
artificial differences in citations intensities. We therefore include a full range of patent
13This is implemented by the xtpoisson, fe command in STATA. Note that Poisson models estimated
by pseudo-maximum likelihood can deal with over-dispersion (see Silva and Tenreyro (2006)), so that
negative binomial models offer no particular advantage. In particular, we find the pseudo-fixed effects
negative binomial estimator available in stata (xtnbreg, fe) untrustable, since it does not truly conditions
out the fixed effects (only the overdispersion coefficient is assumed to vary across units - see Allison and
Waterman (2002), Greene (2007), for more information on this issue). However, as a robustness check
we also estimated equation 4.1 using an unconditional negative binomial estimator with patent office,
year, month and sector dummies (including a whole range of sector by year by patent office dummies is
computationally infeasible) and find very similar results. The coefficient obtained for the clean dummy
variable is 0.508***. The standard error varies from 0.041 when we cluster at the patent office and sector
level, 0.023 when we cluster at the patent office level only and 0.093 when we cluster at the sector level
only.
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office-by-year-by-sector fixed effects. Practically speaking, this means that we effec-
tively compare for example clean energy patents filed at the USPTO in 2000 with dirty
energy patents filed at the USPTO that same year. To account for seasonality effects,
we also include dummy variables for each month using the publication date.14
Second, the main problem we face is the fact that clean technologies are relatively
newer, which makes them intrinsically different from dirty technologies. Note that
the direction of the potential bias is not obvious. On the one hand, inventors start
from a lower knowledge base which may lead to greater opportunities for big break-
throughs and larger positive spillovers than more mature technologies. On the other
hand, the number of opportunities to be cited is smaller for clean technologies because
we only know about citations received so far. As a result, we might be overestimating
or underestimating spillovers effects from clean patents, depending on which effect
dominates. In order to make a first attempt at controlling for this issue, we include the
stock of past patents from the same technological field (defined on the basis of 4-digit
IPC code) in the regressions.15 Clearly, the stock of past patents might not perfectly
capture the level of development of the technology and we come back to this point later.
Finally, citations might not exclusively capture knowledge flows, but also the com-
mercial value of the patent. In order to control for this problem and focus on the part of
the patent’s value that is not appropriated by the inventor we include three measures of
patent value: the patent’s family size, a dummy variable indicating a “triadic” patent,
and a dummy variable indicating the grant status. Family size is the number of patent
offices where the invention has been filed. Family size has been used widely as a
measure of patent value (Harhoff et al., 2003, Lanjouw and Mody, 1996, Lanjouw and
Schankerman, 2004). Triadic patents are patents which have been filed in the US, Eu-
ropean, and Japanese patent offices. Triadic patents have also been used extensively as
14Remember our unit of observation is the patent family. We use the earliest publication date within
the family as the invention publication date.
15We also tried including higher-order polynomial terms of the past patent stock. This does not alter
the results in any way.
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a way to identify highest-value patents (Dernis and Khan, 2004, Grupp, 1998, Grupp
et al., 1996, Guellec and Van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie, 2004, Van Pottelsberghe
et al., 2001). The grant status of an invention indicates whether the patent has been
granted by the patent office yet and obviously indicates a higher quality patent.
4.4 Results
Results from equation 4.1 can be found in table 4.3. The results from the econometric
analysis confirm those of the exploratory data analysis: conditional on sector, patent
office, publication year, commercial value and level of technology development, clean
inventions appear to give rise to larger knowledge spillovers than dirty inventions. On
average across the two technological fields, we find that clean inventions receive be-
tween 40% and 43% more citations than dirty ones depending on the specification. The
coefficient is highly statistically significant across all models (p<0.001).16 We get the
strongest effect when adding all three measures of value as controls, but there is little
variation across specifications. Given that these value measures all enter with a highly
statistically significant coefficient, column 4 is our preferred specification. Notably,
the number of past patents is always negative and significant, indicating that the lat-
est patents in a field receive a decreasing number of citations as the field grows over
time.17 Results based on PatentRank confirm the results found with citations counts.
Clean inventions have a significantly higher PatentRank across all sectors. Hence, when
considering the whole citation network, knowledge spillovers from clean technologies
are still larger than those generated by dirty technologies. Moreover, PatentRank has
the advantage of taking into account the possible effect of different citing behavior of
inventors citing clean and dirty patents. For instance, if inventors citing clean patents
generally cite more patents than inventors citing dirty patents, this would translate into
higher citations received for clean innovations but not in a higher PatentRank. Recall
the PatentRank normalizes the number of citations received by the number of citations
16We cluster standard errors at the sector by patent office by year level. To check the robustness of the
results we cluster-bootstrap the standard errors instead. The standard error increases slightly from .0137
to .0146 with the associated p-value still <0.001.
17Including the squared stock in the regression leads to a clean invention coefficient of 0.404*** (with
a coefficient of -0.613*** for the stock and 0.028*** for the squared stock)
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made by a citing patent.
Table 4.3: Basic results
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dep. var. Citations received PatentRank
Clean invention 0.398*** 0.392*** 0.430*** 0.267*** 0.264*** 0.292***
(0.015) (0.015) (0.014) (0.013) (0.014) (0.014)
Number of patents -0.092*** -0.057*** -0.052*** -0.031***
(0.008) (0.007) (0.006) (0.005)
Family size 0.073*** 0.067***
(0.004) (0.003)
Triadic 0.456*** 0.241***
(0.036) (0.025)
Granted 0.947*** 0.491***
(0.031) (0.021)
Patent office-by-year-by-sector yes yes yes yes yes yes
Month fixed effect yes yes yes yes yes yes
Obs. 1,149,988 1,149,988 1,149,988 1,149,988 1,149,988 1,149,988
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses (* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001). The dependent variable is the total number of citations received excluding self-
citations by inventors (columns 1 to 3) and the PatentRank after 20 iterations (columns 4 to 6). All columns are estimated by fixed-effects Poisson pseudo-maximum
likelihood.
We conducted a number of robustness checks on the basic specification. First,
we use variations over our dependent variable to measure knowledge spillovers: the
number of citations received within a five-years window (table C.21), the number of ci-
tations discarding citations added by the patent examiner (table C.22), and the number
of citations excluding self-citations at the applicant level on top of excluding citations
at the inventor-level (table C.23). Second, we add various controls: the number of
claims, the number of 3-digit IPC codes, the number of citations made, the number
of inventors, and the number of applicants (table C.24). Finally, we focus on various
subsamples including patents that received at least one citations, triadic patents, patents
from the US and European patent office (table C.26). None of these tests modifies our
results.
In order to investigate the evolution of the relative intensity of spillovers across time,
we run our estimation for each five years period between 1950 and 2005 and plot the
coefficients obtained for clean invention along with their 95% confidence intervals in
figures 4.3 and 4.4. We find that there has been a clear increase in the clean premium
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over time.
Figure 4.3: Clean coefficient between 1950 to 2005 using citations received
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Figure 4.4: Clean coefficient between 1950 and 2005 using PatentRank
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In table 4.4 we present the regressions results for each technology separately. The
results are robust across both sectors, but we find some heterogeneity in the clean co-
efficient. Clean inventions in the transportation sector receive 35% more citations than
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dirty inventions, while the clean premium in the electricity is larger (49%).
Table 4.4: Results by sector
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Sector Transport Electricity Transport Electricity
Dep. var. Citation count PatentRank
Clean invention 0.347*** 0.488*** 0.219*** 0.333***
(0.018) (0.023) (0.014) (0.023)
Number of patents -0.068*** -0.047*** -0.048*** -0.019**
(0.008) (0.009) (0.006) (0.007)
Family size 0.070*** 0.067*** 0.062*** 0.060***
(0.008) (0.004) (0.007) (0.004)
Triadic 0.512*** 0.432*** 0.279*** 0.252***
(0.056) (0.050) (0.045) (0.041)
Granted 1.134*** 0.725*** 0.620*** 0.381***
(0.034) (0.024) (0.027) (0.017)
Obs. 419,959 748,918 419,959 748,918
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses (* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001). The dependent variables
are the total number of citations received excluding self-citations by inventors in columns 1 and 2 and the
PatentRank index in columns 3 and 4. The regressions are all estimated by Poisson pseudo-maximum likeli-
hood. The sample includes inventions from the transport (columns 1 and 3) and electricity (columns 2 and 4)
sectors. All columns include a patent office-by-year and month fixed effects.
So far we have focused on the average effect of being a clean invention on the
citation outcome. We now investigate the heterogeneity of the clean premium across
the distribution of citations. Quantile regression techniques are not readily available
for count data models, but we bypass this issue by estimating probit models of the
likelihood that a patent falls within a given percentile of the patent citation distribution
(see Chernozhukov et al. (2013) for a discussion of this issue). We run the following
model:
Prob(Cite ji = 1) = a+bCleani+ gXi+ ei (4.2)
where Cite ji equals one if invention i receives j citations where j varies between 0
(56% of inventions are never cited) and 479 (the most highly cited invention). Cleani
and Xi are identical to the previous section. Hence the coefficient obtained for Cleani
captures the difference between clean and dirty inventions in the probability of inven-
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tion i to receive j citations. Figure 4.5 shows the coefficient obtained forCleani and the
associated 95% confidence interval on the number of citations received. We conclude
from these results that (i) clean inventions are always more likely to have a positive
citation count than dirty inventions at all levels of the distribution and (ii) the higher
intensity of knowledge spillovers from clean technologies is even more pronounced for
most highly cited patents.
Figure 4.5: Heterogeneity
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4.4.1 Localized Knowledge Spillovers
The existence of localized knowledge spillovers has been widely documented (see
Audretsch and Feldman (2004) for an overview). In one of the earliest papers on this
subject, Jaffe et al. (1993) show that spillovers from research to firms are more intense
when the firm is closer to the institution that generated the research. Jaffe and Tra-
jtenberg (1996, 1999) show that patent citations tend to occur initially between firms
that are close to each other, and later on spread to a larger geographical area and other
countries. Using European patent data, Maurseth and Verspagen (2002) show that
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patent citations occur more often between regions which belong to the same country,
same linguistic group and geographical proximity (see also Peri (2005)). Similar re-
sults have been found for energy technologies (see Braun et al. (2010), Verdolini and
Galeotti (2011)).
In our case, clean technologies could generate larger knowledge spillovers than dirty
technologies simply because the clean industry might be more clustered geographically
than the dirty industry. Although we do not have detailed information on the exact lo-
calization of inventors, we do have extensive information on their country of residence.
We use this information to distinguish between national (within-border) and interna-
tional (cross-border) citations. We then separately run regressions on these two sets
of citation counts.18 For the PatentRank, we compute a new PatentRank on the pool
of national citations and international separately. We find that clean inventions exhibit
larger national (column 2) and international (column 3) spillovers. For the remainder
of the paper, all results will be presented for citations. The PatentRank index results
can be found in the appendix. This suggests that clean inventor community transcend
country borders. The clean advantage is larger in terms of domestic spillovers are
larger than international ones.
18In the case of collaboration, we weight each citations by the number of inventors from each country
involved in the invention. For example, three inventors working together, one in country A and two in
country B, will count as 1/3 of a citation for country A and 2/3 of a citation for country B.
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Table 4.5: Within vs. across-country spillovers
(1) (2) (3)
Dep. var. Citations received Citations received Citations received
within country across country
Clean invention 0.430*** 0.423*** 0.247***
(0.014) (0.017) (0.019)
Number of patents -0.057*** -0.057*** -0.081***
(0.007) (0.008) (0.006)
Family size 0.073*** 0.062*** 0.066***
(0.004) (0.003) (0.004)
Triadic 0.456*** 0.363*** 0.212***
(0.036) (0.028) (0.040)
Granted 0.947*** 0.757*** 0.829***
(0.031) (0.029) (0.030)
Obs. 1,149,988 1,149,988 1,149,988
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses (* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001). The dependent variables are the total
number of citations received (column 1), the total number of citations received from the inventor’s country (column 2), the to-
tal number of citations received from all countries except the invention’s (column 3) corrected for self-citations by inventors.
All columns are estimated by Poisson pseudo-maximum likelihood and include patent office-by-year and month fixed effects.
4.4.2 Public Support for R&D
With many clean technologies dependent on policy support of one form or another,
the expansion of clean technologies and its spillovers could be due in part to public
investment. For instance, in 2011 OECD countries spent over 3 billion euros on R&D
support to renewable energy technologies. To control for the government spending
level, we include in the first two columns of table 4.6 the government spending in
clean and dirty technologies within the transport and electricity sectors. Since we only
have information on R&D spending for 28 countries from 1974 onwards, we run the
baseline regression for this sample in columns 1, 3 and 5 and the include the govern-
ment spending in columns 2, 4 and 6. On average, clean inventions exhibit even larger
spillovers than dirty inventions after controlling for government spending. This effect
is driven by the electricity production sector.
Another related concern is that research in clean technologies might come dispro-
portionately from universities rather than private firms. If this is the case, the clean
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premium might come from the fact that university patents are more highly cited and
more general (Henderson et al., 1998). Moreover, the incentive and reward structure
within the university system induce scientists to invest in their reputation by making
research publicly available (openness of the academic community) and make them
more willing to recognize the influence of their predecessors. We control for whether
the patent was filed by a university or a firm in the last two columns of table 4.6 with
private individuals being the baseline and still find that clean inventions receive 42%
more citations than their dirty counterpart. Taken together, these results suggest that
public support for R&D is not the driving force behind the clean premium.
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Table 4.6: Public spending
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dep. var. Citations received
Government Spending University
Clean invention 0.493*** 0.507*** 0.421*** 0.423***
(0.026) (0.026) (0.014) (0.015)
Number of patents -0.007 -0.006 -0.047*** -0.050***
(0.009) (0.009) (0.006) (0.006)
Family size 0.067*** 0.067*** 0.070*** 0.067***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003)
Triadic 0.452*** 0.450*** 0.450*** 0.432***
(0.046) (0.046) (0.034) (0.034)
Granted 0.689*** 0.688*** 1.005*** 0.992***
(0.025) (0.025) (0.031) (0.032)
Government spending 0.034***
(0.007)
University 0.429***
(0.022)
Firms 0.271***
(0.018)
Obs. 496,788 496,788 826,078 826,078
Source: International Energy Agency (2013): Energy Technology Research and Development Database (Edition:
2013). Mimas, University of Manchester
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses (* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001). The dependent variable is
the total number of citations received excluding self-citations by inventors. All columns are estimated by Poisson
pseudo-maximum likelihood and include patent office-by-year and month fixed effects. The samples of columns
1 and 2 include patent families for which we have government spending, where column 1 is the baseline and col-
umn 2 add a control for government spending. The sample of the last two columns include the patent families for
which we have university or firm, where column 1 is the baseline and the column 2 add a control for university
and firms.
4.4.3 Network Effects
Whether guided by “norms of science” (Merton, 1957, Small and Griffith, 1974) or
self-interest including personal connections (Case and Higgins, 2000, Leopold, 1973),
one might be concerned that inventors working on clean innovation behave system-
atically differently from inventors working on dirty innovations. The community of
researchers working on clean technologies could perhaps be smaller and more close-
knit. Stuart and Podolny (1996) for instance argue that there is also a strong social
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component to a citation. The clean premium would then represent inventors’ networks
rather than true knowledge spillovers. To address this issue we restrict our sample to
inventors who have been working both on clean and dirty technologies and include in-
ventor fixed effects in our baseline estimations. Our data includes 41,713 such inventors
(representing 2.92% of total inventors). Results are presented in table 4.7. We simi-
larly introduce applicant fixed effects and the results do not change either. The clean
premium remains significant albeit of slightly smaller magnitude. However, this is due
to the different sample as can be seen by comparing columns 1 and 2 and columns 3
and 4 respectively.
Table 4.7: Adding inventor and applicant fixed effect
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dep. var. Citations received
Clean invention 0.274*** 0.336*** 0.400*** 0.380***
(0.007) (0.011) (0.019) (0.040)
Number of patents -0.096*** -0.081*** -0.038*** -0.067***
(0.004) (0.006) (0.008) (0.010)
Family size 0.038*** 0.094*** 0.091*** 0.100***
(0.002) (0.006) (0.007) (0.011)
Triadic 0.866*** 0.644*** 0.461*** 0.444***
(0.012) (0.026) (0.056) (0.089)
Granted 1.234*** 1.008*** 1.022*** 1.000***
(0.007) (0.011) (0.033) (0.046)
Inventor fixed effect no yes no no
Applicant fixed effect no no no yes
Obs. 697,192 697,192 435,584 435,584
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses (* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001). The dependent variable is
the total number of citations received excluding self-citations by inventors. All columns are estimated by Poisson
pseudo-maximum likelihood and include patent office, sector, year and month fixed effects.
4.4.4 Nature of the Citations
There are two important types of citations: references to patent documents that are
particularly close to the new invention, which restrict the claims of the inventor, and
references related to the technological background of the new invention. Therefore
citations may reflect the similarity of inventions rather than the cumulative nature of
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innovation Packalen and Bhattacharya (2012). To account for the heterogeneous nature
of citations, we distinguish between citations received from inventions in the same tech-
nological sector (defined using the 3-digit IPC code as assigned by the patent examiner)
and citations received from inventions in a different technological sector.19 While the
former include citations which might merely reflect similarities between patents, the
latter should be closer to true knowledge spillovers. We then run our baseline regres-
sion separately on these two types of citations. Table 4.8 shows that clean inventions
receive more citations both within and across technological fields, suggesting they do
generate larger knowledge spillovers in the economy. The PatentRank index is com-
puted on the pool of intrasectoral and inter-sectoral citations separately.
Table 4.8: Intra vs. inter-sectoral spillovers
(1) (2) (3)
Dep. var. Citations received Intra-sectoral Inter-sectoral
citations citations
Clean invention 0.430*** 0.457*** 0.247***
(0.014) (0.015) (0.019)
Number of patents -0.057*** -0.053*** -0.081***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.006)
Family size 0.073*** 0.074*** 0.066***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.003)
Triadic 0.456*** 0.487*** 0.212***
(0.036) (0.036) (0.040)
Granted 0.947*** 0.963*** 0.829***
(0.031) (0.032) (0.030)
Obs. 1,149,988 1,149,988 1,149,988
Notes: Robust standard errors, p-values in parentheses (* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001).The dependent
variables are the total number of citations (column 1), within a technological field (based on IPC 3 digit code)
(column 2), across technological field (column 3) corrected for self-citations by inventors. All columns are
estimated by Poisson pseudo-maximum likelihood and include patent office-by-year and month fixed effects.
19An important difference between the EPO and the USPTO systems is that in European search re-
ports, cited documents are classified by the patent examiner within a particular citation category accord-
ing to their relevance. When assessing the novelty of patent applications the examiner searches for earlier
documents which have the same or almost the same features as the patent concerned (Schmoch, 1993).
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4.4.5 Generality and Originality
Clean technologies, being relatively newer, might have more opportunities for “fun-
damental” research while older dirty technologies might instead be focused on the
development of new applications. If clean technologies have more general applica-
tions, this might explain why they receive more citations and appear to induce larger
knowledge spillovers.
In the previous section, clean inventions were found to be more likely to be cited
both within or across their originating technological field. To further investigate the
generality of clean and dirty inventions, we construct a measure of generality based
on the Herfindahl index of concentration introduced by Trajtenberg et al. (1997). It
measures the extent to which the follow-up technical advances (i.e. the citations) are
spread across different technological fields, rather than being concentrated in just a
few of them (i.e., they are more likely to have the characteristics of a General Purpose
Technology, see Bresnahan and Trajtenberg (1995), Popp and Newell (2012)). The
generality of a patent is defined in the following way:
Generalityi = 1 
ni
Â
j
s2i j (4.3)
where si j is the percentage of patent citations received by patent family i that belong to
patent class j (defined at 3-digit IPC code), out of ni patent classes.20 An originating
patent with generality approaching one receives citations that are very widely dispersed
across patent classes; a generality equal to zero corresponds to the case where all cita-
tions fall into a single class.
Similarly, one might suspect that clean technologies are more original than their dirty
counterparts because they are relatively newer. We construct an originality measure
using the same approach as in equation 4.3 but replacing si j by the percentage of ci-
20Specifically, we count the number of citations made by a patent and received by a patent family.
This way we are only capturing citations directly made to an invention as oppose to citations made from
one patent family to another.
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tations made (instead of received) by invention i that belong to patent class j (defined
again at 3-digit IPC code).21 Thus, if a patent cites previous patents that belong to a
narrow set of technologies the originality score will be low, whereas citing patents in a
wide range of fields would render a high score.
We carry out regressions using this generality measure as a new outcome variable.
Clean technologies are significantly more general and original in the transport indus-
try while the opposite in true for the electricity production industry (see Table 4.9).22
Adding generality (column 2), originality (column 3) and finally both measures (col-
umn 4) as control in Table C.18 confirms the finding of greater knowledge spillovers
from clean inventions. Interestingly, the coefficient is slightly smaller when adding
these controls than under the baseline specification (column 1). This suggests that
these measures, particularly the generality measure, explain (a small) part of the clean
premium.
Table 4.9: Generality and Originality
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Sector All Transport Electricity All Transport Electricity
Dep. var. Generality measure Originality measure
Clean invention 0.008* 0.047*** -0.034*** -0.003 0.049*** -0.054***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003)
Number of patents -0.047*** -0.081*** -0.024*** -0.050*** -0.086*** -0.027***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001)
Family size 0.012*** 0.011*** 0.012*** 0.008*** 0.007*** 0.007***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.0004) (0.001) (0.001)
Triadic 0.035*** 0.028*** 0.046*** 0.026*** 0.017*** 0.037***
(0.003) (0.004) (0.005) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005)
Granted 0.047*** 0.053*** 0.039*** 0.024*** 0.024*** 0.022***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002)
Obs. 515,217 227,678 291,989 382,236 162,919 222,538
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses (* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001). The dependent variable is a generality measure (columns 1 to
3) and a originality measure (columns 4 to 6) based on Herfindahl index of concentration. The sample includes patents in the transport sectors only
(colunns 2 and 5), in the electricity sector only (column 3 and 6), and in both sectors (columns 1 and 4). All columns are estimated by OLS and
include patent office-by-year-by-sector fixed effects, and month fixed effects.
21These measures depend upon the classification system: a finer classification would render higher
measures, and conversely for a coarser system. We use 3-digit IPC code as used in Hall et al. (2001)
22Note that there is a potential selection bias here, as patents that have never been cited have no
generality measure and are therefore left out of the sample.
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4.4.6 Clean Technologies Versus Other Emerging Fields
Technologies that contain a high degree of new knowledge (radical innovations) are
likely to exhibit higher spillover effects than technologies that contain a low degree
of new knowledge (incremental innovations). Clean technologies are new and rather
under-developed technologies. In contrast, the dirty technologies they replace are
much more mature and developed. Therefore research in clean technologies might
yield spillovers that are completely different in scope from research in dirty tech-
nologies because they can be considered as radically new innovations. In order to
investigate this assumption, we use several strategies.
First, we control for the age of the invention’s technological field defined as the time
elapsed since the date of the first appearance of this technological field (defined at
the 15-digit IPC code) in any patent. Results are reported in column 2 of table 4.10.
Controlling for the age of the technology decreases the coefficient obtained for the
clean dummy variable. In order to account for potential non-linearities we further add
squared age (column 3) and a whole range of dummy variables for each percentile of
the age distribution (column 4). This exercise further diminishes the clean coefficient
from 0.430 to 0.353, indicating that part of the clean premium is explained by the
relative novelty of the field.
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Table 4.10: Controlling for age of technological field
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dep. var. Citations received
Clean invention 0.410*** 0.381*** 0.363*** 0.354***
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
Number of patents -0.094*** -0.052*** -0.043*** -0.046***
(0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Family size 0.070*** 0.067*** 0.068*** 0.068***
(0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Triadic 0.448*** 0.431*** 0.406*** 0.397***
(0.035) (0.035) (0.034) (0.034)
Granted 0.939*** 0.929*** 0.917*** 0.912***
(0.031) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030)
Age of tech field -0.177*** 0.194***
(0.009) (0.034)
Age of tech field2 -0.023***
(0.002)
Age of tech dummies no no no yes
Obs. 1,149,237 1,149,237 1,149,237 1,149,237
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses (* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001). The dependent variable is
the total number of citations received, corrected for self-citations by inventors. All columns are estimated by
Poisson pseudo-maximum likelihood and include patent office-by-year and month fixed effects.
Second, we distinguish between inventions which are radically clean from those
which are related to energy efficiency improvements that make the dirty technology less
dirty. So far, our paper revolves mostly around a distinction between radically clean in-
novations (e.g. electric cars, wind turbines) and dirty innovations (e.g. combustion
engines, coal power plants). In the results presented thus far we have included grey
innovations in the “dirty” category. We now identify these inventions and label these
“grey” innovations. In tables 4.11 and C.11, we compare clean inventions with grey in-
ventions (column 2), grey and truly dirty inventions (column 3), and finally clean with
truly dirty inventions only (column 4). As a benchmark, column 1 simply reproduces
the results from table4.4 where grey innovations are included in the dirty category. This
analysis suggests a clear ranking in citations counts: clean technologies exhibit signifi-
cantly higher levels of spillovers than grey technologies, which themselves outperform
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truly dirty technologies. From a policy perspective, this result implies that radically
clean technologies should receive higher public support than incremental innovation in
dirty technologies.
Table 4.11: Clean, Grey and True Dirty
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Sample Clean vs. Clean vs. Grey vs. Clean vs.
Grey and true Dirty Grey True Dirty True Dirty
Dep. var. Citations received
Clean/Grey invention 0.430*** 0.191*** 0.307*** 0.502***
(0.014) (0.016) (0.016) (0.015)
Number of patents -0.057*** -0.051*** -0.114*** -0.060***
(0.007) (0.009) (0.005) (0.007)
Family size 0.073*** 0.069*** 0.072*** 0.071***
(0.004) (0.007) (0.004) (0.004)
Triadic 0.456*** 0.481*** 0.454*** 0.441***
(0.036) (0.055) (0.037) (0.035)
Granted 0.947*** 0.997*** 0.977*** 0.868***
(0.031) (0.035) (0.033) (0.027)
Obs. 1,149,988 326,942 978,179 1,006,996
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses (* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001). The dependent variable is the total number
of citations received, corrected for self-citations by inventors. The sample includes clean, grey and truly dirty (column 1), clean
and grey (column 2), grey and truly dirty (column 3), and clean and truly dirty (column 4) inventions. All columns are estimated
by Poisson pseudo-maximum likelihood and include patent office-by-year and month fixed effects.
Third, we compare knowledge spillovers between clean inventions in the transport
and electricity technologies to other radically new technologies, namely IT, biotech-
nologies, nanotechnologies, robots and 3D (see Table C.3 for the list of related IPC
codes). Results in table 4.12 show that clean inventions receive 41% more citations
than biotech inventions. However, clean inventions receive significantly fewer citations
than inventions in the IT, nanotechnology, robot and 3D industries. In tables C.18 and
C.20, we find that clean inventions are less general and less original than all new tech-
nologies apart from nanotechnologies. Taken together, these results suggest that the
relative novelty of clean technologies might explain why they exhibit larger spillovers.
Looking at the coefficients obtained for the clean invention variable, it is interesting to
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note that knowledge spillovers from clean technologies appear comparable to those in
the IT sector, which has been behind the third industrial revolution.
Table 4.12: Spillovers from clean and other new technologies
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Baseline sector IT Biotechs Nano Robot 3D
Dep. var. Citations received
Clean invention -0.153*** 0.408*** -0.337*** -0.127*** -0.278***
(0.029) (0.033) (0.062) (0.042) (0.036)
Number of patents -0.013 -0.160*** -0.031*** -0.039*** -0.037***
(0.008) (0.014) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Family size 0.020*** 0.033*** 0.063*** 0.063*** 0.062***
(0.003) (0.005) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Triadic 0.574*** 0.663*** 0.525*** 0.550*** 0.528***
(0.057) (0.053) (0.070) (0.069) (0.068)
Granted 1.181*** 0.806*** 0.862*** 0.877*** 0.882***
(0.065) (0.023) (0.038) (0.036) (0.037)
Obs. 1,445,552 403,294 180,441 198,602 185,726
Notes: Robust standard errors, p-values in parentheses (* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001). The dependent variable is the to-
tal number of citations received, corrected for self-citations by inventors. The sample includes all clean patents (transport and
electricity) and patents from the following technologies: IT (column 1), bioechs (column 2), nano (column 3), robot (column
4), and 3D (column 5). All columns are estimated by Poisson pseudo-maximum likelihood and include patent office-by-year
and month fixed effects.
Fourth, we compare the previous sample (clean transport, clean electricity, IT,
biotech, nano, robots and 3D) to all other inventions. Figure 4.6 plots the coefficient
of the dirty (in black), grey (in grey), clean (in green) and radically new technologies
(in orange). Clean transport and electricity exhibit larger spillovers than the average
invention. In terms of relative ranking, the clean transport and clean electricity are
positioned between their dirty counterparts and radically new technologies.
Fifth, we restrict the sample of radically new technologies (IT, biotechs, nano, and
robots) and compare clean and dirty inventions within these technologies. While clean
inventions within the IT and the biotechs technologies still exhibit larger knowledge
spillovers, there is no clean advantage within the nano and robot sectors.
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Figure 4.6: Clean, grey, dirty, and radically new technologies vs. all other technologies-
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Table 4.13: Comparing spillovers from clean and dirty within new technologies
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Sector IT Biotechs Nano Robot
Dep. var. Citations received
Clean invention 0.222* 0.609** 0.313 0.677
(0.091) (0.053) (0.211) (0.525)
Number of patents -0.012 -0.257*** -0.169*** -0.051
(0.008) (0.016) (0.044) (0.047)
Family size 0.020*** 0.033*** 0.109*** 0.104***
(0.003) (0.005) (0.018) (0.014)
Triadic 0.547*** 0.583*** 0.268* 0.387***
(0.055) (0.056) (0.136) (0.113)
Granted 1.220*** 0.699*** 0.961*** 1.005***
(0.072) (0.031) (0.145) (0.053)
Obs. 1,270,842 227,100 1,481 22,266
Notes: Robust standard errors, p-values in parentheses (* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001). The depen-
dent variable is the total number of citations received, corrected for self-citations by inventors. The sample
includes patents from the following technologies: IT (column 1), bioechs (column 2), nano (column 3),
robot (column 4), and 3D (column 5). All columns are estimated by Poisson pseudo-maximum likelihood
and include patent office-by-year and month fixed effects.
Finally, in an attempt to find a dirty yet radically new technology, we compare
knowledge spillovers between clean electricity production technologies and carbon
capture and storage technologies (CCS) in table 4.14. The clean advantage disappears
when considering simple patent counts and PatentRank, suggesting it is not because
they are clean that clean technologies generate larger knowledge spillovers.
4.5 Discussion and Conclusion
In this paper we compare the relative intensity of knowledge spillovers from clean and
dirty technologies. To measure knowledge spillovers, we use a rich dataset of 3 million
citations received by over a million inventions patented in the automobile and electric-
ity production sectors. This analysis is crucial to answer the question of whether clean
technologies warrant higher subsidies than dirty ones. Our results unambiguously show
that clean technologies induce larger knowledge spillovers than their dirty counterparts.
We conduct a large number of sensitivity tests and the findings are remarkably robust.
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Table 4.14: Spillovers from clean and CCS technologies
Dep. var. Citations received
Clean invention -0.083*
(0.034)
Number of patents 0.037***
(0.010)
Family size 0.065***
(0.006)
Triadic 0.477***
(0.062)
Granted 0.681***
(0.030)
Obs. 106,700
Notes: Robust standard errors, p-values in parentheses (*
p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001). The dependent variable
is the total number of citations received, corrected for self-
citations by inventors. The sample includes clean electricity
production inventions and CO2 Capture and Storage technol-
ogy. All columns are estimated by Poisson pseudo-maximum
likelihood and include patent office-by-year and month fixed
effects.
In particular, as depicted by the innovation flowers, this result is confirmed when using
a completely novel methodology to measure knowledge spillovers that does not only
count immediate forward citations but takes into account the whole network of patent
citations.
We explore five potential explanations for our findings. First, we find no evidence
that the clean industry is more geographically clustered. Second, differential citations
behaviors among scientists involved in clean technologies cannot fully explain the
clean advantage. Third, we find no evidence that government spending cannot account
for clean premium. Fourth, we examine the generality and originality features of clean
inventions. We find that clean inventions in the automobile industry are more gen-
eral (i.e. they are cited by a wider range of technological fields) and more original.
However, clean inventions in the electricity production industry are less general and
less original. Finally, we compare clean inventions to other radically new inventions
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such as IT, biotechnologies and nanotechnologies. We conclude that clean inventions
seem to benefit from early returns to scale and steep learning curves. Interestingly we
observe that knowledge spillovers from clean technologies appear comparable in scope
to those in the IT sector.
Our results have two important policy implications. Firstly, the larger knowledge
spillovers from clean technologies uncovered in this study justify higher subsidies for
clean R&D or specific R&D programs for clean technologies, in addition to implicit
support for clean R&D trough climate policies such as carbon taxation. Radically new
clean technologies should receive higher public support than research activities targeted
at improving on the existing dirty technologies.23 However, such specific support could
equally be justified for a range of other emerging areas, such as nanotechnologies or
IT. This recommendation has been made in the past, for instance by Hart (2008) or
Acemoglu et al. (2012) but it is the first time to our knowledge that it is substantiated
by robust empirical evidence.24 While a first best policy scenario would suggest a
combination of emissions pricing and R&D subsidies specifically targeted at clean
technologies, in times of tight government budgets it might be difficult to achieve the
necessary subsidy levels. There might also be concerns over governments’ ability to
channel funds to R&D projects with the highest potential either because of information
asymmetry or because of political interference. In this case our results would support
a second best policy with more stringent emission pricing and regulation that would
otherwise be the case (see for exampleGerlagh et al. (2009), Hart (2008), Kverndokk
and Rosendahl (2007), Kverndokk et al. (2004)).
23Importantly, our results suggest that the relative support to clean R&D should grow over time.
Incidentally, in a recent working paper Daubanes et al. (2013) show that gradual rise in subsidies to
clean R&D activities causes a less rapid extraction of fossil resources, because it enhances the long-run
resource productivity.
24Interestingly, statistics in OECD countries show that there is higher public R&D spending in clean
technologies than in dirty ones. A look at the International Energy Agency’s R&D expenditures data
reveals that between 2000 and 2012, OECD countries have spent 198 million euros on dirty cars and
18 billion euros on dirty energy but 327 million euros on clean cars (65% more than dirty cars) and 25
billion euros on clean energy (35% more than dirty energy). However, these numbers do not include
subsidies to private clean R&D, which is also warranted in a first best policy setting.
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Secondly, our results lend support to the idea that a redirection of innovation from dirty
to clean technologies induced by environmental or climate policies can lead to higher
growth in the short and medium run. This can happen if the larger spillover effects from
clean technologies exceed any negative growth effects from more stringent regulation.
Our results however suggest that the potential growth effects of environmental policies
very much depend on the type of displacement being induced by increasing support
for clean technologies. If clean innovation crowds out dirty innovation, as shown by
Aghion et al. (2012a) for the transport industry, there is scope for medium run growth
effects. If innovation in other emerging areas is crowded out, such effects are less
likely. At any rate, one should keep in mind that higher spillovers are only a necessary
but not a sufficient condition for growth effects from green policies.
Our work can be extended in several directions. First, it would be interesting to
investigate how knowledge spillovers affect firms’ decisions to invest in radical inno-
vation (clean technologies) or in incremental innovation (less dirty technologies), and
how they respond to R&D subsidies targeted at clean technologies. Second, an inter-
esting direction is to understand the spatial pattern of knowledge diffusion for clean
technologies, including the transfer of knowledge across borders, in particular between
developed and developing countries. Third, we could use micro data to estimate the
impact of knowledge spillovers from clean and dirty technologies on firms’ productiv-
ity. These parameters are crucial to empirically validate the potential impact of green
policies on economic growth.
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Table A.1: Year of Passage of Laws, by US States
State
Territory
Joined the
Union1
State
Joined the
Union2
Introduction of
Compulsory
Schooling3
Age Groups
Compulsory
Schooling Laws
Applied to4
Introduction
of Child Labor
Laws5
Introduction of
Birth
Registration
Proof6
Alabama 1817 1819 1915 8 - 14 1910 1908
Alaska 1959 1929
Arizona 1863 1912 1899 8 - 14 after 1910 1909
Arkansas 1819 1836 1909 8 - 14 1910 1914
California 1850 1874 8 - 14 1890 1905
Colorado 1861 1876 1889 8 - 14 1890 1907
Connecticut 1788 1872 7 - 14 1890 1897
Delaware 1787 1907 7 - 14 after 1910 1881
Florida 1822 1845 1915 8 - 12 1910 1899
Georgia 1788 1916 8 - 12 1910 1919
Hawaii 1959 1896
Idaho 1863 1890 1887 8 - 14 1910 1911
Illinois 1809 1818 1883 7 - 14 1900 1916
Indiana 1800 1816 1897 7 - 14 1890 1908
Iowa 1838 1846 1902 7 - 14 1910 1880
Kansas 1854 1861 1874 8 - 14 1910 1911
Kentucky 1792 1896 7 - 14 1910 1911
Louisiana 1804 1812 1910 - 14 1890 1918
Maine 1820 1875 7 - 14 1890 1892
Maryland 1788 1902 8 - 12 1900 1898
Massachusetts 1788 1852 7 - 14 before 1880 1841
Michigan 1805 1837 1871 7 - 14 1890 1906
Minnesota 1858 1885 8 - 14 1900 1872
Mississippi 1798 1817 1918 7 - 12 1910 1912
Missouri 1821 1905 8 - 14 1900 1910
Montana 1864 1889 1883 8 - 14 1910 1907
Nebraska 1867 1887 7 - 14 1890 1904
Nevada 1861 1864 1873 8 - 14 after 1910 1911
New Hampshire 1788 1871 8 - 14 before 1880 1883
New Jersey 1787 1875 7 - 14 before 1880 1878
New Mexico 1850 1912 1891 7 - after 1910 1920
New York 1788 1874 7 - 14 1890 1880
North Carolina 1789 1907 8 - 12 1910 1914
North Dakota 1861 1889 1883 8 - 14 1900 1907
Ohio 1803 1877 8 - 14 1890 1909
Oklahoma 1890 1907 1907 8 - 14 1910 1917
Oregon 1848 1859 1889 9 - 14 1910 1903
Pennsylvania 1787 1895 8 - 14 before 1880 1906
Rhode Island 1790 1883 7 - 14 before 1880 1896
South Carolina 1788 1915 8 - 14 1910 1915
South Dakota 1861 1889 1883 8 - 14 1910 1905
Tennessee 1790 1796 1905 8 - 14 1900 1914
Texas 1845 1915 8 - 12 1910 1903
Utah 1850 1896 1890 8 - after 1910 1905
Vermont 1791 1867 8 - 12 before 1880
Virginia 1788 1908 8 - 12 1910 1912
Washington 1853 1889 1871 8 - 14 1910 1907
West Virginia 1863 1897 8 - 12 1900 1925
Wisconsin 1836 1848 1879 7 - 12 before 1880 1908
Wyoming 1868 1890 1876 7 - after 1910 1909
Table A1: Year of Passage of Laws, by US State*
Notes and Sources:
* The District of Columbia is not included as it is a federal district.
1 Year when the territory joined the Union [extracted from Braun and Kvasnicka 2013]
2 Year when the state joined the Union [extracted from US Census Office]
3 Year of introduction of compulsory school attendance laws [extracted from Landes and Solomon 1972]
4 Year of introduction of child labor laws for manufacturing employment [extracted from Moehling 1999]
5 Age groups that compulsory schooling laws applied to when the laws were introduced (i.e., the closest year available) [extracted from
Lleras-Muney and Shertzer 2015]
6 Year of introduction of birth certificate as official proof of a child's age [extracted from Fagernäs 2014]
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Table A.5: Full Baseline Specification
Table A4: Full Baseline Specification, Enrolment and Illiteracy Coefficients Shown
Non parametric Cox proportional hazard model estimates, hazard rates reported
Robust standard errors; All covariates measured in effect sizes
(1) Baseline
Share of the State Population that is:
From European Countries that did NOT have CSL in 1850 2.15***
(.509)
From European Countries that had CSL in 1850 .780
(.161)
Non-European Born 1.80***
(.409)
Enrolment Rate of American-Borns 2.82**
(1.39)
.815*
(.094)
1.03
(.153)
Enrolment Rate of Migrants From Non-European Countries 1.18
(.235)
Illiteracy Rate of Adult American-Borns .155**
(.134)
1.12
(.197)
.256***
(.088)
.753
(.186)
Group Controls Yes
State Controls Yes
European Groups Equal [p-value] [.004]
Euro Without CSL = Non-Euro [p-value] [.505]
Observations (state-census year) 230
Notes: *** denotes significance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10%. A non-parametric Cox proportional hazard model is estimated, where hazard rates
are reported. Hence tests for significance relate to the null that the coefficient is equal to one. The unit of observation is the state-census year, for
all census years from 1850. A state drops from the sample once compulsory schooling is passed. Robust standard errors are reported. The year
of passage of compulsory school attendance laws is extracted from Landes and Solomon [1972]. All coefficients are defined in effect sizes,
where this is calculated using census-years prior to the introduction of compulsory schooling law. The European countries defined to have had
compulsory schooling laws in place in 1850 are Austria-Hungary, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Norway, Portugal and Sweden. We control for the
following characteristics of each group (American born, non-European, European with and without compulsory schooling laws in 1850): the share
aged 0-15, the enrolment rate of 8-14 year olds, the share of adults (aged 15 and over) that are illiterate, the labor force participation rate, and
the share residing on a farm. We also control for the following state characteristics: the total population and the average occupational score of
the population. At the foot of the Column we report the p-value on the null hypothesis that the hazard coefficients are the same for the two
European groups, and the p-value that the hazard coefficients are the same for the non-European immigrant groups and European borns from
countries that did not have compulsory schooling in place in 1850.
Enrolment Rate of Europeans From Countries that did NOT have CSL in 1850
Enrolment Rate of Europeans From Countries that had CSL in 1850
Illiteracy Rate of Adult Europeans From Countries that did NOT have CSL in 1850
Illiteracy Rate of Adult Europeans From Countries that had CSL in 1850
Illiteracy Rate of Adult Migrants From Non-European Countries
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Table A.6: Robustness Checks
Table A5: Robustness Checks
Non parametric Cox proportional model, hazard rates reported
Robust standard errors; Populations shares measured in effect sizes
(1) Rolling
Window (2) Americans
(3) Child Labor and Birth
Registration Laws in Place
(4) Universal Suffrage and
Women's Property Rights
(5) European Child
Labor Laws
Share of the State Population that is From:
European Countries that did NOT have CSL introduced in the past 30 years 2.31*
(.995)
European Countries that had CSL introduced sometime in the past 30 years .628*
(.170)
American-Born, Second Generation .777
(.213)
European Countries that did NOT have CSL in 1850 1.62* 2.22*** 2.20*** 2.58***
(.447) (.533) (.528) (.851)
European Countries that had CSL in 1850 1.07 .836 .819 .856
(.244) (.195) (.198) (.161)
Non-European Countries 1.08 1.56** 1.77*** 1.76*** 1.85***
(.262) (.304) (.377) (.386) (.434)
European Countries that had Child Labor Law in 1850 .693
(.317)
Child Labor Laws in Place 1.19 1.19
(.366) (.360)
Birth Registration Law in Place .707 .716
(.283) (.293)
Universal Suffrage for Men and Women .904
(.199)
Women Have Right to Property and their Own Earnings 1.15
(.356)
Group and State Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
European Groups Equal (with and without CSL) [p-value] [.049] [.241] [.005] [.004] [.004]
Euro Without CSL = Non-Euro [p-value] [.218] [.894] [.386] [.382] [.316]
Observations (state-census year) 230 230 230 230 230
Notes: *** denotes significance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10%. A non-parametric Cox proportional hazard model is estimated, where hazard rates are reported. Hence tests for significance relate to the null that the coefficient is one. The unit of observation is
the state-census year, for all census years from 1850. A state drops from the sample once compulsory schooling laws are passed. Robust standard errors are reported. The year of passage of compulsory school attendance laws is extracted from Landes
and Solomon [1972]. In all Columns population share groupings are defined in effect sizes, where this is calculated using population shares in census-years prior to the introduction of compulsory schooling law. From Columns 3 onwards, the European
countries defined to have had compulsory schooling laws in place in 1850 are Austria-Hungary, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Norway, Portugal and Sweden. In all Columns we control for the following characteristics of each group (American born, non-
European, European with and without compulsory schooling laws in 1850, as well as the one additional group defined in each column): the share aged 0-15, the share of adults (aged 15 and over) that are illiterate, the labor force participation rate, the
enrolment rate of 8-14 year olds and the share residing on a farm. In all Columns we control for the following state characteristics: the total population, and the average occupational score of the population. In Column 2 we split the American-born population
into those with and without foreign-born parents. In Column 3, the child labor laws are derived from Moehling [1999, Table 1], and the year of introduction of birth certificate as official proof of a child's age is extracted from Fagernäs [2014]. In Column 4 the
coding for whether the US state has universal suffrage for men is derived from multiple sources, and the state coding for whether women have the right to property and their own earnings is extracted from Geddes et al. [2012]. In Column 5 the following
European countries are defined to have child labor laws in place in 1850: Britain, France, Germany and Switzerland. At the foot of each Column we report the p-value on the null hypothesis that the hazard coefficients are the same for the two European
groups, and the p-value that the hazard coefficients are the same for the non-European immigrant groups and European borns from countries that did not have CSL in place in 1850.
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Table A.9: Population and the Passage of Compulsory Schooling Laws by US State
Table A8: Population and the Passage of Compulsory Schooling Laws by US State
OLS estimates, standard errors clustered by region
(1) Unconditional (2) FixedEffects
(3) Mean
Reversion
(4) Foreign
Born
Population
(5) European
Born from
Countries that
had CSL in 1850
(6) European Born
from Countries that
did NOT have CSL
in 1850
(7) Ratio of Europeans
from Countries without
CSL in 1850 to Those that
had CSL in 1850
A. Mean Reversion Model
CSL Passed [yes=1] 1.04*** -.112* -.074 .113 .098 .063 -2.96
(.174) (.056) (.062) (.078) (.106) (.103) (2.43)
State Fixed Effects No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Census Year x 1850 Population Interactions No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Census Year x 1850 Occ Score Interactions No No No No No No No
Observations (state-census year) 288 288 288 288 286 288 286
B. Trend Break Model
Post CSL Passage Trend Break -.003 -.013* - -.001 .008 .001 -.251
(.009) (.016) - (.005) (.005) (.004) (.216)
1850-1930 Trend .025*** .030*** - .020*** .017*** .018*** -.032
(.004) (.004) - (.005) (.003) (.003) (.040)
-
State Fixed Effects No Yes - Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations (state-census year) 288 288 - 288 286 288 286
Log (State Population) Foreign Born Population
Notes: *** denotes significance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10%. The unit of observation is a state-census year from 1850 to 1930. The dependent variable varies across columns: in Columns 1 to 3 it is the log of the total
state population, and in Columns 4 to 7 it relates to various migrant populations. All variables are derived from the IPUMS-USA census samples. OLS regression estimates are shown with standard errors clustered by
census region. In Panel A, a mean reversion model is estimated (allowing for state and year effects, as well as a linear time effect of the outcome in 1850) and in Panel B a trend break model is estimated (including state
fixed effects and a linear time trend). The European countries defined to have had compulsory schooling laws in place in 1850 are Austria-Hungary, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Norway, Portugal and Sweden.
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Additional Figures
Figure A.1: Foreign Population by US State, 1880
Notes: All variables are derived from the 100% IPUMS-USA 1880 census sample. In Figure D, there are some states in which none of the foreign-born population resides in urban areas. The solid line shows the mean of
each variable in all state-census years prior to the adoption of compulsory schooling laws. The dashed line shows the .5 population share.
Figure A1: Foreign Population by US State, 1880
A. Share of Total Population that is Foreign Born B. Share of Male Population that is Foreign Born
D. Share of Urban Population that is Foreign BornC. Share of Labor Force that is Foreign Born
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Figure A.4: Foreign Population by US County, 1880
European Born from Countries that did NOT have CSL in
Place in 1850
European Born from Countries that had CSL in Place in
1850 Non-European Born
Figure A4: Foreign Population by US County, 1880
California
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Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1: For any i im and for any j 2 R where j > im we can rewrite
di j = diim +dim j. Schooling shifts migrant values towards im by l . So for i im, as all
migrants have values j> im this distance becomes di j = diim +(1 l )dim j. Introducing
compulsory schooling then gives an American-born individual i im utility,
uim = c 
Z
j2R
f ( j)dim jd j 
Z
j2R
g( j)[diim +(1 l )dim j]d j T (A.1)
= c 
Z
j2R
f ( j)dim jd j 
Z
j2R
g( j)diimd j 
Z
j2R
g( j)dim jd j+
Z
j2R
g( j)ldim jd j T
= c 
Z
j2R
f ( j)dim jd j 
Z
j2R
g( j)[diim +dim j]d j+
Z
j2R
g( j)ldim jd j T
Hence the American-born individual i  im votes for compulsory schooling ifR
j2R g( j)ldim jd j   T , that can be re-written as (2.3). As this inequality is the same
for all American-borns with values i  im, a majority of American-borns vote for
compulsory schooling if (2.3) is satisfied and a majority vote against otherwise.⌅
Proof of Proposition 2: The voter in group j indifferent between voting for party A or
B is given by,
s j⇤ = u j(gA) u j(gB) (A.2)
= (gB gA)y
jq
y¯
+a j(q j,1(HCSLj))(H(gA) H(gB)). (A.3)
All voters i in group j with s i j  s j⇤ prefer party A. Therefore, the share of the
electorate that vote for party A is,
pA = Â
j
W jf j(s j⇤+ 1
2f j
) (A.4)
= Â
j
W j((gB gA)y
jq
y¯
+a j(q j,1(HCSLj))(H(gA) H(gB))+ 12f j ),(A.5)
whereW j = N jf j is group j’s political weight. Party A wins the election if pA > 1/2.
As both parties facing the same optimization problem, in equilibrium they announce the
same policy. The equilibrium amount of common schooling is then derived by taking
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the first order condition of pA with respect to gA and using the fact that gA = gB = g⇤.
Solving gives (2.7).⌅
Coding Compulsory Schooling Laws
US States
The data on the year of enactment of compulsory schooling laws (CSL) across US states
was extracted from Landes and Solomon [1972], whose original source was Steinhilber
and Sokolowski [1966]. The Landes and Solomon [1972] data has been compared to
alternative sources including Katz [1976], Leddon [2010], and theWorkers’ Compensa-
tion Project of Fishback [2000]. Katz [1976] mentions the dates of CSL enactment for a
number of states: they are all in accordance with the Landes and Solomon data. Leddon
[2010] provides a table with the enactment years of CSL, which correspond exactly to
those in Landes and Solomon [1972]. Finally, the Workers Compensation Project Data
does not include Alaska and Hawaii, but coincides with Landes and Solomon [1972]
for all other available states.
European Countries
Our coding of the introduction of compulsory state schooling laws across European
countries relies on primary sources (original laws were consulted whenever possi-
ble) and secondary sources of a scientific and official nature (monographs and papers,
mostly written by historians, and information provided by governments or the Euro-
pean Union). We focus on the first establishment of general compulsory education in
the respective territory of interest. We do not explicitly differentiate between compul-
sory school attendance and compulsory education, as some countries allow for home
schooling. It should be noted that sources on the history of compulsory education
in different countries sometimes contradict each other: this is a particular concern for
countries with federal systems (such as Switzerland) and for territories which belonged
to different national entities over the 19th and 20th century (such as today’s Poland and
Germany).
AlbaniaCompulsory schooling was introduced when the country became a monarchy
in 1928. Article 206 of the Royal Constitution, adopted in 1928, states, “The primary
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education of all Albanian subjects is obligatory, and the State schools are free” [Ho¨rner
et al. 2007, Sefa and Lushnje 2012].
ArmeniaCompulsory primary schooling was introduced in 1932 [EFA 2000, Ho¨rner
et al. 2007].
Austria-HungaryAs part of a comprehensive schooling reform, Maria Theresia signed
the General School Ordinance (Allgemeine Schulordnung) in 1774, which made
schooling compulsory for children of both genders between 6 and 12 throughout most
of the Austro-Hungarian territory. Article 12 of the ordinance states, “children of both
sexes whose parents or guardians do not have the will or the means to support a tutor
should go to school without exception (...) as soon as they have entered their 6th year”.
In order to be allowed to leave school before the age of 12, children needed to “prove
in public exams, and provide a written certificate by the superintendent, that they had
learnt all the necessary”.1 The ordinance further stipulates that municipal authorities in
the city and teachers in the country should keep a list of children who have to attend
school and admonish parents to send their children to school. This regulation did not
apply to Hungary, where schooling was however made compulsory in 1777 with the
Ratio Educationis [Melton 1988]. The 1774 law could not be fully enforced, such that
analphabetism remained a widespread phenomenon in Austria in the 19th century. To
increase school attendance, Maria Theresia’s son and successor Joseph II established
punishments for non-compliance in 1781. In 1869, a comprehensive new schooling
law (the Reichsvolksschulgesetz) was enacted. It restated the compulsory character
of schooling (Art. II.20) and increased years of compulsory attendance from 6 to 8
1“Kinder, beiderlei Geschlechts, deren Ueltern, oder Vormu¨nder in Sta¨dten eigene Hauslehrer zu
unterhalten nicht den Willen, oder nicht das Vermo¨gen haben, geho¨ren ohne Ausnahme in die Schule,
und zwar sobald sie das 6te Jahr angetreten haben, von welchem an sie bis zu vollsta¨ndiger Erlernung der
fu¨r ihren ku¨nftigen Stand, und Lebensart erforderlichen Gegensta¨nde die deutschen Schulen besuchen
mu¨ssen; welches sie wohl schwerlich vor dem 12ten Jahr ihres Lebens, wenn sie im 6ten, oder nach
dem 6ten angefangen haben, gru¨ndlich werden vollbringen ko¨nnen; daher es denn gerne gesehen wird,
daß Ueltern ihre Kinder wenigstens durch 6 oder 7 Jahre in den deutschen Schulen liessen (...) Wenn
aber einige vor dem 12ten Jahre zu dem Studiren u¨bergehen, oder aus der Schule entlassen sein wollen;
so mu¨ssen sie in den o¨ffentlichen Pru¨fungen beweisen, und von dem Schulaufseher ein schriftliches
Zeugnis erhalten, daß sie alles No¨thige wohl erlernet haben”.
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(Art II.21) [Slaje 2009, Donnermair 2010].2,3 According to Schneider [1982], the 1869
Reichsvolksschulgesetz achieved compulsory schooling even in rural areas.
Belgium Primary schooling was made compulsory in 1914 with the Loi Poullet [Flora
et al. 1983, Wielemans 1991, Colle-Michel 2007, Gathmann et al. 2012].
Denmark Education was first made compulsory in Denmark-Norway in 1739, to pre-
pare children for confirmation. Under those provisions, education consisted of the
basics of religion and the reading of familiar texts. In Denmark, writing was added to
the curriculum with the 1814 Education Act, when compulsory primary schools were
established [Schneider 1982, Flora et al. 1983, Simola 2002, Bandle et al. 2005, Gath-
mann et al. 2012].
Finland Primary schools were established in 1866 and became compulsory in 1921
with the Compulsory School Attendance Act. However, universal primary school at-
tendance was only achieved at the time of the Second World War [Flora et al. 1983,
Simola 2002].
France In France, law no. 11 696 of March 28, 1882 (Loi Jules Ferry), made primary
education compulsory for children of both sexes aged 6-13 years [Cubberley 1920,
Schneider 1982, Flora et al. 1983, Schriewer 1985]. Its Article 4 states, “primary
instruction is compulsory for children of both sexes from 6 to 13 years of age”.4 Chil-
dren were allowed to leave school at age 11 if they passed the public examination for
the “certificate of primary studies”. A municipal commission was set up to monitor
and encourage school attendance by keeping lists of school-aged children and taking
different types of measures in case of non-compliance.
Germany Education was made compulsory in Prussia in 1717 with the School Edict
(Schuledikt) enacted by Frederick William I, who “made attendance at village schools
compulsory for all children not otherwise provided with instruction” [p4, Ramirez and
Boli 1987]. According to Stolze, this was the first time Frederick William proclaimed
2“Die Eltern oder deren Stellvertreter du¨rfen ihre Kinder oder Pflegebefohlenen nicht ohne den Un-
terricht lassen, welcher fu¨r die o¨ffentlichen Volksschulen vorgeschrieben ist.”
3“Die Schulpflichtigkeit beginnt mit dem vollendeten sechsten, und dauert bis zum vollendeted
vierzehnten Lebensjahre.”
4“L’instruction primaire est obligatoire pour les enfants des deux sexes aˆge´s des six ans re´volus a`
treize ans re´volus.”
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schooling to be compulsory in all Prussian provinces [Stolze 1911]. This regulation
was reiterated by his son Frederick II in his 1763 “General Regulations for Village
Schools” (General-Landschul-Reglement), which decreed compulsory schooling for
the entire Prussian monarchy. Article 1 of the general regulations stipulates that “all
subjects sent both their own children and children entrusted to them, boys or girls, from
their fifth year of age on, to school”.5 The regulation stated the school fees to be paid.
For those too poor to afford them, they should be financed through church or village
donations. The responsibility to enforce attendance lay with the local preacher and
court authorities, who were able to sanction fines for non-compliance. The General-
Landschul-Reglement did not apply to Catholics and urban residents. However, a sep-
arate edict was promulgated in 1765 for Silesian Catholic schools. Given widespread
opposition, compulsory schooling only became effective over a long period [Ramirez
and Boli 1987, Melton 1988]. In the German Empire, education became compulsory
upon unification in 1871, but precise regulations differed between states (in Bavaria and
Wurtemberg, school was compulsory for children between 7 and 14, whereas in the rest
of the Empire, it was for those aged between 6 and 14) [Flora et al. 1983]. Not only
Prussia, but also most of the other German territories had already introduced compul-
sory schooling before unification. The first state to do so was Palatinate-Zweibru¨cken
in 1592 [Oelkers 2009]. The state of Weimar introduced compulsory education in 1619
according to Ramirez and Boli [1987], and the Kingdom of Bavaria in 1802 according
to De Maeyer [2005], a date which is, however, contradicted by other sources.
Great Britain In England and Wales, the 1870 Elementary Education Act (Forster’s
Education Act) established state responsibility for primary education. Schooling was
made compulsory for children aged between 5 and 13 ten years later, in the Education
Act of 1880 [Flora et al. 1983, Ritter 1986]. In Scotland, education became compulsory
5“Zuvo¨rderst wollen Wir, daß alle Unsere Unterthanen, es mo¨gen denn Eltern, Vormu¨nder oder
Herrschaften, denen die Erziehung der Jugend oblieget, ihre eigene sowol als ihrer Pflege anvertraute
Kinder, Knaben oder Ma¨dchen, wo nicht eher doch ho¨chstens vom Fu¨nften Jahre ihres Alters in die
Schule schicken, auch damit ordentlich bis ins Dreyzehente und Vierzehente Jahr continuiren und sie
so lange zur Schule halten sollen, bis sie nicht nur das No¨thigste vom Christenthum gefasset haben und
fertig lesen und schreiben, sondern auch von demjenigen Red und Antwort geben ko¨nnen, was ihnen
nach den von Unsern Confistoriis verordneten und approbirten Lehrbu¨chern beygebracht werden soll.”
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for all children between 5 and 13 in 1872 with the Education (Scotland) Act [Flora et
al. 1983, Anderson 1995].
Greece Education was made compulsory in a 1834 decree on elementary education,
which was part of the so-called “Bavarian Plan”, an educational reform which took
place under the reign of King Otto, a Prince of Bavaria. [Gkolia and Brundrett 2008,
Cowen and Kazamias 2009].
Ireland Schooling was made compulsory in 1892 by the Irish Education Act [Akenson
1970, Schneider 1982, Flora et al. 1983]. Children were excused from compulsory
attendance during harvest and other seasons during which their labor was needed. Fur-
thermore, children aged between 11 and 14 could obtain a work permit if they had a
“certificate of proficiency in reading, writing and arithmetic”. School attendance com-
mittees were in charge of enforcing the legislation, and courts could impose modest
fines on parents who refused to comply. Nonetheless, the law appeared to have little
impact on school attendance during the 19th century [Akenson 1970].
ItalyCompulsory schooling in Italy is based on the Legge Casati, enacted in 1859 in
the Kingdom of Sardinia. This law defined elementary schooling to consist of two
grades, inferior and superior, each of which takes two years. Article 326 states that
“[p]arents, and those who act as their substitutes, are obliged to procure, in the way
they believe most convenient, to their children of both sexes in the age of attending
public elementary school of the inferior grade, the instruction which is given in those”.6
Elementary education was provided free of charge. The law became effective in 1860,
and was extended to all Italian provinces upon unification. The legal framework was
completed in 1877 with the Legge Coppino, which reiterates the compulsory character
of education in its first article: “Boys and girls who have completed the age of six years,
and to those parents or those acting as their substitutes have no procured the necessary
instruction (...) have to be sent to the local public school”.7 However, it did not result in
6“I padri, e coloro che ne fanno le veci, hanno obbligo di procacciare, nel modo che crederanno
piu` conveniente, ai loro figli dei du sessi in eta` di frequentare le scuole pubbliche elementari del grado
inferiore, l’istruzione che vien data nelle medesime.”
7“I fanciulli e le fanciulle che abbiano compiuta l’eta` di sei anni, e ai quali i genitori o quelli che
ne tengono il luogo non procaccino la necessaria istruzione (...) dovranno essere inviati alla scuola
elementare del comune.”
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universal school attendance everywhere. Additional laws were hence enacted in 1904
and 1911, which made more stringent provisions for school attendance and increased
state aid for elementary schools [Cubberley 1920, Schneider 1982, Ramirez and Boli
1987].
LuxembourgCompulsory schooling was introduced in Luxembourg through the 1881
law on the organisation of primary education [European Commission 2010]. Article
5 of this law states that “every child of either sex, having completed six years of age
at the beginning of the school year, has to receive during six consecutive years in-
struction in the subjects listed...”.8 However, the compulsory character of schooling
is reflected in earlier laws as well. Article 23 of the 1843 law on primary instruction
(which is bilingual) defines “children of school-age” (“schulpflichtige Kinder” in its
German, “enfans susceptibles de fre´quenter l’e´cole” in its French version) as those be-
tween 6 and 12 years of age.9 While the French wording is less explicit, the German
wording “Schulpflicht” clearly implies an obligation to attend school. Article 56 of
the same law even specifies sanctions for non-compliance. For example, “indigent par-
ents who habitually neglect sending their children to school, can be prived from public
support.”10,11
NetherlandsCompulsory education was introduced in 1900, with “De Leerplichtwet”
[Schneider 1982, Flora et al. 1983, Gathmann et al. 2012].
8“Tout enfant de l’un ou de l’autre sexe, aˆge´ de six ans re´volus au commencement de l’anne´e scolaire,
doit recevoir pendant six anne´es conse´cutives l’instruction dans les matie`res e´nume´re´es (...)” / “Jedes
Kind beiderlei Geschlechts, welches bei Beginn des Schuljahres das sechste Lebensjahr zuru¨ckgelegt hat,
muß wa¨hrend sechs aufeinander folgender Jahre in den (...) angegebenen Lehrgegensta¨nden unterrichtet
werden.”
9Sont conside´re´s comme tels, les enfans qui, a´ partir du premier octobre de chaque anne´e, ont six ans
re´volus et moins de douze ans accomplis (...)” / “Als solche werden diejenigen Kinder betrachtet, welche
vom 1. October jedes Jahres an sechs Jahre zuru¨ckgelegt haben und noch nicht volle 12 Jahre alt sind
(...)”.
10“Les parens indigens qui ne´gligeront habituellement ’envoyer leurs enfans aux e´coles, pourront eˆtre
prive´s des secours publics.” / “Die du¨rftigen Eltern, die gewohnheitlich unterlassen, ihre Kinder in die
Schule zu schicken, ko¨nnen von den o¨ffentlichen Unterstu¨tzungen ausgeschlossen werden.”
11Earlier administrative documents, in particular a circular from 1842 and an ordinance from 1840,
refer to a school regulation from 1828. The original text of the 1828 regulation could not be accessed,
which is why we could not determine whether schooling was made first made compulsory in 1828 or in
1843.
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Norway Education was first made compulsory in Denmark-Norway in 1739, to prepare
children for confirmation. Under those provisions, education consisted of the basics
of religion and the reading of familiar texts. In Norway, writing was added to the
curriculum in 1827 with a new primary school law, but children were typically unable
to write more than their name and the letters of the alphabet. Several authors regard
the 1827 Primary School Act as the first compulsory schooling law of Norway [Hove
1967, Einhorn 2005]. Still in 1857, 80% of rural children only had access to ambulant
schooling, as there were no schools in their parishes. This changed after the 1860
School Law, which provided for permanent schools instead [Rust 1990]. In 1889, a
stricter compulsory schooling law was enacted, requiring “a more demanding mother
tongue subject” and 7 years of primary school attendance [Hove 1967, Bandle et al.
2005].
PolandDuring the 19th century Poland was partitioned between Prussia, Russia and
Austria-Hungary on three occasions. Education in Poland was, on the one hand, largely
determined by the respective occupier, but reflected, on the other hand, the efforts of
the Polish to upheld their cultural heritage [Slaje 2009]. In the Prussian part of Poland,
compulsory schooling was introduced in 1825 [Biskup 1983]. Sources are contra-
dictory on whether there was corresponding legislation in the Austrian and Russian
parts during the partition. Shortly after re-obtaining its independence in 1918, Poland
enacted a decree “On Compulsory Schooling” (O obowiazku skolnym) which made
school attendance compulsory for children between 7 and 14 in 1919 [Slaje 2009].
PortugalCompulsory schooling was first introduced in Portugal in 1835, with the Reg-
ulamento Geral da Instrucc¸a˜o Primaria. In Title VII, Article 1, it states that “To the
obligation imposed, by the constitution, on the government to provide all citizens with
primary education, corresponds the obligation of parents to send their children to public
schools, as soon as the pass 7 years (...) if they don’t have the means to educate them
otherwise”.12 The responsibility for enforcement rested on municipal authorities and
12“A obrigac¸a˜o imposta, pela Carta Constitucional, ao Governo de proporcionar a todos os Cidada˜os
a Instrucc¸a˜o Primaria, corresponde a obrigac¸a˜o dos Pais de familia de enviar seus filhos a`s Esco`las
Publicas, logo de passem de 7 annos, (...), se meios na˜o tiverem de o fazer construir de outro modo.”
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priests.13
RussiaCompulsory education for children between 6 and 17 years of age was intro-
duced shortly after the success of the October Revolution, with the Dekret ot “ob Edi-
noy Trudovoy Shkole Rossiyskoy Sozialisticheskoy Federativnoy Sovetskoy Respub-
liki (Polojenie)” (Decree on the Unified Labour School of the Russian Soviet Federative
Socialist Republic) of October 16, 1918 [Presidential Library 2013].
Spain The first law to regulate education in Spain was the 1838 Law of Primary In-
struction (Ley de Instruccio´n Primaria). It was accompanied by a Plan of Primary
Instruction (Plan de Instruccio´n Primaria), which stipulates the obligation of villages
and cities to provide primary schools (Art. 7-10). Furthermore, its Article 26 states
that “[a]s it is an obligation of parents to procure for their children, and for guardians to
procure for the persons under their responsibility, the amount of instruction which can
make them useful for society and for themselves, the local commissions will assure by
the means their prudence dictates them to stimulate parents and guardians to comply
with this important duty, applying at the same time all their enlightenment and zeal to
the removal of obstacles which would impede it,”, remaining thus highly vague with
respect to the content and form of such an instruction.14
Compulsory education was introduced with the Law of Public Instruction of
September 9, 1857 [De Maeyer 2005, Gathmann et al. 2012]. Article 7 states that “El-
ementary primary education is compulsory for all Spanish. The parents and guardians
must send their children and wards to public schools from the age of six to nine years;
unless they provide them sufficiently with this type of instruction in their homes or in
private establishments”.15
13“A’s Camaras Municipaes, e aos Parochos incumbe o procurar mover por todos os meios de que
poderem usar, os Pais de familia a cumprir com esta importante obrigac¸a˜o...”
14Siendo una obligacion de los padres procurar a´ sus hijos, y lo mismo los tutores y curadores a´ las
personas confiadas a´ su cuidado, aquel grado de instruccion que pueda hacerlos u´tiles a´ la sociedad y a´
si mismos, las Comisiones locales procurara´n por cuantos medios les dicte su prudencia estimular a´ los
padres y tutores al cumplimiento de este deber importante, aplicando al propio tiempo toda su ilustracion
y su celo a´ la remocion de los obsta´culos que lo impidan.”
15“La primera ensen˜anza elemental es obligatoria para todos los espan˜oles. Los padres y tutores o
encargados enviara´n a las Escuelas pu´blicas a sus hijos y pupilos desde la edad de seis an˜os hasta la
de nueve; a no ser que les proporcionen suficientemente esta clase de instruccio´n en sus casas o en
establecimiento particular”.
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SwedenCompulsory education was introduced in 1842 with the Folkskolestadgan
[Schneider 1982, Soysal and Strang 1989, Simola 2002].
SwitzerlandWith the adoption of the Swiss Federal Constitution (Bundesverfassung)
of 1874, primary schooling became mandatory in all Swiss cantons [Schweizerische
Eidgenossenschaft 1874, Muller 2007]. Article 27.2 states that “Cantons provide suffi-
cient primary education, which shall be exclusively under the control of the state. It is
compulsory and, in public schools, free of charge.”16 However, compulsory schooling
had been introduced previously by different cantons at different points in time. Sources
contradict each other in terms of the dates of introduction. For example, Forster [2008]
dates the introduction of compulsory schooling in Geneva in 1536, whereas Muller
[2007] sets it at 1872.
Robustness Checks
Our first robustness check explores a specification exploiting within-country variation
over time, in exposure to compulsory state schooling. To do so, we consider the impact
of a rolling window of Europeans’ exposure to compulsory schooling by examining
whether the American median-voter is differentially sensitive to the presence of Euro-
pean migrants that have passed compulsory schooling at least 30. Figure 2 makes clear
that using a rolling window for Europeans’ exposure to compulsory schooling adds in a
number of significant countries that pass compulsory schooling between 1850 and 1880
(Spain, Switzerland, Italy and Britain) and so might impact the cross-state passage of
compulsory schooling in the US from 1910 onwards. Column 1 of Table A5 shows that
with this definition the sharp contrast between how American-borns react to different
types of European migrant becomes even more pronounced.
Another way to examine differential responses over time of American voters to
individuals with the same country of origin is to focus in on second generation mi-
grants. They are American-born and coded as such, but the next specification splits
American-borns between those with American-born parents and those with at least one
foreign-born parent. This latter group of individuals form an additional group j that
16“Die Kantone sorgen fu¨r genu¨genden Primarunterricht, welcher ausschliesslich unter staatlicher
Leitung stehen soll. Derselbe ist obligatorisch und in den o¨ffentlichen Schulen unentgeltlich.”
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can then also be controlled for (we then also control for the group characteristics of
second generation immigrants in X jst). Column 2 in Table A5 shows the result: the pas-
sage of compulsory schooling is not significantly impacted by the presence of second
generation migrants, rather it is the composition of more recent foreign-born migrants
that drives the policy response of US states.
Other Legislation
The next set of robustness checks include additional controls in (2.4). First, we con-
sider the passage of other pieces of state legislation, that might be complementary to,
or pre-requisites for, the passage of compulsory schooling. For example, the passage
of child labor laws and the establishment of a birth registration system have been ar-
gued to be interlinked with compulsory schooling [Lleras-Muney 2002, Goldin and
Katz 2003]. Column 3 of Table A5 shows the baseline results to be unchanged if we
additionally control for whether a state has child labor laws or a system of birth reg-
istration. Given the stability of our coefficients of interest, this finding further implies
migrant groups were not differentially attracted to states based on these legislative and
regulatory characteristics.17
A second concern is that some states might be more progressive than others, in
that they are more likely to pass compulsory schooling, but also be more likely to
universal suffrage or to allow women property rights and over their own earnings. If
migrants from European countries are differentially likely to locate to such progressive
states (as a function of their country of origin’s own legislative history), our earlier
result would be spurious. To check for this we then additionally control for both state
characteristics. Column 4 shows that neither having universal suffrage nor property
rights for women have significant impacts on the passage of compulsory schooling in
the state (neither hazard significantly differs from one). Moreover, the impacts of the
presence of different migrant groups replicate the baseline findings.
Finally, we consider additionally controlling for the presence of European mi-
17The coding for child labor laws are extracted from Moehling [1999, Table 1] as these extend back to
the mid-1800s (an updating coding is also provided in Lleras-Muney and Shertzer.[2015] for the 1910-39
period); the coding for the introduction of birth registration proofs is extracted from Fagernas [2014].
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grants from countries that have passed other pieces of legislation, apart from compul-
sory schooling, that might relate to migrant values. For example, we consider whether
the American-born median voter responds to the presence of Europeans from coun-
tries with child labor laws in place since 1850. Column 5 shows there is no impact
of having migrants in the state from European countries with a long history of child
labor laws, that might otherwise have reflected the passage of compulsory schooling
as being driven by the child-related preferences of migrants (and natives), rather than
compulsory schooling being driven by the desire of the American-born median voter to
homogenize certain incoming migrants.
Alternative Econometric Specifications
A next set of robustness checks relate to using alternative econometric specifications.
We impose more parametric structure on the underlying hazard, h0(t), using a log lo-
gistic model. When estimating this model, time ratios are reported.18 Recall that a
time ratio less than one has the same interpretation as a hazard greater than one, indi-
cating the covariate is associated with the passage of compulsory schooling earlier in
time. Column 1 in Table A6 shows that imposing this parametric structure leaves our
core findings unchanged: (i) the passage of compulsory schooling occurs significantly
earlier in time when a greater share of the population comprises European migrants
without historic exposure to compulsory schooling; (ii) the time ratio on Europeans
with historic exposure to compulsory schooling is above one and these time ratios are
significantly different between the European migrant groups; (iii) compulsory school-
ing is passed significantly earlier in time when a greater share of the population is
non-European born. All these findings to continue to hold when we allow for there to
be cross-state heterogeneity in hazard rates as captured by a frailty parameter (Column
2).
We next move away from survival models and use a linear probability regression,
following some of the earlier literature examining the passage of compulsory school-
18In the log logistic model the hazard rate is characterized as h(t,X) = l
1
g t(
1
g  1)
g[1+(l t)
1
g ]
, where l =
exp (Xb ). This has two parameters: l is the location parameter and g is the shape parameter, allowing
for non-monotonic hazards.
192 Appendix A. Appendix to Chapter 2
ing. Such models use all state-years (not just those pre-adoption) to essentially estimate
the probability that state s has compulsory schooling in place, and are equivalent to a
survival model assuming duration independence in the passage of legislation. Column
3 shows the result: using a regression model we find no significant partial correla-
tion between the population shares of either European migrant grouping and the like-
lihood compulsory schooling is passed, although an increase in the population share
of non-Europeans does have a positive and significant impact, consistent with earlier
work [Landes and Solomon 1972, Lleras-Muney and Shertzer 2015]. The reason why
the OLS and survival results differ is that the assumption of duration independence is
strongly rejected in our data: history does matter and so the hazard of passing legis-
lation, h0(t), varies over census years t, a result demonstrated in the unparameterized
Cox proportional hazard model, and the parametric log logistic specification.
Alternative Classifications
We now consider alternative ways to group European countries by their exposure to
compulsory schooling. We first regroup European countries using the lower and upper
bound definitions of the introduction of compulsory schooling (shown in Table A2).
The results are in Columns 4 and 5 of Table A6: our baseline result is robust to us-
ing the lower bound definition and so narrowing down the focus on those European
countries that have the longest exposure to compulsory schooling at home. Using the
upper bound definitions, the results suggest compulsory schooling is significantly less
likely to be passed in the presence of European migrants with exposure to compulsory
schooling at home, and the hazard of compulsory schooling being passed across US
states remains significantly differently related to the two groups of European migrant,
with and without compulsory schooling at home [p-value= .005].
Internal Migration
American-borns
If the passage of compulsory schooling was an instrument used by states to attract
American migrants (or Americans took ideas over compulsory schooling with them
as they migrated across states), and that the location of the foreign-born groups we
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focus on in Table 2 is interlinked with the internal migration of white American-borns,
this would generate a spurious correlation between the presence of these foreign-born
groups and the cross-state passage of compulsory schooling. To check for this, we use
data on the internal migration of Americans from the 1880 census to plot the cross-
state variation in Americans born out-of-state (but in the US) and the foreign-born
population group shares core to our analysis (N js,1880). Figure A3 shows the result (and
line of best fit): we find no significant relationship between the population share of out-
of-state American-borns, with the population shares of Europeans with and without
long exposure to compulsory schooling at home, or non-Europeans. This suggests our
findings are not merely picking up the internal migration of white American-borns.19
Foreign-borns
We can further check whether the passage of compulsory schooling in state s by census
year t, is associated with subsequent changes in the composition of the migrant popula-
tion within the state. This sheds light on the narrower issue of whether any process by
which natives and migrants sort into states is significantly altered by the introduction of
compulsory schooling law. We use two specifications to check for whether population
trends shift in response to compulsory schooling:
N jst = µ1(CSLst = 1)+ds+dt +Ât qt(N js1850.dt)+ust , (A.6)
N jst = d t+k [(t CSLst)1(CSLst = 1)]+ds+ est , (A.7)
where N jst corresponds to measures of the state-year population, and 1(CSLst = 1) is
a dummy for whether compulsory schooling law has been adopted in state s by cen-
sus year t. Specification (A.6) allows for a complete set of state and year fixed effects
(ds,dt), and also allows for there to be long run reversion to the mean in populations
across states, as captured in the N js1850.dt term. Specification (A.7) is a standard trend
break model, that allows for state fixed effects, but assumes population follows a linear
19Rocha et al. [2015] provide long run evidence on the economic/industrial development of Brazilian
municipalities that explicitly used settlement policies to attract high skilled migrants into them in the late
19th and early 20th century.
194 Appendix A. Appendix to Chapter 2
time trend (d t) and then tests for a break in this linear trend in the years after compul-
sory schooling law has been adopted in state s.
Table A8 presents the results: Panel A shows estimates of µ from (A.6), and Panel
B shows estimates of k and d from (A.7). In Columns 1 to 3 we focus on the partial
correlation between the passage of compulsory schooling in a state on the subsequent
total state population (Nst = Â j N
j
st). Examining Panel A, we see that unconditionally,
states with compulsory schooling subsequently have significantly larger populations,
but this result is not robust: including state fixed effects reduces the magnitude of the
partial correlation by 90%, and allowing for reversion to the mean eliminates any sig-
nificant correlation between the total population and the earlier passage of compulsory
schooling. Columns 4 to 7 focus on the composition of the foreign-born population
in the state. We find no evidence that after compulsory schooling laws are passed, the
foreign born population, European migrants from countries with a long history of com-
pulsory schooling, European migrants from countries without a long history of com-
pulsory schooling, or the ratio of the two groups of European migrant, are significantly
different. These results go firmly against the idea that native or migrant population
movements are endogenously driven by the earlier passage of compulsory schooling in
a state. Equally, the results suggests migrant groups were not resisting the civic values
being imparted onto them via compulsory schooling by moving to other states. These
conclusions are reinforced if we move to Panel B where (A.7) is estimated: we again
find little evidence of native or migrant populations being responsive to the earlier pas-
sage of compulsory schooling (bk = 0 in five out of six specifications).
IV Method
We use a control function (CF) approach to implement an instrumental variables strat-
egy based on a Bartik-Card style instrument for migrant shares. The non-linear hazard
model in (2.4) is a special case of a generalized regression model: yi =D.F(xib ,u) for
D :R!R a known non-degenerate and monotonic function and F :R2!Rmonotonic
in each variable [Han 1987].20 To overcome potential endogeneity of one of the regres-
20For the Cox proportional hazard model, yi = F 1(xib+ui) with F(z ) = log
R z
0 h(t)dt , and h being
the hazard function, yi > 0, h()> 0, and ui ⇠ EV (1) [Han 1987].
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sors in such generalized regression models, the CF approach can be adopted where the
unobservable covariate is directly controlled for (rather than instrumenting the endoge-
nous variable as for 2SLS linear models). Terza et al. [2008a, 2008b] and Wooldridge
[2010] show the consistency of such a two-stage residual inclusion (2SRI) methods for
non-linear models.
To make explicit the nature of the endogeneity problem, we first let Z jst denote
the exogenous variables (X jst , Xst) and add a state-migrant-specific unobservable to the
empirical specification in (2.4), denoted V jst , with Vst an S⇥ J matrix of state-migrant
unobservables. These unobservables enter additively in the proportional hazard model,
that can be written in the regression form,
H(t) = exp( Nstb  Zsty Vst)+U, (A.8)
where H(t) =
R t
0 h(s)ds is the integrated hazard function, U ⇠ Exp(1), with U ?
(Nst ,Zst ,Vst), Zst ? Vst but Nst 6? Vst . Hence the migrant shares are endogenous in that
they correlate with unobservable determinants of compulsory schooling law. The en-
dogenous migration shares N jst are assumed to relate to some instrumentW
j
st according
to the following parametric model,
N jst = a jW
j
st +d jZ
j
st + e
j
st , (A.9)
where e jst is an error term. We assume the rank condition holds, that the instruments are
exogenous (W jst ? e jst ,e jst) and that E[e jst |Z jst ,W jst ] = 0. The unobserved V jst component
can be decomposed into a term that is potentially correlated with N jst and a residual,
V jst = e
j
st
0r j+ e jst , (A.10)
where e jst ? e jst , and wlog, E[exp(e jst)] = 1. The key to the CF approach is to obtain the
population expectation conditional on V jst , which under the above assumptions is,
E[H(t)|Nst ,Zst ,Vst ] = exp( Nstb  Zsty  estr), (A.11)
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where est is a S⇥J matrix of residuals from (A.9). In the first stage, consistent estimates
of (aˆ j, dˆ j) are obtained by OLS, and predicted values of the residuals are obtained as
eˆ jst = N
j
st  Nˆ jst . In the second stage, eˆst = (eˆ1st , ..., eˆJst) is then included in (A.11),
E[H(t)|Nst ,Zst , eˆst ] = exp( Nstb  Zsty  eˆstr). (A.12)
If the first stage is correctly specified, estimating this exponential regression model
conditioning on eˆst gives consistent estimates of (b ,y) [Wooldridge 2010]. The need to
include additional covariates when estimating the second stage equation is demanding
given our data dimensions: hence we first present result from the most parsimonious
model that excludes the exogenous covariates Zst = (X
j
st , Xst) from both stages.
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Centrality measures
In this section, I provide the brief description of some terms and variables for a non–
valued and undirected network.1
Some Basic Notions
Consider a graph G = (V,E) with |V | nodes (also called vertices) and |E| edges, en-
coded using |V |⇥ |V | adjacency matrix A :
auv =
8<: 1 if u,v 2 E0 otherwise
A path in a graph is simply a sequence of nodes with the property that each consecutive
pair in the sequence is connected by an edge.
The distance between two scientists is the minimum number of edges that takes to
go from one to another. This is also known as the geodesic distance. If two nodes are
neighbours or adjacent, the distance between them is 1. If A links to B, and B links to
C (and A does not link to C), then actors A and C are at a distance of 2. The shortest
path length between nodes v and u, dist(u,v), is defined as the minimum distance (i.e.
1For more detailed definitions and descriptions, see Easley and Kleinberg (2010), Jackson et al.
(2008)
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number of edges) from node v to reach node u:
dist(v,u) =min(avx+ ...+ayu) (B.1)
Measures at the node level
The degree of node v is the number of edges connected to node v, which is the cardi-
nality of the node’s neighbourhood:
Degree(v) =
|V |
Â
i=1
aiv (B.2)
If two people in a social network have a friend in common, then there is an increased
likelihood that they will become friends themselves at some point in the future. This
principle is captured by “triadic closure” and its prevalence is measured by the cluster-
ing coefficient. It is defines as the proportion of neighbours of v that are also connected
to each other. This corresponds to dividing the amount of “triangles” of which node v
is part of, tD(v), to the amount of possible triangles of which v could be part of, t3(v):
cl(v) =
tD(v)
t3(v)
(B.3)
In general, the clustering coefficient of a node ranges from 0 (when none of the node’s
friends are friends with each other) to 1 (when all of the node’s friends are friends with
each other).
Closeness defines that a node is central if it is close to other nodes. This takes the
inverse of the sum of all path lengths going from node v to all other nodes:
Closeness(v) =
1
Â|V |i=1 dist(v, i)
(B.4)
Betweenness of node v is defined as the sum of proportions of the number of shortest
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paths between all pairs of nodes that go through node v:
Betweenness(i) =
n
Â
i6= j 6=k2V
s(i, j|v)
s(i, j)
(B.5)
where s(i, j) is the total number of shortest paths between any two nodes and s(i, j|v)
the amount of those paths that go through v.
Eigenvector centrality states that a node is central if its neighbours are centrals through
an iterative paths. Let A= (ai j) be the adjacency matrix. The eigenvector centrality of
node v is given by
Eigenvector(v) =
1
l Â{u,v}2E
eigenvector(u) (B.6)
where l 6= 0 is a constant. In the matrix form, we have:
leigenvector = eigenvectorA (B.7)
Measured at the network level
The diameter is the length of the largest geodesic path in a network.
The average path length is the mean length of the shortest path between any two
nodes. Shorter average path lengths means information has to travel less (on average)
to get from randomly–selected node i to j.
The assortativity coefficient is a correlation coefficient between the degrees of all
nodes on two opposite ends of a link. A positive assortativity coefficient indicates that
nodes tend to link to other nodes with the same or similar degree.
Network components are maximally connected networks, that satisfy two conditions.
First, two scientists in a network component gc are either directly linked, or indirectly
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linked through a sequence of agents in gc (i.e. there is a path between the two of them).
Second, two scientists in different network components gc and gc0 cannot be con-
nected through any such sequence. The number of clusters is the maximal connected
components of a graph.
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Obituary sources
Manually searches
In addition to obituary records in Azoulay et al. (2010) and Azoulay et al. (2015),
other obituary records were manually collected from American National Biography,
Australian Dictionary of Biography, National Academy of Science Memoires, Oxford
Dictionary of National Biography, Plarr’s Lives of the Fellows Online, Royal Society,
Who was who, and World Biography Information System. When possible, searches
were targeted to the medical profession and death occurring before the age of 68.
Webscrapping
As a second collection method, a webscrapping algorithm was used to query the Pro-
Quest database for the words “Dr.” and “MD.” along with the surname of medical
scientists within obituaries between to 2009. The ProQuest database offers access to
obituaries in newspapers since the 18th century. Newspapers include The Guardian
(1821-2003), The Observer (1791-2003), The Atlanta Constitution (1868-1945), The
Baltimore Sun (1837-1986), Boston Globe (1872 - 1979), Chicago Defender (1910-
1975), Chicago Tribune (1849-1988), The Christian Science Monitor (1908-1998),
Hartford Courant (1764-1986), Los Angeles Times (1881-1988), The New York Times
(1851-2008), New York Tribune (1841-1922), San Francisco Chronicle (1865-1922),
The Wall Street Journal (1889-1994), and The Washington Post (1877-1995).
Linking obituary records to “Author-ity”
Linking obituary records to the 9 million individuals in the “Author-ity” database can
be a challenge. For each obituary record there are several possible authors with similar
names. Using the first and last names of authors is an obvious first step to match
records. The “Author-ity” database provide all the different versions of the names
of the authors. For a large fraction of the authors, no first name is provided. Given
these limitations, I construct four groups: group A consists of individuals with exact
matches of the first and last names of authors, group B matches the last name and the
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Table B.1: Number of obituary record by source
Obituary source Count With a cause of death Sudden death
American National Biography 380 4 3
Australian Dictionary of Biography 535 0 0
Azoulay et al. (2010) 137 137 57
Azoulay et al. (2015) 451 394 34
International Who is who 102 0 0
National Academy of Science Memoires 216 12 4
Oxford Dictionary of National Biography 709 0 0
Plarr’s Lives of the Fellows Online 5,523 3 1
ProQuest (webscrapping) 301 177 55
Royal Society 1,149 1 0
Who was who 626 2 0
World Biography Information System 4,522 9 3
Total 6,186 852 337
first initial, group C fuzzy matches the first and last name2, and group D fuzzy matches
on last name and exactly matches on the initial. All matches regardless of the group
must satisfy the following conditions: I eliminate individuals younger than 18 years
old the year of their first publication, individuals whose first publication occurs in the
last five years to their death if they were 50 years old or older the year of their death
and individuals whose last publication was more than ten years before or after their
death. The assumptions behind these restrictions is that individuals should be active
researchers rather than practitioners. I also eliminate all scientists who have died after
2008. Following these basic restrictions, each group contains a set of potential matches.
I then proceed by iterations: at each step, I collect the number of unique matches and
continue to the next step with the obituary records for which there are still multiple
matches until I find a unique author for each scientist found in the obituary record.
Iteration 1 I first individually match individuals with the same institutional affilia-
2For the fuzzy string matching, I compute pairwise string distances between obituary names and au-
thor names based on the Levenshtein distance. This algorithm counts the number of deletions, insertions
and substitutions necessary to turn one name into another.
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tion in the “Author-ity” and the death records.3
Iteration 2 For the remaining multiple matches, I further restrict the sample to (1)
individuals with first publications between the ages of 25 and 40, and (2) last publica-
tion within 5 years pre-post death.
Iteration 3 For those remaining, I choose the individual with the highest number
of publication. This is based on the assumption that scientists who have obituary
records are most likely to be written for well known scientists.
The following table summarises the number of unique matches found by iteration.
The sample used in this study includes all uniquely identified obituary records for each
step. Out of the 6186 scientists found in obituary records, I successfully match 1111.
Table B.2: Fuzzy name matching by group
Number of obituary record with unique author ID
Group Iteration 1a Iteration 2b Iteration 3c Total
A: Perfect match first and last name 259 41 30 330
B: Perfect match last name and initial 301 80 150 531
C: Fuzzy match first and last name 126 19 20 165
D: Fuzzy match last name and perfect match initial 62 12 11 85
Total 748 152 211 1111
aAffliation between Author-ity and death records match.
bAmong the remaining individuals (i.e. those with multiple matches), I increasing the restriction:
first publication below age 40 and last publication can be up to 5 years pre/post death.
c Finally, the individual with the most publication is chosen.
3Until 2014, only the affiliation and the address of the affiliation of the lead author was included. The
obituaries generally record the last institutional affiliation of the deceased. Therefore potential unique
match at this stage only include scientists within this subset of lead authors and recorded affiliations in
the obituary.
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Table B.3: Sudden deaths
Cause of death Count
heart attack 51
“died suddenly” 23
car accident 14
airplane crash 6
heart failure 5
stroke 5
murder 4
pulmonary embolism 3
scuba-diving accident 2
“died while travelling” 2
accidental fall 2
bike accident 1
aneurysm 1
cardiac arrest 1
cerebral aneurysm 1
brain haemorrhage 1
complications from routine surgery 1
drowned 1
hit in the head by a stone 1
adverse drug reaction/ multi-organ fail 1
trekking accident in Nepal 1
TOTAL 127
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Table B.4: Anticipated deaths
Cause of death Count
cancer 50
brain cancer 16
cancer of the lung 14
breast cancer 12
diabetes 11
heart disease 11
“long illness” 11
cancer of the pancreas 10
cancer of the prostate 7
leukaemia 7
“anticipated” 5
cancer of the colon 5
melanoma 4
bone cancer 3
kidney cancer 3
lymphoma 3
AIDS 2
Alzheimers disease 2
aortic aneurysm 2
esophageal cancer 2
gastric cancer 2
glioblastoma 2
heart attack 2
Hodgkins disease 2
infection of the heart 2
multiple myeloma 2
ocular melanoma 2
Parkinsons disease 2
suicide 2
tumor 2
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Anticipated deaths (continued)
Cause of death Count
aortic dissection 1
asthma attack 1
brain tumour 1
cancer of the chest or abdomen 1
cancer of the stomach 1
carcinoma of nasal sinus 1
cervical cancer 1
complication from kidney transplant 1
complications following surgery 1
complications from brain surgery 1
complications of liver surgery 1
Creutzfeldt Jacob disease 1
embolism 1
glioma 1
hemorrhagic dementia 1
liver cancer 1
Lou Gehrig disease 1
lymphatic cancer 1
malignant melanoma 1
metastatic disease 1
ovarian cancer 1
pneumonia 1
postpolio complications 1
renal cancer 1
renal cell carcinoma 1
sarcoma of the lung 1
suddenly 1
T cell lymphoma 1
uterine cancer 1
Total 224
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September 4, 1998
Mary Lou Clements-Mann, 51, An Expert on AIDS
Vaccines
By WOLFGANG SAXON
Dr. Mary Lou Clements-Mann, an epidemiologist and vaccine expert who headed the center for
immunization research at the Johns Hopkins University School of Hygiene and Public Health in
Baltimore, died with her husband in Wednesday night's plane crash off Nova Scotia.
Like her husband, Dr. Jonathan M. Mann, she was 51 and lived in Columbia, Md.
The couple were on their way to meetings of the World Health Organization in Geneva. Dr.
Clements-Mann was to have attended a United Nations AIDS conference dealing with research into
vaccines against H.I.V. She was a leading researcher on AIDS vaccines and was considered an
expert on the assessment of vaccines.
Dr. Clements-Mann was a 1968 graduate of Texas Tech University and earned her medical degree
at the University of Texas in 1972. She also received a doctorate in tropical medicine from the
University of London in 1975 and a master's degree in public health, specifically epidemiology,
from Johns Hopkins in 1979, the year she first joined the staff at the university's school of
medicine.
Earlier in her career she served as a special epidemiologist on the World Health Organization's
smallpox program in Uttar Pradesh, India. That was followed by a stint as coordinator for the
organization's smallpox eradication program, also in India.
In the early 1980's she was associated with the University of Maryland School of Medicine in
Baltimore and was chief of the clinical studies section in its Center for Vaccine Development in
1985 when Johns Hopkins named her an associate professor in the Department of International
Health, School of Hygiene and Public Health.
She also was a member of the medical staff at Johns Hopkins Hospital and Bayview Medical
Center. She advanced to tenured professor in the department of international health in 1990 with a
joint appointment in the department of molecular microbiology and immunology.
She is survived by her mother, Mary Still Clements of Longview, Tex., and two sisters, Ann Rhew of
Floresville, Tex., and Paula Conley of Fort Worth.
Photo: Mary Lou Clements-Mann (Associated Press)
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Mary Lou Clements-Mann, longtime head of the Division
of Vaccine Sciences in the Department of International
Health at the School of Public Health, and her husband,
Jonath  M. M nn, a vi iting professor at Hopkins and
dean of the School of Public Health at Allegheny
University of the Health Sciences, died Sept. 2 in the
Swissair jetliner crash off the coast of Can da.
The couple, both leaders in the world's fight against AIDS,
were en route to a U.N. AIDS vaccine conference in
Geneva. Both were 51.
"Mary Lou Clements-Mann and Jonathan Mann were
distinguished and celebrated members of the faculty," said
Alfred Sommer, dean of the School of Public Health. "Their
loss will be felt deeply by all of us here and by the
thousands, if not millions, of people who live better lives
today because of their work."
In a news report following the crash, Dan Rutz, CNN
medical correspondent, began his report by saying, "World
leaders in the war against AIDS are in shock over the loss
of two of their most trusted and admired colleagues."
Mary Lou Clements and Jonathan Mann--each of them a
highly respected and renowned researcher--met while
working together on an expert committee that was
developing new strategies to fight disease. They married in
1996, and in 1997 Hopkins' Clements-Mann became a
visiting professor in the Department of Cancer Biology at
the Harvard School of Public Health, where her husband
was the Francois-Xavier Bagnoud Professor of Health and
Human Rights; the same year, Mann accepted an
appointment as a visiting professor in the Department of
Health Policy and Management in the Hopkins School of
Public Health. He joined Allegheny University in
Philadelphia this year.
"Theirs was a love story," Dean Sommer said. "Their
devotion to one another and the happiness they obviously
had together was obvious to all of us here at the school."
Raised in Longview, Texas, Mary Lou Clements-Mann
graduated from Texas Tech University and received a
medical degree from the University of Texas
(Southwestern) Medical School in 1972. In 1975, she was
awarded a D.T.M.H. from the University of London,
London School of Hygiene & Public Health. She received a
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J Infect Dis. 1998 May;177(5):1230-46.
Immune responses to human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) type 1 induced
by canarypox expressing HIV-1MN gp120, HIV-1SF2 recombinant gp120, or
both vaccines in seronegative adults. NIAID AIDS Vaccine Evaluation Group.
Clements-Mann ML , Weinhold K, Matthews TJ, Graham BS, Gorse GJ, Keefer MC, McElrath MJ, Hsieh RH,
Mestecky J, Zolla-Pazner S, Mascola J, Schwartz D, Siliciano R, Corey L, Wright PF, Belshe R, Dolin R,
Jackson S, Xu S, Fast P, Walker MC, Stablein D, Excler JL, Tartaglia J, Paoletti E, et al.
Johns Hopkins University School of Public Health, Baltimore, Maryland, USA.
mclement@jhsph.edu
Abstract
A safety and immunogenicity trial was conducted in vaccinia-immune and vaccinia-naive human
immunodeficiency virus (HIV)-uninfected adults who were randomized to receive 10(6) or 10(7)
TCID50 of canarypox (ALVAC) vector expressing HIV-1MN gp160 or 10(5.5) TCID50 of ALVAC-
rabies virus glycoprotein control at 0 and 1 or 2 months and ALVAC-gp160 or 50 microg of HIV-
1SF2 recombinant (r) gp120 in microfluidized emulsion at 9 and 12 months; others received
rgp120 at 0, 1, 6, and 12 months. All vaccines were well-tolerated. Neither vaccinia-immune status
before vaccination nor ALVAC dose affected HIV immune responses. HIV-1MN and HIV-1SF2
neutralizing antibodies were detected more often (100%) in ALVAC-gp160/rgp120 recipients than
in recipients of ALVAC-gp160 (<65%) or rgp120 (89%) alone. ALVAC-gp160/rgp120 also elicited
more frequent HIV V3-specific and fusion-inhibition antibodies, antibody-dependent cellular
cytotoxicity, lymphoproliferation, and cytotoxic CD8+ T cell activity than did either vaccine alone.
Trials with ALVAC expressing additional HIV components and rgp120 are underway.
PMID: 9593008 [PubMed - indexed for MEDLINE] Free full text
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PLoS Pathog. 2011 Feb 10;7(2):e1001273. doi: 10.1371/journal.ppat.1001273.
Relationship between functional profile of HIV-1 specific CD8 T cells and
epitope variability with the selection of escape mutants in acute HIV-1
infection.
Ferrari G , Korber B, Goonetilleke N, Liu MK, Turnbull EL, Salazar-Gonzalez JF, Hawkins N, Self S, Watson S,
Betts MR, Gay C, McGhee K, Pellegrino P, Williams I, Tomaras GD, Haynes BF, Gray CM, Borrow P, Roederer
M, McMichael AJ, Weinhold KJ.
Department of Surgery, Duke University Medical Center, Durham, North Carolina, United States
of America. gflmp@duke.edu
Abstract
In the present study, we analyzed the functional profile of CD8+ T-cell responses directed against
autologous transmitted/founder HIV-1 isolates during acute and early infection, and examined
whether multifunctionality is required for selection of virus escape mutations. Seven anti-retroviral
therapy-naïve subjects were studied in detail between 1 and 87 weeks following onset of
symptoms of acute HIV-1 infection. Synthetic peptides representing the autologous
transmitted/founder HIV-1 sequences were used in multiparameter flow cytometry assays to
determine the functionality of HIV-1-specific CD8+ T memory cells. In all seven patients, the
earliest T cell responses were predominantly oligofunctional, although the relative contribution of
multifunctional cell responses increased significantly with time from infection. Interestingly, only the
magnitude of the total and not of the poly-functional T-cell responses was significantly associated
with the selection of escape mutants. However, the high contribution of MIP-1β-producing CD8+ T-
cells to the total response suggests that mechanisms not limited to cytotoxicity could be exerting
immune pressure during acute infection. Lastly, we show that epitope entropy, reflecting the
capacity of the epitope to tolerate mutational change and defined as the diversity of epitope
sequences at the population level, was also correlated with rate of emergence of escape mutants.
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Additional Descriptives
Table B.5: Descriptives by decade
1970 1980 1990 2000
A. Publications Level
Number of publ. 5,424,571 9,213,862 15,902,121 25,377,269
Number of single authored publ. 820,376 801,511 1,223,776 1,563,419
Avg. number of authors per publ. 3,23 4.16 4.91 11.37
B. Author Level
Number of authors 3,036,674 4,845,869 7,877,119 12,391,948
Mean publ. per year 1.79 1.90 2.02 2.05
Std. dev. 1.72 1.98 2.32 2.43
Max. 88 139 181 279
Mean number of coauthors per year 3.79 5.28 6.75 10.53
Std. dev. 3.57 5.32 7.34 31.66
Max. 119 289 504 1,863
C. Network Level
Number of vertices 209,785 336,606 584,270 969,803
Number of edges 712,704 1,481,102 3,477,344 7,250,480
Diameter 55 45 40 44
Assortative coefficient 0.35 0.29 0.17 0.66
Number of clusters 34,265 40,293 43,419 63,236
Notes: All variables are constructed from the coauthorship network in 1970, 1980, 1990 and 2000. The unit
of observation is the publication (panel A), the author (panel B) and the entire network (panel C). Definitions
for the network level variables can be found in the appendix A.
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Figure B.1: Total number of publications
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Table B.6: Descriptives - Sudden death
Mean Median Std. dev. Mean Median Std. dev.
A. Star Level Deceased stars (112 Obs.) Matched stars (569 Obs.)
Age at death 56.44 57.00 6.44
Cohort 1975.66 1973 9.30 1975.50 1973 9.46
Cum. # publ. 85.51 68.50 79.33 89.17 60.00 102.10
Cum. # JIF-weighted publ. 179.20 87.16 225.41 184.73 106.15 234.02
Cum. # citations received 4794.02 2214.00 8027.73 3583.83 1671.00 5281.60
Cum. # grants 21.01 12.00 22.60 13.71 3.00 21.06
Cum. # R01 grants 1.07 0.00 1.53 0.56 0.00 1.36
Cum. # coauthors 114.63 74.50 105.75 112.44 72.00 130.66
Closeness 2.21E-06 2.26E-06 7.37E-07 2.14E-06 2.24E-06 7.05E-07
Betweenness 6.25E05 1.31E05 1.62E06 6.59E05 1.25E05 1.71E06
Eigenvector 1.50E-02 4.68E-07 1.13E-01 3.08E-04 2.15E-06 1.52E-03
Clustering coefficient 0.15 0.11 0.16 0.14 0.10 0.15
Triangle 5.06E02 2.72E02 6.54E02 6.47E02 2.83E02 1.09E03
B. Coauthor Level Treated coauthors (8,636 Obs.) Matched coauthors (8,636 Obs.)
Cohort 1984.79 1986 10.13 1984.54 1985.00 10.64
Cum. # publ. 18.44 7.00 30.09 19.35 7.00 34.78
Cum. # JIF-weighted publ. 31.43 11.15 58.36 30.87 9.37 62.92
Cum. # citations received 693.39 211.00 1615.93 675.42 174.00 1508.51
Cum. # MeSH codes 131.93 86.00 133.65 146.84 92.00 159.05
Cum. # coauthors 35.23 18.00 46.26 36.20 18.00 50.11
C. Coauthorship Level Treated pairs (8,635 Obs.) Control pairs (8,636 Obs.)
Strength of coauthorship 2.34 1.00 3.86 2.30 1.00 5.74
Recency of coauthorship 8.03 6.00 7.15 8.20 5.00 7.42
# non-redundant nodes 27.31 11.00 43.90 28.38 10.00 47.35
Brokerage degree 0.18 0.06 0.26 0.17 0.05 0.26
Neighborhood overlap 5.92 5.00 4.99 5.95 5.00 5.67
Notes: The unit of observation is the star (panel A), the coauthor of a star (panel B) and the star-coauthor pair (panel
C). The cohort is the year of first publication. All variables apart from the cohort are defined at the time of the death
of the star or pseudo-death of the matched star. The R01 grants are NIH grants awarded to individual researchers. The
strength of the coauthorship is the number of joint publications between the star and the coauthor, the recency of the
coauthorship is the number of years since the last joint publication before the death. The brokerage degree is the fraction
of non-redundant nodes offered by the star to his coauthor over all the links of the star as defined by equation 2.
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Figure B.3: Star Matching – Cohort
Figure B.4: Star Matching – Productivity
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Figure B.5: Star Matching – Connectedness
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Figure B.6: Star matching – Grant
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Figure B.7: Star matching – Closeness
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Figure B.8: Star matching – Betweenness
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Figure B.9: Star matching – Eigenvector Centrality
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Figure B.10: Star matching – Clustering Coeff.
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Figure B.11: Star matching – Triangle
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Figure B.12: Coauthor Matching – Cohort
Figure B.13: Coauthor Matching – Productivity
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Figure B.14: Coauthor Matching – Connectedness
Figure B.15: Coauthorship Matching – Brokerage degree
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Figure B.16: Coauthorship Matching – Strength of collaboration
Figure B.17: Coauthorship Matching – Recency of collaboration
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Figure B.18: Publication Trends for Treated and Control Coauthors
control
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Notes: Mean number of publications around the time of the death. The solid red line corresponds
to treated group (coauthors of star scientists who suddenly die) and the green line corresponds to the
control group (matched coauthors of star scientists).
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Figure B.19: Histogram: Brokerage Degree
0.0
2.5
5.0
7.5
10.0
12.5
0.00 0.25 0.50 0.75 1.00
Brokerage degree
de
ns
ity
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Table D3 Topics of deceased star scientists
Topics Count
Chemicals and Drugs [D] 865
Diseases [C] 653
Organisms [B] 567
Anatomy [A] 462
Analytical, Diagnostic and Therapeutic Techniques and Equipment [E] 368
Persons [M] 340
Biological Sciences [G] 245
Health Care [N] 108
Psychiatry and Psychology [F] 76
Geographic Locations [Z] 26
Anthropology, Education, Sociology and Social Phenomena [I] 19
Information Science [L] 8
Physical Sciences [H] 5
Technology and Food and Beverages [J] 3
Humanities [K] 1
Notes: The speciality of each scientist is defined by the modal topic up to the time
of death. In the case of multiple modal topics, all specialities are kept.
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Figure B.21: Histogram: brokerage degree in terms of topics
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Figure B.22: Publication trends for anticipated deaths
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Table B.11: Results over time
Sample: All deaths
Dep.Var.: Number of publications per year
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
pre-1979 1980-1984 1985-1989 1990-1994 1995-1999 2000-2004
post death -0.242 0.270** 0.199* 0.234** 0.013 0.045
(0.277) (0.095) (0.076) (0.074) (0.053) (0.041)
post death⇤bi j,death -0.620 -0.534 -1.260*** -1.112* -0.462* -0.585***
(0.489) (0.452) (0.307) (0.466) (0.228) (0.128)
R2 0.093 0.068 0.066 0.071 0.064 0.075
Nb. of obs. 1,974 11,098 50,371 58,555 139,126 171,931
Nb. of deceased 2 5 11 14 28 33
Nb. of coauthors 48 270 1,348 1,681 4,547 6,323
Notes: *** denotes significance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10%. OLS specifications including a full set of dyad fixed
effect, age and year dummies. Robust standard errors, clustered at the level of the star, are reported in the parentheses.
The dependent variables are the annual number of publications (winsorized at the 1% level). The sample in each column
includes the coauthors of stars scientists who died prior to 1980 (column 1), between 1980-1984 (column 2), between
1985-1989 (column 3), between 1990-1994 (column 4), between 1995-1999 (column 5) and between 2000-2004 (column
6) along with their appropriate control group. The variable post death is a dummy equal to one after the death of a star
for all his coauthors. The variable bi j,death is the fraction of non-redundant nodes offered by the star “j” to his coauthor
“i” at the time of his death.
Table B.12: Alternative measure of brokerage
Sample: Sudden deaths
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
# publ. per year # JIF-publ. per year # citations-publ. per year
post death -0.136*** 0.116** -0.271*** 0.471*** -13.221*** 3.982
(0.023) (0.040) (0.065) (0.115) (2.242) (3.260)
post death⇤#non  redundant -0.007*** -0.012*** -0.279***
nodesi j,death (0.001) (0.002) (0.060)
post death⇤degree j,death -0.0001 -0.002** -0.043**
(0.0001) (0.001) (0.016)
R2 0.066 0.071 0.036 0.040 0.031 0.033
Nb. of obs. 503,748 503,748 503,748 503,748 503,748 503,748
Nb. of coauthors 17,272 17,272 17,272 17,272 17,272 17,272
Notes: *** denotes significance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10%. OLS specifications includes a full set of dyad fixed effect, age and
year dummies. Robust standard errors, clustered at the level of the star, are reported in the parentheses. The dependent variables are
the annual number of publications (winsorized at the 1% level) in columns 1 and 2, the annual number of publication weighted by their
journal impact factors in columns 3 and 4 and the number of publications weighted by the number of citations received in columns 5
and 6. The sample includes the coauthors of star scientists who died suddenly (see table C2 in the appendix for a list of sudden causes
of deaths) along with their appropriate control coauthors. The variable post death is a dummy equal to one after the death of a star for
all his coauthors.
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Table B.13: Treated only
Sample: Sudden deaths
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
# publ. per year # JIF-publ. per year # citations-publ. per year
post death -0.229*** -0.054 -0.359*** -0.109 -17.582*** -12.240***
(0.035) (0.036) (0.061) (0.074) (2.941) (2.997)
post death⇤bi j,death -0.912*** -1.296*** -27.728**
(0.116) (0.237) (8.252)
R2 0.069 0.075 0.038 0.041 0.032 0.033
Nb. of obs. 251,283 251,283 251,283 251,283 251,283 251,283
Nb. of coauthors 8,636 8,636 8,636 8,636 8,636 8,636
Notes: *** denotes significance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10%. OLS specifications includes a full set of dyad fixed effect,
age and year dummies. Robust standard errors, clustered at the level of the star, are reported in the parentheses. The de-
pendent variables are the annual number of publications in columns 1 and 2, the annual number of publication weighted
by their journal impact factors in columns 3 and 4 and the annual number of publications weighted by the citations re-
ceived in columns 5 and 6. The sample includes the coauthors of star scientists who died suddenly (see table C2 in the
appendix for a list of sudden causes of deaths) along with their appropriate control coauthors. The variable post death is
a dummy equal to one after the death of a star for all his coauthors. The variable bi j,death is the fraction of non-redundant
nodes offered by the star “j” to his coauthor “i” at the time of his death.
Figure B.23: Dynamics of the Treatment Effect for Young Scientists
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Figure B.24: Dynamics of the Treatment Effect for Experienced Scientists
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Figure B.25: Dynamics on the Publications as First Author
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Figure B.26: Dynamics on the Publications as Last Author
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Classification
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Table C.1: Patent classification codes - Transport
CLEAN
B60K 1 Arrangement or mounting of electrical propulsion units
B60K 6 Arrangement or mounting of hybrid propulsion systems comprising
electric motors and internal combustion
B60L 3 Electric devices on electrically-propelled vehicles for safety purposes:
Monitoring operating variables e.g. speed, deceleration, power consumption
B60L 7 Dynamic electric regenerative braking
B60L 11 Electric propulsion with power supplied within the vehicle
B60L 15 Methods, circuits, or devices for controlling the traction-motor speed
of electrically-propelled vehicles
B60R 16 Electric or fluid circuits specially adapted for vehicles and not otherwise provided for
B60S 5 Supplying batteries to, or removing batteries form
B60W 10 Conjoint control of vehicles sub-units of different type or different function
B60W 20 Control systems specially adapted for hybrid vehicles
H01M Fuel cells
GREY
F02M 39/71 Fuel injection apparatus
F02M 3/02-05 Idling devices for carburettors preventing flow of idling fue
F02M 23 Apparatus for adding secondary air to fuel-air mixture
F02M 25 Engine-pertinent apparatus for adding non-fuel substances or small quantities
of secondary fuel to combustion-air, main fuel, or fuel-air mixture
F02D 41 Electric control of supply of combustion mixture or its constituents
F02B 47/06 Methods of operating engines involving adding non-fuel substances or
anti-knock agents to combustion air, fuel, or fuel-air mixtures of engines,
the substances including non-airborne oxygen
DIRTY
F02B Internal-combustion piston engines; combustion engines in genera
F02D Controlling combustion engines
F02F Cylinders, pistons, or casings for combustion engines;
arragement of sealings in combustion engines
F02M Supplying combustion engines with combustiles mixtures or constituents thereof
F02N Starting of combustion engines
F02P Ignition (other than compression ignition) for internal-combustion engines
235
Table C.2: Patent classification codes - Electricity Production
CLEAN
Y02E10 Energy generation through renewable energy sources
Y02E30 Energy generation of nuclear origin
E02B9/08 Tide or wave power plants
F03B13/10-26 Submerged units incorporating electric generators or motors characterized
by using wave or tide energy
F03D Wind motors
F03G4 Devices for producing mechanical power from geothermal energy
F03G6 Devices for producing mechanical power from solar energy
F03G7/05 Ocean thermal energy conversion
F24J2 Use of solar heat, e.g. solar heat collectors
F24J3/08 Production or use of heat, not derived from combustion using geothermal heat
F26B3/28 Drying solid materials or objects by processes involving the application of
heat by radiation, e.g. from the sun
GREY
Y02E50 Technologies for the production of fuel of non-fossil origin
Y02E20/10 Combined combustion
Y02E20/12 Heat utilisation in combustion or incineration of waste
Y02E20/14 Combined heat and power generation
Y02E20/16 Combined cycle power plant, or combined cycle gas turbine
Y02E20/18 Integrated gasification combined cycle
Y02E20/30 Technologies for a more efficient combustion or heat usage
Y02E20/32 Direct C02 mitigation
Y02E20/34 Indirect C02 mitigation, by acting on non C02 directly related matters of
the process, more efficient use of fuels
Y02E20/36 Heat recovery other than air pre-heating
DIRTY
C10G1 Production of liquid hydrocarbon mixtures from oil-shale, oil-sand, or non-melting solid
carbonaceous or similar materials, e.g. wood, coal, oil-sand, or the like B03B
C10L1 Fuel
C10J Production of fuel gases by carburetting air or other gases
E02B Hydraulic engineering
F01K Steam engine plans; steam accumulators; engine plants not otherwise provided for;
engines using special working fluids or cycles
F02C Gas-turbine plants; air intakes for jet-propulsion plants; controlling fuel supply
in air-breathing jet-propulsion plants
F22 Steam generation
F23 Combustion apparatus; combustion processes
F24J Production or use of heat not otherwise provided for
F27 Furnaces; kilns; ovens; retorts
F28 Heat exchange in general
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Patent Examples
Figure C.1: Patent example US6026921A
238 Appendix C. Appendix to Chapter 4
Figure C.2: Patent example US6727670B1
239
Figure C.3: Patent example US8036340B2
240 Appendix C. Appendix to Chapter 4
PatentRank Results
Table C.4: Within vs. across-country spillovers
(1) (2) (3)
Dep. var. PatentRank PatentRank PatentRank
for “national” citations for “international” citations
Clean invention 0.292*** 0.285*** 0.361***
(0.014) (0.017) (0.013)
Number of patents -0.031*** -0.035*** -0.042***
(0.005) (0.006) (0.005)
Family size 0.067*** 0.062*** 0.073***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Triadic 0.241*** 0.240** 0.331***
(0.026) (0.020) (0.033)
Granted 0.491*** 0.435*** 0.731***
(0.021) (0.016) (0.028)
Obs. 1,149,988 1,149,988 1,149,988
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses (* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001). The dependent variables are the PatentRank index
(column 1), the PatentRank index on the pool of national citations (column 2), and the PatentRank index on the pool of international
citations (column 3). All columns are estimated by Poisson pseudo-maximum likelihood and include patent office-by-year and month
fixed effects.
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Table C.5: Government spending
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Sample All Transport Electricity
Dep. var. PatentRank index
Clean invention 0.345*** 0.353*** 0.153** 0.149** 0.339** 0.347**
(0.028) (0.026) (0.052) (0.052) (0.028) (0.026)
Government spending 0.022*** -0.020 0.021**
(0.007) (0.155) (0.006)
Number of patents 0.012 0.013 -0.040** -0.040** 0.013 0.014
(0.008) (0.008) (0.015) (0.015) (0.008) (0.008)
Family size 0.060*** 0.059*** 0.057*** 0.057*** 0.059*** 0.059***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.015) (0.015) (0.004) (0.004)
Triadic 0.285*** 0.284*** 0.391*** 0.394*** 0.274*** 0.273***
(0.037) (0.037) (0.076) (0.076) (0.037) (0.037)
Granted 0.360*** 0.360*** 0.534*** 0.535*** 0.359*** 0.358***
(0.017) (0.017) (0.032) (0.032) (0.017) (0.017)
Obs. 497,439 497,439 16,719 16,719 489,531 489,531
Source: International Energy Agency (2013): Energy Technology Research and Development Database (Edition: 2013). Mimas, University of
Manchester
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses (* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001). The dependent variable is the PatentRank index. The sam-
ple includes clean and dirty inventions from the transport sector (columns 3 and 4), electricity sector (columns 5 and 6) and both transport and
electricity sectors (columns 1 and 2) . All columns are estimated by Poisson pseudo-maximum likelihood and include patent office-by-year and
month fixed effects.
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Table C.6: University and Firms
(1) (2)
Dep. var. PatentRank index
Clean invention 0.293*** 0.298***
(0.013) (0.013)
Number of patents -0.019*** -0.022***
(0.004) (0.004)
Family size 0.063*** 0.060***
(0.003) (0.003)
Triadic 0.237*** 0.229***
(0.024) (0.024)
Granted 0.561*** 0.552***
(0.021) (0.021)
University 0.276***
(0.014)
Firms 0.206***
(0.011)
Obs. 826,078 826,078
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses (* p<0.05, ** p<0.01,
*** p<0.001). The dependent variable is the total number of citations
received excluding self-citations by inventors (columns 1 and 2) and
the PatentRank index (columns 3 and 4). All columns are estimated
by Poisson pseudo-maximum likelihood and include patent office-by-
year and month fixed effects.
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Table C.7: Adding inventor and inventor fixed effect
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dep. var. PatentRank index
Clean invention 0.216*** 0.259*** 0.274*** 0.272***
(0.004) (0.006) (0.017) (0.027)
Number of patents -0.028*** -0.023*** -0.002 -0.024***
(0.002) (0.003) (0.007) (0.008)
Family size 0.027*** 0.077*** 0.082*** 0.085***
(0.002) (0.004) (0.006) (0.009)
Triadic 0.598*** 0.405*** 0.250*** 0.254***
(0.009) (0.015) (0.042) (0.056)
Granted 0.721*** 0.572*** 0.562*** 0.574***
(0.005) (0.007) (0.024) (0.025)
fixed effect no inventor no applicant
Obs. 697,192 697,192 435,584 435,584
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses (* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001). The dependent variable
is the total number of citations received excluding self-citations by inventors. All columns are estimated by
Poisson pseudo-maximum likelihood and include patent office, sector, year and month fixed effects.
Table C.8: Intra vs. inter-sectoral spillovers
(1) (2) (3)
Dep. var. PatentRank PatentRank PatentRank
intra-sectoral inter-sectoral
Clean invention 0.292*** 0.336*** 0.248***
(0.014) (0.016) (0.016)
Number of patents -0.031*** -0.044*** -0.160***
(0.005) (0.006) (0.007)
Family size 0.067*** 0.067*** 0.068***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Triadic 0.241*** 0.246*** 0.259***
(0.026) (0.025) (0.025)
Granted 0.491*** 0.456*** 0.521***
(0.021) (0.021) (0.017)
Obs. 1,149,988 1,149,988 1,149,988
Notes: Robust standard errors, p-values in parentheses (* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001). The
dependent variables are PatentRank index (column 1), PatentRank index on citations within their
own technological field (based on IPC 3 digit code) (column 2), and the PatentRank index on cita-
tions across across technological field (column 3). All columns are estimated by Poisson pseudo-
maximum likelihood and include patent office-by-year and month fixed effects.
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Table C.9: Generality and originality as controls
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dep. var. PatentRank index
Clean invention 0.193*** 0.179*** 0.193*** 0.178***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Number of patents -0.010*** 0.019*** -0.003 0.016***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Family size 0.026*** 0.022*** 0.025*** 0.023***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Triadic 0.130*** 0.110*** 0.127*** 0.111***
(0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006)
Granted 0.245*** 0.203*** 0.240*** 0.204***
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
Generality 0.628*** 0.663***
(0.010) (0.010)
Originality 0.127*** -0.097***
(0.006) (0.008)
Obs. 281,978 281,978 281,978 281,978
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses (* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001). The dependent vari-
able is the total number of citations received, corrected for self-citations by inventors. All columns are esti-
mated by Poisson pseudo-maximum likelihood and include patent office-by-year and month fixed effects.
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Table C.10: Controlling for age of technological field
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dep. var. PatentRank index
Clean invention 0.283*** 0.267*** 0.257*** 0.247***
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.012)
Number of patents -0.053*** -0.029*** -0.023*** -0.023***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Family size 0.065*** 0.063*** 0.063*** 0.063***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Triadic 0.236*** 0.227*** 0.210*** 0.202***
(0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025)
Granted 0.487*** 0.480*** 0.474*** 0.470***
(0.021) (0.021) (0.020) (0.020)
Age of tech field -0.117*** 0.233***
(0.006) (0.014)
Age of tech fieldˆ2 -0.023***
(0.001)
Age of tech dummies no no no yes
Obs. 1,149,237 1,149,237 1,149,237 1,149,237
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses (* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001). The dependent variable is
the PatentRank index. All columns are estimated by Poisson pseudo-maximum likelihood and include patent
office-by-year and month fixed effects.
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Table C.11: Clean, Grey and True Dirty
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Sample Clean vs. Clean vs. Grey vs. Clean vs.
Grey and true Dirty Grey True Dirty True Dirty
Dep. var. PatentRank index
Clean/Grey invention 0.292*** 0.121*** 0.190*** 0.331***
(0.014) (0.012) (0.016) (0.015)
Number of patents -0.031*** -0.006 -0.084*** -0.029***
(0.005) (0.008) (0.004) (0.005)
Family size 0.067*** 0.059*** 0.065*** 0.065***
(0.003) (0.006) (0.004) (0.003)
Triadic 0.241*** 0.278*** 0.238*** 0.240***
(0.025) (0.045) (0.028) (0.026)
Granted 0.491*** 0.520*** 0.508*** 0.456***
(0.021) (0.022) (0.022) (0.019)
Obs. 1,149,988 326,942 978,179 1,006,996
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses (* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001). The dependent variable is the PatentRank
index. The sample includes clean, grey and truly dirty (column 1), clean and grey (column 2), grey and truly dirty (column
3), and clean and truly dirty (column 4) inventions. All columns are estimated by Poisson pseudo-maximum likelihood and
include patent office-by-year and month fixed effects.
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Table C.12: Spillovers from clean and other new technologies
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Baseline sector IT Biotechs Nano Robot 3D
Dep. var. PatentRank index
Clean invention -0.039 0.131*** -0.249*** -0.096* -0.120***
(0.028) (0.023) (0.040) (0.043) (0.018)
Number of patents -0.031*** -0.029*** 0.023*** 0.014 0.018*
(0.005) (0.006) (0.008) (0.078) (0.008)
Family size 0.017*** 0.029*** 0.052*** 0.053*** 0.052***
(0.003) (0.004) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Triadic 0.421*** 0.435*** 0.329*** 0.337*** 0.333***
(0.050) (0.042) (0.055) (0.054) (0.055)
Granted 0.604*** 0.413*** 0.441*** 0.443*** 0.448***
(0.040) (0.017) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025)
Observations 1,445,552 403,294 180,441 198,602 185,726
Notes: Robust standard errors, p-values in parentheses (* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001). The dependent variable is the
PatentRank index. The sample includes all clean patents (transport and electricity) and patents from the following technolo-
gies: IT (column 1), biotechs (column 2), nano (column 3), robot (column 4), and 3D (column 5). All columns are estimated
by Poisson pseudo-maximum likelihood and include patent office-by-year and month fixed effects.
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Figure C.4: Clean, grey, dirty, and radically new technologies vs. all other technologies –
PageRank index
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Table C.13: Comparing spillovers from clean and dirty within new technologies
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Sector IT Biotechs Nano Robot 3D
Dep. var. PatentRank index
Clean invention 0.129* 0.422*** 0.189 0.349 0.290
(0.053) (0.067) (0.100) (0.325) (0.461)
Number of patents -0.037*** -0.074*** 0.033 -0.062** -0.080***
(0.006) (0.005) (0.023) (0.023) (0.014)
Family size 0.017*** 0.028*** 0.070*** 0.088*** 0.056***
(0.003) (0.004) (0.013) (0.009) (0.011)
Triadic 0.401*** 0.406*** 0.341*** 0.261*** 0.305**
(0.049) (0.041) (0.070) (0.057) (0.060)
Granted 0.624*** 0.342*** 0.424*** 0.443*** 0.571***
(0.044) (0.019) (0.075) (0.042) (0.044)
Observations 1,270,842 227,100 1,481 22,266 9,359
Notes: Robust standard errors, p-values in parentheses (* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001). The dependent variable is the
PatentRank. The sample includes patents from the following technologies: IT (column 1), bioechs (column 2), nano (column
3), robot (column 4), and 3D (column 5). All columns are estimated by Poisson pseudo-maximum likelihood and include
patent office-by-year and month fixed effects.
Table C.14: Spillovers from clean and CCS technologies
Dep. var. PatentRank index
Clean invention 0.045
(0.023)
Number of patents 0.057***
(0.010)
Family size 0.055***
(0.005)
Triadic 0.271***
(0.047)
Granted 0.338***
(0.019)
Observations 106,700
Notes: Robust standard errors, p-values in parentheses (*
p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001). The dependent variable
is the total number of citations received, corrected for self-
citations by inventors. The sample includes clean electricity
production inventions and CO2 Capture and Storage technol-
ogy. All columns are estimated by Poisson pseudo-maximum
likelihood and include patent office-by-year and month fixed
effects.
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Additional Results
Table C.15: Government spending
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Sample Transport Electricity
Dep. var. Citations received
Clean invention 0.253** 0.253*** 0.483*** 0.497***
(0.077) (0.079) (0.026) (0.026)
Government spending -0.001 0.032***
(0.033) (0.007)
Number of patents -0.070*** -0.070*** -0.006 -0.005
(0.020) (0.020) (0.009) (0.009)
Family size 0.054*** 0.054*** 0.066*** 0.066***
(0.012) (0.012) (0.004) (0.004)
Triadic 0.474*** 0.474*** 0.447*** 0.445***
(0.093) (0.094) (0.046) (0.047)
Granted 0.776*** 0.776*** 0.696*** 0.695***
(0.055) (0.055) (0.026) (0.026)
Obs. 16,703 16,703 488,896 488,896
Source: International Energy Agency (2013): Energy Technology Research and Development Database (Edi-
tion: 2013). Mimas, University of Manchester
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses (* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001). The dependent variable is
the total number of citations received excluding self-citations by inventors. The sample includes clean and dirty
inventions from the transport sector (columns 3 and 4), electricity sector (columns 5 and 6) and both transport
and electricity sectors (columns 1 and 2) . All columns are estimated by Poisson pseudo-maximum likelihood
and include patent office-by-year and month fixed effects.
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Table C.18: Generality and originality as controls
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dep. var. Citations received
Clean invention 0.365*** 0.332*** 0.363*** 0.332***
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
Number of patents -0.044*** 0.007 -0.025*** 0.006
(0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005)
Family size 0.043*** 0.039*** 0.041*** 0.039***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Triadic 0.296*** 0.264*** 0.287*** 0.264***
(0.014) (0.013) (0.014) (0.013)
Granted 0.673*** 0.591*** 0.659*** 0.592***
(0.023) (0.021) (0.022) (0.021)
Generality 1.149*** 1.164***
(0.019) (0.019)
Originality 0.371*** -0.036*
(0.015) (0.015)
Obs. 281,978 281,978 281,978 281,978
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses (* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001). The dependent vari-
able is the total number of citations received, corrected for self-citations by inventors. All columns are esti-
mated by Poisson pseudo-maximum likelihood and include patent office-by-year and month fixed effects.
Table C.19: Comparing the generality of clean and other new technologies
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Sector IT Biotechs Nano Robot 3D
Dep. var. Originality measure
Clean invention -0.050*** -0.059*** 0.009 -0.130*** -0.184***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.018) (0.004) (0.006)
Number of patents -0.070*** -0.033*** -0.049*** -0.051*** -0.051***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Family size 0.003*** 0.002*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.005***
(0.0004) (0.0003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Triadic 0.010*** 0.005 0.014*** 0.015*** 0.014**
(0.002) (0.002) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004)
Granted 0.020*** -0.003 0.029*** 0.027*** 0.027***
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Observations 520,978 155,701 59,651 67,115 62,559
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses (* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001). The dependent variable is the originality
measure. The sample includes all clean inventions (automobile and electricity production sectors) and inventions from the fol-
lowing technologies: IT (column 1), biotechs (column 2), nano (column 3), robot (column 4), and 3D (column 5). All columns
are estimated by OLS and include patent office-by-year and month fixed effects.
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Table C.20: Comparing the generality of clean and other new technologies
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Sector IT Biotechs Nano Robot 3D
Dep. var. Generality measure
Clean invention -0.047*** -0.052*** 0.009 -0.126*** -0.204***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.022) (0.004) (0.006)
Number of patents -0.063*** -0.034*** -0.048*** -0.050*** -0.050***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Family size 0.004*** 0.003*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.008***
(0.0005) (0.0003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Triadic 0.013*** 0.016*** 0.022*** 0.023*** 0.020***
(0.002) (0.003) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004)
Granted 0.022*** 0.022*** 0.041*** 0.038*** 0.039***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Obs. 723,257 207,073 94,437 103,972 98,461
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses (* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001). The dependent variable is the generality
measure. The sample includes all clean patents (automobile and electricity production sectors) and patents from the following
technologies: IT (column 1), biotechs (column 2), nano (column 3), robot (column 4), and 3D (column 5). All columns are
estimated by OLS and include patent office-by-year and month fixed effects.
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Robustness Checks
Five Years Window
As in section 4.2.4 we look at the number of citations received within a five-year
window to at least partially overcome the truncation bias that is due to the fact that we
observe citations for only a portion of the life of an invention, with the duration of that
portion varying across patent cohorts (see Table C.21). The coefficients obtained for
the clean dummy barely change.
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Discarding Citations
We discard citations added by patent examiners in Table C.22.1 By restricting the
citation counts to the ones made by the applicant only, we address the concern that
patent citations added by examiners might not capture actual knowledge spillovers.
The results obtained when all sectors are pooled together barely change but the only
noticeable difference is that the clean dummy is no longer significant on the fuel sector
when citations added by examiners are excluded. Jaffe and Trajtenberg (1999)) find that
patent assigned to the same firm are more likely to cite each other. We therefore correct
for self-citations at the level of the applicant (the firm or the individual who filed the
patent) rather than at the level of individual inventors in Table C.23. The results don’t
change qualitatively.
Additional Controls
We add a number of additional controls variables for patent quality in Table C.24. The
claims specify the components of the patent invention and hence represent the scope of
the invention (Lanjouw and Schankerman (1999)). This information is only available
in our patent database for a limited number of patent offices, implying that our sample
size is significantly reduced. For this reason we do not include the number of claims
in our baseline regressions, but overall the results barely change (coefficient on clean
= 0.403***). The number of IPC3 codes is added in order to control for the fact that
certain inventions belong to multiple IPC codes. These inventions are likely to be more
general and therefore more cited. This effect however does not appear to downplay the
clean advantage in terms of spillovers. Finally, we add the number of inventors and still
find that clean inventions are
Various subsamples
In Table C.26 we look at different subsamples. We start by restricting the sample to
patents that received at least one citation. Given that a large fraction of patents (69%)
are never cited, spillovers from clean technologies might be biased if there are dispro-
portionately more dirty patents that are never cited. We also look at highly valuable in-
1Note that we restrict the sample to patent offices for which distinction between citation added by
patent examiner or applicant is made.
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Table C.24: Additional controls
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dep. var. Citations received
Clean invention 0.404*** 0.432*** 0.427*** 0.432*** 0.428*** 0.432***
(0.015) (0.014) (0.015) (0.014) (0.014) (0.015)
Number of patents -0.032*** -0.020*** -0.005*** -0.049*** -0.057*** -0.013
(0.005) (0.008) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Family size 0.033*** 0.065*** 0.061*** 0.062*** 0.056*** 0.013***
(0.002) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003)
Triadic 0.239*** 0.464*** 0.281*** 0.401*** 0.447*** 0.229***
(0.012) (0.042) (0.022) (0.029) (0.034) (0.019)
Granted 0.750*** 0.938*** 0.922*** 0.894*** 0.941*** 0.855***
(0.025) (0.000) (0.028) (0.030) (0.030) (0.028)
# claims 0.010***
(0.0004)
# IPC 3 0.103*** 0.092***
(0.013) (0.005)
# inventors 0.321*** 0.341***
(0.014) (0.167)
# citations made 0.018*** 0.017***
(0.001) (0.001)
# applicants 0.009*** -0.008***
(0.0010) (0.001)
Obs. 175,298 1,161,160 865,607 1,161,160 1,161,160
Notes: Robust standard errors, p-values in parentheses (* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001). The dependent variable is the total number of cita-
tions received, excluding self-citations by the inventor (columns 1 to 3) and the PatentRank index on the sample of citations excluding self-citations
by the inventor (colums 4 to 6). The sample includes clean or dirty technologies in the automobile and electricity production sectors. All columns
are estimated by Poisson pseudo-maximum likelihood and include patent office-by-year-by-sector fixed effects, and month fixed effects.
ventions by focusing on triadic patents (i.e., patents that have been filed at the USPTO,
the EPO and the Japan Patent Office, see above). This can give us some insight into
whether the clean advantage is still present for the upper part of the distribution. In
addition, we restrict our sample to patents filed at the US patent office and at the Euro-
pean Patent Office. None of these tests modify our main finding (coefficient on clean
between 0.319*** and 0.469***).
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Table C.25: Additional controls
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dep. var. PatentRank index
Clean invention 0.239*** 0.295*** 0.294*** 0.294*** 0.291*** 0.298***
(0.009) (0.014) (0.013) (0.014) (0.014) (0.013)
Number of patents -0.0002 -0.005 -0.022*** -0.027*** -0.031*** 0.003***
(0.002) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004)
Family size 0.021*** 0.061*** 0.023*** 0.059*** 0.058*** 0.023***
(0.001) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002)
Triadic 0.120*** 0.244*** 0.138*** 0.193*** 0.236*** 0.095***
(0.005) (0.030) (0.017) (0.022) (0.026) (0.014)
Granted 0.336*** 0.484*** 0.517*** 0.462*** 0.488*** 0.475***
(0.016) (0.021) (0.018) (0.019) (0.021) (0.017)
# claims 0.004***
(0.0002)
# IPC 3 0.077*** 0.062***
(0.007) (0.003)
# inventors 0.216*** 0.238***
(0.009) (0.010)
# citations made 0.014*** 0.012***
(0.001) (0.001)
# applicants 0.006*** -0.008
(0.002) (0.001)
Obs. 175,298 1,161,160 865,607 1,161,160 1,161,160
Notes: Robust standard errors, p-values in parentheses (* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001). The dependent variable is the PatentRank index on
the sample of citations received, excluding self-citations by the inventor. The sample includes clean or dirty technologies in the automobile and
electricity production sectors. All columns are estimated by Poisson pseudo-maximum likelihood and include patent office-by-year-by-sector
fixed effects, and month fixed effects
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Table C.26: Different subsamples
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Sample No zero triadic US patent office EU patent office
Dep. var. Citations received
Clean invention 0.321*** 0.387*** 0.429*** 0.491***
(0.012) (0.019) (0.019) (0.050)
Number of patents -0.045*** -0.041*** -0.054*** -0.010
(0.005) (0.008) (0.009) (0.019)
Family size 0.056*** 0.021*** 0.049*** 0.048***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.011)
Triadic 0.365*** 0.134*** 0.447***
(0.022) (0.021) (0.048)
Granted 0.625*** 0.663*** 0.957*** 0.641***
(0.025) (0.045) (0.069) (0.045)
Obs. 514,865 45,129 134,664 10,248
Notes: Robust standard errors, p-values in parentheses (* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001). The dependent variable is the
total number of citations received, excluding self-citations by the inventor The sample includes (i) patents that receive at least
one citation in column 1; (ii) triadic patents (filed at EPO, USPTO and JPO) in column 2; (iii) patents first filed in the US patent
office only in column 3; (iv) patents first filed in the European patent office only in column 4. All columns are estimated by
Poisson pseudo-maximum likelihood and include patent office-by-year-by-sector fixed effects, and month fixed effects.
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Table C.27: Different subsamples
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Sample nozero triadic US patent office EU patent office
Dep. var. PatentRank index
Clean invention 0.173*** 0.212*** 0.254*** 0.340***
(0.008) (0.009) (0.014) (0.032)
Number of patents -0.013*** -0.003 -0.016*** -0.007
(0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.008)
Family size 0.039*** 0.007*** 0.031*** 0.038***
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003)
Triadic 0.164*** 0.070*** 0.234***
(0.013) (0.010) (0.023)
Granted 0.249*** 0.294*** 0.573*** 0.337***
(0.016) (0.024) (0.040) (0.026)
Observations 514,865 45,129 134,664 10,248
Notes: Robust standard errors, p-values in parentheses (* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001). The dependent variable is the
PatentRank index on the sample of citations received, corrected for self-citations by inventors. The sample includes (i) patents
that receive at least one citation in column 1; (ii) triadic patents (filed at EPO, USPTO and JPO) in column 2; (iii) patents
first filed in the US patent office only in column 3; (iv) patents first filed in the European patent office only in column 4. All
columns are estimated by Poisson pseudo-maximum likelihood and include patent office-by-year-by-sector fixed effects, and
month fixed effects.
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